i i i i i i
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-07-00658-CV
In the Matter of M.A.O., a Child,
From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2007-JUV-02071
Honorable Carmen Kelsey, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2008
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN PART
M.A.O., a juvenile, appeals from orders adjudicating him to have engaged in delinquent
conduct by committing two drug possession offenses and transferring his case to Harris County for
disposition. As to the adjudication order, we affirm. As to the transfer order, we dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on Tuesday, June 19, 2007, fifteen-year-old M.A.O. and another
individual were walking on the street in a residential area in San Antonio. At the time, San Antonio
police officer Ernest Stevens and another officer were patrolling the area, which had a reputation for
04-07-00658-CV
gang activity and violence. Because the individuals appeared to be minors, Stevens decided to find
out if they were violating the city’s curfew ordinance. The ordinance made it unlawful for minors
to be on the streets without an adult after 10:30 p.m. on a weeknight. The officer accompanying
Stevens parked the patrol car about fifteen feet behind the two individuals, but he did not turn on the
emergency lights. Stevens got out of the car, called to the individuals, and motioned for them to
come over to him.
The individuals walked over to Stevens, who asked for their names and ages. Stevens learned
the two individuals were minors and lived nearby. Stevens did not handcuff M.A.O. and the other
minor, nor did he place them in the back of the patrol car. Stevens did ask, “Do you guys have
anything on you that you are not suppose[d] to have?” In response, M.A.O. stated, “I have some pills
in my pocket that I found.” Stevens then searched M.A.O.’s front pocket and retrieved nine pills. The
pills were not in a container. With the assistance of the poison control center, Stevens identified
some of the pills and confirmed they contained drugs that were unlawful to possess without a
prescription. Stevens then formally arrested M.A.O.
Thereafter, the State filed an original petition alleging M.A.O. engaged in delinquent conduct
by possessing carisoprodol, a dangerous drug, and less than 28 grams of hydrocodone, a controlled
substance. The acts alleged in the State’s petition were misdemeanor offenses punishable by
confinement in jail. See TEX . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN . § 481.117 (Vernon 2003), § 483.041
(Vernon Supp. 2008).
M.A.O. filed a motion to suppress his oral statement and the pills retrieved from his pocket.
This motion was denied by the trial court.
-2-
04-07-00658-CV
The matter was tried to a jury, which found M.A.O. had engaged in delinquent conduct as
alleged in the State’s petition. Based on the jury’s findings, the juvenile court entered an adjudication
order and found a need for disposition, but did not proceed to disposition. Instead, after noting
M.A.O. had previously been adjudicated of delinquent conduct in Harris County and had already
been placed on probation in that county, the juvenile court transferred M.A.O.’s case to Harris
County for disposition. M.A.O. then perfected this appeal.
On appeal, M.A.O. raises three issues. In his first and second issues, M.A.O. argues the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. In his third issue, M.A.O. argues the
trial court abused its discretion by transferring his case to Harris County for disposition.
B. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A ruling on a motion to suppress in a juvenile case is reviewed using the same standard that
applies to such motions in adult criminal cases. See In re R.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002);
Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 31 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). In an adult criminal
case, a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Balentine
v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In conducting this review, we give almost total
deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts while reviewing the court’s application
of the law de novo. Id.; Hernandez v. State, 107 S.W.3d 41, 46-47 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003,
pet. ref’d).
We are obligated to uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was supported by the record and was
correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave the wrong reason
for its ruling. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); State v. Ross, 32
-3-
04-07-00658-CV
S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We must determine if the trial court could have
reasonably denied the motion to suppress in light of the evidence presented and the applicable law.
Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404.
A motion to suppress is nothing more than a specialized objection to the admissibility of
evidence. Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949, 952 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). To preserve a
complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. TEX . R. APP . P. 33.1(a). A
juvenile’s appellate contention must comport with the specific objection made at trial. See Wilson
v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). An objection stating one legal theory may not
be used to support a different legal theory on appeal. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995). A reviewing court need not consider errors, even of constitutional magnitude, not
called to the trial court’s attention. Id.
