NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT C. WHITE, No. 18-55691
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-08875-PA-AGR
v.
MEMORANDUM**
BARBARA M. BARRETT*, Secretary,
United States Air Force,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2020***
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Vincent C. White appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his employment action alleging violations of Title VII and the Age
*
Barbara M. Barrett has been substituted for her predecessor, Deborah
James, as Secretary of the United States Air Force under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego, 763
F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on White’s disparate
treatment and retaliation claims because White failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
not hiring him were pretextual. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888-
91 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
for a Title VII claim; explaining that the framework also applies to an ADEA
claim); see also Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 953-55 (9th Cir. 2007)
(setting forth requirements for retaliation claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on White’s disparate
impact claims because White failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendant’s facially-neutral employment practices had a significantly
disproportionate impact on any protected class. See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118,
1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing prima facie case of disparate impact).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying White’s motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because White failed to comply with
the requirements of Rule 56(d). See Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home
Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of
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review and requirements for a party seeking a continuance to conduct additional
discovery essential to oppose summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying White’s motion for
reconsideration because White failed to demonstrate any grounds for relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and explaining circumstances
warranting reconsideration).
We reject as without merit White’s contention that the district court should
have entered a spoliation of evidence order.
AFFIRMED.
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