TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-00-00380-CV
John M. Cutney, Jr. and Elizabeth Cutney, Appellants
v.
Wayne Lesser and Lou Ellen MacNaughton, Appellees
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 98-0-109, HONORABLE CHARLES RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDING
John M. Cutney, Jr. and Elizabeth Cutney ("the Cutneys")and Wayne Lesser and
Lou Ellen MacNaughton share a common boundary between their respective properties in
Caldwell County. The Cutneys sued Lesser and MacNaughton contending a fence built by the
Lessers encroached on their side of the boundary line. The parties agreed to submit their dispute
to arbitration. The arbitrator denied all relief requested by the Cutneys and awarded
MacNaughton $5,000 in damages on their counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The trial court confirmed the arbitrator's award. The Cutneys raise four issues on appeal
We affirm.
In their first and third issues, the Cutneys argue that the trial court erred by failing to recognize a common law ground for vacating the arbitrator's award. Citing Lee v. El Paso County, 965 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1998, pet. denied), they assert that the award violated public policy and therefore should have been vacated. See Lee v. El Paso County, 965 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1998, pet. denied). We disagree. The Lee case involved a dispute over a "buy back" provision in a collective bargaining agreement for unused sick leave. The arbitrator ordered the county to pay the disputed unused sick leave. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county. On appeal, the court concluded that the award was against public policy. Id. at 673. The public policy at issue was the "use of government funds." Id. This case is distinguishable from Lee. Here, the facts involve a private dispute and do not involve public funds. We decline to apply the public policy exception from Lee. Accordingly, we overrule issues one and three.
In their second issue, the Cutneys argue that the arbitrator's award constituted an abuse of discretion and was against the preponderance of the evidence. In their fourth issue, the Cutneys contend that the trial court erred in affirming the arbitrator's award of $5,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress contending that the evidence presented at the arbitration was legally and factually insufficient to support the award.(1) In both issues, the Cutneys misstate the standard of review of an arbitrator's award.
Review of arbitration awards is extraordinarily narrow. Cooper v. Bushong, 10 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999, pet. denied) (citing Faulconer, Inc. v. HFI Ltd. Partnership, 970 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1998, no pet.)). We must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the award. Cooper, 10 S.W.3d at 24. A court can set aside an arbitration award only if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) the rights of a party were prejudiced by evident partiality, corruption, misconduct, or wilful behavior by an arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his powers, refused to postpone the hearing, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or conducted the hearing contrary to the General Arbitration Act, in a manner that substantially prejudiced the rights of the parities; or (4) there was no agreement to arbitrate, the issue was not adversely determined in a proceeding to compel or stay arbitration, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. Cooper, 10 S.W.3d at 24-25; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088(a) (West Supp. 2000).
An award can be modified or corrected only if: (1) the award contains an evident miscalculation of numbers, or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) the arbitrator has made an award with respect to a matter not submitted to him and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision made with respect to the issues that were submitted; or (3) the form of the award is imperfect in a manner not affecting the merits of the controversy. Cooper 10 S.W.3d at 25; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.091(a) (West Supp. 2000).
A mere mistake of fact or law is insufficient to set aside an award; only those errors of fact or law that result in a fraud or some great and manifest wrong and injustice warrant setting aside an arbitration award. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) (citing Island on Lake Travis, Ltd. v. Hayman Co. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992), writ granted w.r.m., 848 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1993)). Absent a statutory or common law ground to vacate or modify an arbitration award, a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to review other complaints, including the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award. J.J. Gregory Gourmet Servs., Inc. v. Antone's Import Co., 927 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
Because the Cutneys have failed to articulate grounds for challenging the arbitration
award as set out in sections 171.088 (a) or 171.091 (a), they have presented nothing for this Court
to review by their second and fourth issues. Accordingly, we overrule issues two and four.
Having overruled appellants' issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
J. Woodfin Jones, Justice
Before Justices Jones, Kidd and Yeakel
Affirmed
Filed: December 21, 2000
Do Not Publish
1. The Lessers counterclaimed for damages after Mr. Cutney fired a gun in MacNaughton's presence when she approached the Lesser's home attempting to retrieve her dog.
pet. denied). We disagree. The Lee case involved a dispute over a "buy back" provision in a collective bargaining agreement for unused sick leave. The arbitrator ordered the county to pay the disputed unused sick leave. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county. On appeal, the court concluded that the award was against public policy. Id. at 673. The public policy at issue was the "use of government funds." Id. This case is distinguishable from Lee. Here, the facts involve a private dispute and do not involve public funds. We decline to apply the public policy exception from Lee. Accordingly, we overrule issues one and three.
In their second issue, the Cutneys argue that the arbitrator's award constituted an abuse of discretion and was against the preponderance of the evidence. In their fourth issue, the Cutneys contend that the trial court erred in affirming the arbitrator's award of $5,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress contending that the evidence presented at the arbitration was legally and factually insufficient to support the award.(1) In both issues, the Cutneys misstate the standard of review of an arbitrator's award.
Review of arbitration awards is extraordinarily narrow. Cooper v. Bushong, 10 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999, pet. denied) (citing Faulconer, Inc. v. HFI Ltd. Partnership, 970 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1998, no pet.)). We must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the award. Cooper, 10 S.W.3d at 24. A court can set aside an arbitration award only if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) the rights of a party were prejudiced by evident partiality, corruption, misconduct, or wilful behavior by an arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his powers, refused to postpone the hearing, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or conducted the hearing contrary to the General Arbitration Act, in a manner that substantially prejudiced the rights of the parities; or (4) there was no agreement to arbitrate, the issue was not adversely determined in a proceeding to compel or stay arbitration, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. Cooper, 10 S.W.3d at 24-25; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088(a) (West Supp. 2000).
An award can be modified or corrected only if: (1) the award contains an evident miscalc