1. SCOPE OF THE QUESTIONING
In his first issue, M.A.O. argues that even though the initial stop to investigate a possible
curfew violation was proper, Stevens’s legal authority was limited to questioning him about his age
and address. M.A.O. contends Stevens’s question, “Do you guys have anything on you you’re not
supposed to have?,” went beyond the permissible scope of a curfew investigation, thereby violating
the municipal curfew ordinance and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The issue raised by M.A.O. on appeal was not presented to the trial court. Nowhere in his
motion to suppress does M.A.O. present an argument about the propriety of the officer’s question.
The motion simply asserts that M.A.O.’s “arrest was unreasonable and illegal pursuant to the Fourth
-4-
04-07-00658-CV
Amendment of the United States Constitution” and “had no basis in probable cause and was made
without a warrant.” We conclude M.A.O.’s motion to suppress was not specific enough to preserve
the argument now presented on appeal. See Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (holding global statements in motion to suppress were not sufficiently specific to preserve
arguments made on appeal). In addition, M.A.O.’s argument at the suppression hearing did not
address this contention. Because the argument presented in M.A.O.’s first issue does not comport
with any objection raised in the motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing, M.A.O. has failed
to preserve this issue for appellate review. See TEX . R. APP . P. 33.1(a).
But even if M.A.O. had presented this argument below, we would not sustain this issue.
M.A.O. acknowledges the curfew investigation was reasonable, but maintains the “subsequent
questioning” that led to the discovery of the pills was unreasonable and violated the Fourth
Amendment. We disagree.
An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. 2004); Davis v. State, 947
S.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Once the purpose of the stop has been satisfied, the
stop may not be used for a “fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.” Davis, 947 S.W.2d
at 243 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Nevertheless,
a police officer’s questioning, even on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop, is not itself a
Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
-5-
04-07-00658-CV
Here, M.A.O. complains of only one question asked by Stevens. M.A.O. suggests this critical
question was asked after the curfew investigation was completed. The State suggests Stevens’s
question was asked shortly after M.A.O. was stopped. In reality, the record is not well-developed as
to the question’s timing. Additionally, the record does not establish that Stevens failed to diligently
pursue the curfew investigation, or that the question unreasonably prolonged the duration of the
investigation. Based on the record before us, we cannot say Stevens’s question was unreasonable and
violated M.A.O.’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Edmond v. State, 116 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (concluding questioning about drugs during a traffic
stop was permissible when it did not unreasonably prolong the detention). We therefore overrule the
first issue.
2. WARNINGS UNDER SECTION 51.095 OF THE TEXAS FAMILY CODE
In his second issue, M.A.O. argues the trial court should have suppressed his oral statement,
“I have some pills in my pocket that I found,” because prior to making the statement he was not
taken before a magistrate and given the warnings set out in Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) of the Texas
Family Code. See TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . § 51.095(a)(1)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). In response, the
State argues the motion to suppress was properly denied because no custodial interrogation took
place and the statement was admissible under section 51.095(a)(2) of the Texas Family Code, which
permits the admission of oral statements of facts or circumstances found to be true and tending to
establish a juvenile’s guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with
which the juvenile states the offense was committed. See id. § 51.095(a)(2).
-6-
04-07-00658-CV
The admissibility of a statement made by a juvenile is governed by Section 51.095 of
the Texas Family Code. Id. § 51.095 (Vernon Supp. 2008). The statute provides that a written
statement by a juvenile is admissible at trial if it shows the juvenile was taken before a magistrate
and given certain warnings prior to making the statement. Id. § 51.095(a)(1). These warnings include
advising the juvenile (1) he may remain silent and not make any statement at all, and any statement
made may be used in evidence against him; (2) he has the right to have an attorney present before
or during questioning; (3) he has the right to have an attorney appointed if he is unable to employ
an attorney on his own; and (4) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time. Id.
