FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 03 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT C. WHITE, No. 13-56787
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-04622-RGK-JC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EASTSIDE UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Vincent C. White appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his employment action alleging disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
retaliation claims under Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir.
2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on White’s disparate
treatment claim because White failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether his job performance was satisfactory, or whether similarly situated
individuals outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. See id. at
603 (requirements for disparate treatment claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on White’s disparate
impact claim because White failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the
substitute teacher evaluation form caused a disparate impact. See Stout v. Potter,
276 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is not sufficient to present evidence
raising an inference of discrimination on a disparate impact claim. The plaintiff
must actually prove the discriminatory impact at issue.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 1123 (“[T]he probative value of any
statistical comparison is limited by the small available sample.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on White’s retaliation
claim because White failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was a
causal link between the protected activity and an adverse employment action. See
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Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (elements of a prima
facie case of retaliation).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying White’s discovery
requests and his Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion because White failed to show that the
discovery he requested was essential to oppose summary judgment. See Getz v.
Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a plaintiff must show that the discovery
sought would have precluded summary judgment); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d
732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial court has broad discretion to deny a motion to
compel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying White’s motion for
reconsideration because White failed to demonstrate any grounds for relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and explaining circumstances
warranting reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant costs in
the amount of $3,448.00. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944
n.12 & at 945-46 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that the district court reasonably exercised discretion in determining that the
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reasons advanced by the losing party were not sufficiently persuasive to overcome
the presumption of a fee award).
We reject White’s contentions that the district court judge was biased and
improperly denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
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