OPINION
No. 04-03-00162-CR
Clifford McLEAN,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From County Court at Law No. 2, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. CCL-02-1148
Honorable Frank Follis, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice
Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice
Paul W. Green, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 28, 2004
AFFIRMED
Appellant Clifford McLean was charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. McLean subsequently filed a motion to suppress. Following a hearing, the motion was denied. On February 3, 2003, McLean entered a plea of nolo contendre and was sentenced to 12 months probation and a $2,000 fine. McLean now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress in two issues.
In both his first and second issues, McLean argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress "any and all evidence seized or obtained as a result of illegal acts on behalf of the State." Specifically, McLean avers that there was no probable cause or exigent circumstances to justify the traffic stop made by State Trooper Edward Riojas, and that the trial court's denial of the motion was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. As such, he contends any evidence obtained as a result of this stop should not be admissible at trial.
Standard of Review
Motions to suppress are subject to a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts and rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns upon the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Morfin v. State, 34 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Appellate courts are not at liberty to disturb the trial court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by the record. However, we decide de novo whether the trial court erred in misapplying the law to the facts. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87-88; Morfin, 34 S.W.3d at 666.
Motion to Suppress
McLean's written motion to suppress attacks the validity of the traffic stop made by Trooper Riojas because McLean believes the stop was made without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or exigent circumstances. An officer may lawfully stop and detain a person for a traffic violation. McVickers v. State, 874 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). To justify a traffic stop, the officer must have observed specific and articulable facts which, in light of the officer's experience and personal knowledge, together with rational inferences from these facts, would warrant a reasonable person to believe a traffic violation had occurred. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Texas law requires that a tail lamp or separate lamp "be constructed to emit a white light that: (1) illuminates the rear license plate and (2) makes the plate clearly visible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 542.301(a), 547.322(f)(Vernon 1999). The failure to do so constitutes a traffic offense. Id. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper Riojas testified that he stopped McLean because, as McLean's vehicle passed him from the opposite direction, he turned and noticed the vehicle lacked a functioning rear license plate light. Upon stopping McLean, however, Riojas was able to discern that the license plate was, in fact, "very dimly lit." Riojas maintained that, in spite of the faint light, he was not able to read the license plate as McLean passed. McLean disputed Riojas's testimony, claiming that his light was in working order the whole time, sufficiently meeting the standards of the Texas Transportation Code. At the hearing, McLean's father testified that he measured fifty feet from the license plate and that he was able to read the license plate. As additional support, McLean cited the fact that his car had recently passed inspection.
The trial court implicitly found Trooper Riojas's testimony regarding the condition of the light to be more reliable, as evidenced by the court's denial of the motion to suppress. Giving total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in deciding that Trooper Riojas possessed reasonable articulable facts which justified his initial traffic stop of McLean. We overrule McLean's first and second issues.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Paul W. Green, Justice
Do Not Publish