§ 51.095(a)(1)(A) (i-iv). An oral statement recorded by an electronic recording device is admissible
if these same warnings are given by a magistrate prior to the juvenile making the statement. Id.
§ 51.095(a)(5).
The warnings specified under Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) must precede statements made while
the juvenile is in a detention facility or other place of confinement, in the custody of an officer, or
in the possession of the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. Id. § 51.095(d).
However, these warnings need not precede a statement that does not stem from interrogation of a
child in custody. Id. § 51.095(b)(1). Thus, the statute allows the admission of a voluntary oral
statement by a juvenile that is not the product of custodial interrogation. Id. § 51.095(b)(1), (d);
Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32.
In this case, the only evidence presented in support of the motion to suppress was Stevens’s
testimony. After considering this evidence, the trial court stated,“I am going to rule the child was in
custody. Just for the record, the child was in custody, but I am going to rule he was not being
-7-
04-07-00658-CV
interrogated while in custody of the officer. So his statement and the items that were turned over to
the officer are admissible.” We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was correct under any theory
of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. See
Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404; Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856.
Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. Cannon v. State, 691
S.W.2d 664, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). A child is under interrogation if he is subjected to direct
questioning or its functional equivalent, which occurs when police officers engage in conduct that
they know is likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. Lam v. State, 25 S.W.3d
233, 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). A child is in custody if, under the objective
circumstances, a reasonable child of the same age would believe his freedom of movement was
restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; Jeffley v. State,
38 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).
In determining whether a child was in custody at the time of questioning, courts consider the
age of the juvenile and all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to decide whether there
was a formal arrest or restraint of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest. Martinez,
131 S.W.3d at 32; Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 855. We apply a two-step analysis to determine whether an
individual is in custody. Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; In the Matter of M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d 319, 323
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). First, we examine all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation to determine whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement
to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323.
-8-
04-07-00658-CV
This initial determination focuses on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officer or the individual being questioned.
Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323. “[T]he restriction upon freedom of movement
must amount to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention.”
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Second, in light of those circumstances, we consider whether a reasonable person would have
felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at
323. Traditionally, courts consider four factors in making this determination (1) whether probable
cause to arrest existed at the time of questioning; (2) the subjective intent of the police; (3) the focus
of the investigation; and (4) the subjective belief of the defendant. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254.
However, the subjective intent of both the police and the defendant is irrelevant except to the extent
that the intent may be manifested in the words or actions of law enforcement officials. Martinez, 131
S.W.3d at 32; M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323. The custody determination is based entirely upon objective
circumstances. Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323. Additionally, being the focus
of a criminal investigation does not amount to being in custody. Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621-
22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). When the circumstances show that the individual acts upon the invitation
or request of the police and there are no threats, express or implied, that he will be forcibly taken,
then that person is not in custody at that time. Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987)).
