In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-01-00133-CR ______________________________
CHARLIE R. TAYLOR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 12th Judicial District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court No. 20,553
Before Morriss, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ. Opinion by Justice Ross
O P I N I O N
Charlie R. Taylor, a prison inmate, was indicted for assault on a correctional officer. He represented himself in a jury trial and was found guilty. The jury assessed his punishment, enhanced by three prior felony convictions, at life imprisonment. Taylor, who continues to represent himself on appeal, raises eight issues for review: 1) that the special prosecutor in his case had no authority to prosecute him; 2) that the grand jury that returned the indictment against him was illegally constituted; 3) that the sentencing in his case constitutes double jeopardy; 4) that the prior convictions alleged in the indictment for enhancement violated the statute of limitations; 5) that there were cruelties against religion, health, and civil rights in his case; 6) that he was denied access to court and to records; 7) that he was denied a copy of the reporter's record; and 8) that there are mistakes in his prison time sheets.
On July 8, 1999, Taylor was an inmate at the Estelle High Security Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Jamie Street was employed as a correctional officer at that facility and was carrying out her duties of distributing food to the inmates in their cells when she was assaulted by Taylor. She testified that, while retrieving food trays from the inmates, Taylor grabbed her arm through the food slot of his cell, and while holding her arm inside his cell, cut her with an object she could not see and that was unknown to her. She further testified that, as she was walking away from Taylor's cell, he threw bottles of liquid that hit her on the leg. Street received medical treatment for the cut on her arm and testified the cut left her with a scar. Street further testified that, at the time of this incident, she was wearing the distinctive uniform of a correctional officer and that Taylor knew she was an officer for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Street testified that she did nothing to provoke Taylor and that he later apologized for assaulting her and told her he attacked her because his rights were being violated.
Taylor first contends the special prosecutor who represented the State had no authority to prosecute him. Taylor, however, did not voice any complaint about the special prosecutor at the trial level. Under Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, Taylor cannot complain at the appellate level of things he did not preserve at the trial level. His first issue is overruled.
Taylor next contends the grand jury in his case was illegally constituted because it did not consist of twelve persons and two alternates as required by Tex. Const. art. V, § 13 and by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 19.18 (Vernon Supp. 2002). In support of his contention, Taylor relies on the following testimony he elicited on cross-examination from the grand jury foreman at the guilt/innocence phase of trial:
Q How many of y'all was present at the array (sic) for this indictment - just you by yourself?
. . . .
A As far as I recall, all of the grand jury . . . .
Q And how many of you were there?
A Six or eight, something like that.
Q Six or eight. That's what the State requires, six or eight?
A As far as I know.
Grand juries in Texas are composed of twelve persons, but only a quorum of nine is required to transact business. Tex. Const. art. V, § 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 19.26(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002), 19.40 (Vernon 1977). The testimony from the grand jury foreman was given two years after the fact and shows the witness was less than certain as to the exact number of grand jurors present at the time Taylor was indicted. Under questioning by the State on redirect examination, the foreman acknowledged he did not "know the technicalities of the law," but stated unequivocally that a quorum was present when the grand jury returned the indictment against Taylor. Taylor's second issue is overruled.
In his third issue, Taylor contends the sentencing in this case constitutes double jeopardy. He bases this contention on a pronouncement made by the trial court at sentencing:
And it is the order of this court that the judgment and sentence in this cause shall begin to run from and after the sentence that you received in Cause No. 19,753, for aggravated assault on a correctional officer in the 3rd District Court of Anderson County, Texas.
When that sentence has ceased to operate, sir, this sentence shall begin to run; . . . .
Taylor argues that this pronouncement "added onto time credit of Cause No. 19753 before being release [sic] from prison."
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002) provides:
If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while the defendant was an inmate in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the defendant has not completed the sentence he was serving at the time of the offense, the judge shall order the sentence for the subsequent offense to commence immediately on completion of the sentence for the original offense.
The trial court followed Section 42.08(b) when it made the pronouncement quoted above, and Taylor has not cited any authority holding such to constitute double jeopardy. This issue is overruled.
In his fourth issue, Taylor seems to contend that prior convictions used for enhancement purposes in an indictment are subject to the statute of limitations. In this assertion, Taylor confuses the statute of limitations for obtaining an indictment for a particular offense with the use of a prior felony as an enhancement for sentencing. Because there is no statute of limitations for the use of a prior felony for the purpose of enhancing a sentence, there is no merit to this contention. This issue is overruled.
Taylor next complains of being put on a punitive food loaf while in prison and asserts this violated his religion and was detrimental to his health. However, none of these claims relate to his guilt or innocence of the offense for which he was convicted or to errors committed at his trial. Taylor's fifth issue is overruled.
As his sixth issue, Taylor contends that he was denied access to the court and that records were withheld from him. However, the record shows Taylor was present at all hearings, and he has failed to specify under this issue what records, if any, were withheld from him. This issue is overruled.
In a related but separate issue, Taylor contends he did not receive a copy of the reporter's record in this case. During the pendency of Taylor's appeal, he complained to this Court that he had not received a copy of the reporter's record. We abated the case to the trial court for a determination regarding whether Taylor was in possession of a copy of the reporter's record. In response, the court reporter provided this Court with a copy of a letter addressed to Taylor wherein she stated she had mailed Taylor a second copy of the reporter's record. No further complaint of this matter was made by Taylor until he raised this issue in his supplemental brief. He apparently received the reporter's record mailed to him, and he has failed to show how he was harmed by not having possession of the reporter's record before receiving a copy in the mail. This issue is overruled.
In his final issue, Taylor complains about his time sheets in prison. However, any complaint about how Taylor's time has been credited by prison authorities must be raised by a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2002). This issue is overruled.
We affirm the judgment.
Donald R. Ross
Justice
Date Submitted: October 17, 2002
Date Decided: November 1, 2002
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