In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-05-00034-CV
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ERIC CARSON WYNN, Appellant
V.
HEATHER RENEE JOHNSON, Appellee
On Appeal from the 307th Judicial District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2003-834-DR
Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Eric Carson Wynn, appellant, has filed a motion asking this Court to abate his appeal in order to determine when the judgment was actually rendered in his suit. The suit was a petition to establish the parent-child relationship. A clerk's record was filed March 16, 2005. The only order contained therein is an order signed September 3, 2004, granting Wynn's motion for paternity testing and granting the respondent's motion for a protective order, and appointing an amicus attorney to represent the child. It is clear both from Wynn's brief and from his motion he is not attempting to appeal from that order, but from some later ruling. However, the record does not contain any later orders or judgment. We have contacted the district clerk's office and have been informed no other order or judgment has been entered in this case.
On March 21, 2005, we sent a letter to Wynn questioning our jurisdiction over the case and warning him that, unless he could show us within ten days that an appealable order or judgment exists in this case, we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b).
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Donald R. Ross
Justice
Date Submitted: April 4, 2005
Date Decided: April 5, 2005
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id not have a receipt and that she did not intend to steal the items. She did not remember whether she went through a checkout stand.
Corine Redmond, Fail's mother, testified that Fail has neuropathy, arthritis, muscle and nerve damage and that she has had a problem with prescription medications in the past and has had short-term memory problems. Fail testified that, on May 21, she was taking Vicadin, Xanax, Soma, Premarin, Zantac, and Restoril, that she has had a number of health and surgical problems, and has short-term memory loss. She has in the past been addicted to prescribed medications and was referred to a pain management clinic. On May 21, she took the prescribed medications.
Fail argues that the evidence is insufficient on the element of intent and that the State's proof merely shows she took the diapers from the store and that there is no testimony about her conscious objective or desire to remove the diapers from the store. Fail further argues that her history of prescription drug dependency and addiction, and the effects of the drugs, clouded her memory and impaired her functioning to the point where she could not formulate the requisite intent as alleged in the indictment.
In our review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we employ the standards set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). This calls for a review of the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and a determination as to whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In contrast to legal sufficiency, a factual sufficiency review dictates that the evidence be viewed in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. In determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence to establish the elements of the offense, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong, or so weak as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Id. However, "[t]he court's evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the jury's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony." Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
The jury was properly instructed that a person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of her conduct or to a result of her conduct when it is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003).
The mental state of the accused is a question of fact for the jury to ascertain, usually from circumstantial evidence and from the surrounding circumstances. Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Intent to deprive must be determined from the acts or words of the accused. Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Banks v. State, 471 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). Because intent is an intangible, it can only be proved by circumstantial evidence. Arnott v. State, 498 S.W.2d 166, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Moyer v. State, 948 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex. App.‒Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd). A jury may infer intent from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
The evidence is that Fail entered the store with three packages of diapers and left with eleven. She was attempting to place them in her vehicle when the manager approached her. None of the packages were bagged in sacks from Brookshire's. When confronted by the manager, Fail could not produce a receipt. None of the checkout personnel had seen or talked to her. No item was presented for exchange.
After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have inferred that Fail intentionally appropriated the diapers. Further, reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say the evidence of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the fact-finder's determination or that the proof of guilt is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Fail's points of error one, two, three, and four concerning legal and factual sufficiency under state and federal law are denied.
2. Voluntary Intoxication Instruction
As previously noted, Fail and Redmond both testified as to Fail's drug usage and addiction. Fail testified that, on May 21, she was taking seven medications. All of these medications were for health problems, including polyneuritis, silicone poisoning, fibromyalgia, three kinds of arthritis, polyneuropathy, short-term memory loss, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She acknowledged she has been addicted to prescribed medications. She further testified that, while she remembers going into the store and then being at her car when the manager was asking her for a receipt, she did not remember the intervening events. As to her previous offenses, she believes drug addiction "had something to do with it" and that she had no intent to steal those items as well. She testified that drugs impair her memory and judgment. In closing argument, the defense attorney stated, "She's impaired. She's impaired physically, she's impaired mentally, and she's impaired by the prescriptions that are prescribed by the doctors . . . ." At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court included an instruction in the jury charge that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 2003). Intoxication was defined as a disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body. Fail argues that such instruction was erroneous, because she was not pleading insanity or temporary insanity. She further alleges these medicines were legitimately prescribed and taken to counteract pain and dysfunction.
Section 8.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides that intoxication is not a defense to the commission of a crime. Fail does not need to rely on intoxication as a defense in order to implicate this provision. Rather, if there is evidence from any source that might lead a jury to conclude that Fail's intoxication somehow excused her actions, an instruction is appropriate. Taylor v. State, 885 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In Taylor, there was evidence, albeit slight, that the defendant's actions could have been precipitated by her marihuana use, justifying the use of the voluntary intoxication instruction.
In Haynes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. App.‒Waco 2002, pet. ref'd), the court held that, even though the defendant was not relying on the defense based on intoxication, a jury could have concluded the defendant lacked the "intent" for murder because he was intoxicated. Therefore, the intoxication instruction was proper.
Here, Fail argues in her brief to this Court that her medication clouded her memory and impaired her functioning to the point where she could not formulate the requisite "intent" as that term is used in the indictment. At trial, testimony was introduced concerning her past drug addiction and concerning the fact that she had taken prescribed medications on the date of the alleged offense. This evidence raised an issue as to whether Fail had the "normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of . . . a drug, . . . into the body," and the jury could have concluded that somehow her actions were excused by her impaired condition. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.01(A) (Vernon 2003). Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the commission of a crime.
Having found the evidence legally and factually sufficient and the jury instruction on voluntary intoxication proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: October 28, 2003
Date Decided: October 29, 2003
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