Applying the first part of the analysis, we examine all the circumstances surrounding the
questioning to determine whether there was a restraint of freedom of movement to the degree
-9-
04-07-00658-CV
associated with a formal arrest. Here, upon initiating contact, the officers did not use the patrol car’s
emergency lights, or pursue M.A.O. Instead, Stevens called out to M.A.O., who responded to this
request by walking over to Stevens. At this juncture, M.A.O. was not patted down, handcuffed, or
placed in the patrol car. When M.A.O. made his oral statement, he was standing on a public street
and was accompanied by one of his friends. Based on all the circumstances surrounding the
questioning, we conclude M.A.O. was not under formal arrest or under a restraint of freedom of
movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Turning to the second part of the analysis, we examine whether a reasonable fifteen-year-old
in the same situation as M.A.O. would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. In
making this determination, we evaluate the four traditional factors. First, we recognize probable
cause to arrest M.A.O. did not exist at the time of questioning. Second, as to the subjective intent
of police, we note that even though Stevens stated he would not have allowed M.A.O. to walk away,
nothing in the record indicates Stevens objectively manifested such an intention through his words
or his actions. See Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 854 (“The subjective intent of law enforcement officials to
arrest is irrelevant unless that intent is somehow communicated or otherwise manifested to the
suspect.”). Third, we recognize that even though M.A.O. was the focus of a curfew violation
investigation, he would not have been taken into custody for such a violation. Stevens testified that
for a first violation, the curfew ordinance only authorized him to issue a warning to the juvenile and
report the incident to a designated youth agency, which in turn contacted the juvenile’s parent or
guardian. See SAN ANTONIO , TEX . MUNICIPAL CODE , ch. 21, art. V, § 21-124 (1991). Finally, we
note that no evidence was presented as to M.A.O.’s subjective beliefs. Our evaluation of the four
-10-
04-07-00658-CV
traditional factors leads us to conclude that a reasonable fifteen-year-old in the same situation as
M.A.O. would have felt free to terminate the questioning and leave.
Based on the totality of circumstances, M.A.O. was not in custody when he made his oral
statement. Because M.A.O. was not in custody when he made his oral statement, the requirement
that a magistrate give him the warnings set forth in Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) of the Texas Family
Code did not apply to him. See In the Matter of R.A., No. 03-04-00483-CV, 2005 WL 1412119, at *3
(Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (denial of motion to suppress based on failure to give Section
51.095 warnings was proper because custody is a precursor to the warning requirements of Section
51.095 and juvenile was not in custody). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to suppress. We overrule the second issue.
C. TRANSFER ORDER
In his third issue, M.A.O. argues the trial court abused its discretion in transferring his case
to Harris County for disposition under Section 51.07 of the Texas Family Code.1 See TEX . FAM .
CODE. ANN . 51.07 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
As a threshold matter, we consider our jurisdiction to review the challenged order. A
juvenile’s right to appeal in juvenile proceedings is controlled by Section 56.01(c) of the Texas
Family Code. TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . § 56.01(c) (Vernon 2008); see In the Matter of R.J.M., 211
1
… Section 51.07, entitled “Transfer to Another County” provides:
W hen a child has been found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for
supervision under Section 54.03, the juvenile court may transfer the case and transcripts of records
and documents to the juvenile court of the county where the child resides for disposition of the case
under Section 54.04. Consent by the court of the county where the child resides is not required.
T EX . F AM . C O D E A N N . § 51.07 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
-11-
04-07-00658-CV
S.W.3d 393, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied). However, section 56.01(c) does not
authorize an appeal from a transfer order issued under Section 51.07 of the Texas Family Code. See
TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . § 56.01(c) (Vernon 2008). When a legislative enactment says a juvenile may
appeal orders delineated in the statute, there is no right to appeal orders not so included. R.J.M., 211
S.W.3d at 394; In the Matter of J.H., 176 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
Because the controlling statute does not authorize an appeal from a transfer order issued
under Section 51.07 of the Texas Family Code, we conclude the order transferring M.A.O.’s case
to another county for disposition is not an appealable order. See R.J.M., 211 S.W.3d at 394-95
(dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Texas Family Code did not authorize an
appeal from a juvenile court order denying motion to appoint counsel for post-adjudication DNA
testing); J.H., 176 S.W.3d at 679 (dismissing juvenile’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
juvenile court order transferring determinate sentence probation to criminal district court was not
appealable). Because the transfer order is not an appealable order, we are without jurisdiction to
consider M.A.O.’s third issue and must dismiss this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See
In re Estate of Munoz, No. 04-06-00850-CV, 2007 WL 4547558, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2007, no pet.) (dismissing corresponding portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction when venue
transfer order was not appealable).
D. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s adjudication order is affirmed. The portion of the appeal challenging the trial
court’s transfer order is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Karen Angelini, Justice
-12-