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MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-07-00870-CV
EX PARTE Ernesto R. HINOJOSA, Sr.,
From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas
Trial Court No. 05-08-43651-CV
Honorable Ricardo H. Garcia, Judge Presiding1
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice
Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice
Catherine Stone, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 1, 2008
AFFIRMED
Ernesto Hinojosa was arrested on August 19, 1982 for the offense of murder. Hinojosa made
bail after his arrest and was released from custody. Hinojosa was never indicted or tried for the
offense in the 23 years that followed his arrest, prompting him to file a petition to expunge his arrest
from public records. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed an opposition to Hinojosa’s
petition, asserting that Hinojosa failed to prove the facts required to justify an expunction. The trial
court rendered an order denying Hinojosa’s petition to expunge, and this appeal followed. On
appeal, Hinojosa contends the trial court erred in denying his petition to expunge because he
qualified for an expunction under the applicable provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. ANN art. 55.01 (Vernon 2006). We affirm.
1
… Sitting by assignment.
04-07-00870-CV
We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition to expunge under an abuse of discretion
standard. Heine v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet.
denied). An expunction proceeding is a civil proceeding, in which the petitioner bears the burden
of proof in meeting the statutory requirements for an expunction. Harris v. State, 733 S.W.2d 710,
711 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ). One of the statutory conditions that Hinojosa was
required to establish for an expunction included that “the limitations period expired before the date
on which [the] petition for expunction was filed.” See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. ANN art. 55.01
(a)(2)(A)(i). The offense for which Hinojosa was arrested, however, has no statute of limitations.
See id. art. 12.01(1)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (providing murder and manslaughter have no
limitations period). Because there is no limitations period applicable to the offense for which
Hinojosa was arrested, Hinojosa cannot satisfy at least one of the statutory requirements for
obtaining an expunction. See id. art. 55.01 (a)(2)(A)(i). Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Hinojosa’s petition to expunge.
The trial court’s order denying Hinojosa’s petition to expunge is affirmed.
Catherine Stone, Justice