in Re: Davie Harrison, Sr.

6-96-028-CV Long Trusts v. Dowd

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-06-00021-CV

______________________________

IN RE:

DAVIE HARRISON, SR.

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Original Mandamus Proceeding

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Opinion by Justice Carter

O P I N I O N

            Davie Harrison, Sr., has filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting this Court to vacate or set aside the judgment convicting Harrison of burglary. We deny Harrison's petition because an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 is the more appropriate remedy for post-conviction relief.

            On November 14, 1994, Harrison pled guilty to burglary pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Harrison asserts that, on October 3, 2005, he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure along with a motion to recuse and a motion of disqualification. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2005). On October 18, 2005, Harrison filed a motion for a recusal hearing and alleges he has never received notice of the motion being filed. In his petition for writ of mandamus, Harrison alleges that Judge Leon Pesek, Sr., violated Article 30.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by presiding over his guilty plea when his son, Leon Pesek, Jr., was the district attorney. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 30.01 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Harrison requests that this Court vacate or set aside the judgment because the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the alleged violation of Article 30.01 and, therefore, the judgment is allegedly void. In the alternative, Harrison requests that we order the trial court to vacate or set aside the judgment.

            Under Texas law, the sole method for a collateral attack on a felony conviction is through an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The procedure set forth in Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive post-conviction judicial remedy available when the conviction is final and the applicant is confined by virtue of his or her felony conviction. See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); McBride v. State, 114 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07; cf. Board of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Mandamus is an extreme remedy and will not be granted unless no other remedy at law exists. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). Because a writ of habeas corpus is a more appropriate vehicle to bring this collateral attack, Harrison is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

            For the reasons stated, we deny Harrison's petition for writ of mandamus.

 

                                                                                    Jack Carter

                                                                                    Justice

Date Submitted:          February 15, 2006

Date Decided:             February 16, 2006

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In The

  Court of Appeals

                        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

 

                                                ______________________________

 

                                                             No. 06-10-00180-CR

                                                ______________________________

 

 

                             TONY CLARKSTON JOHNSON, Appellant

 

                                                                V.

 

                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 

 

                                                                                                  

 

 

                                      On Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court

                                                              Rusk County, Texas

                                                         Trial Court No. CR09-333

 

                                                                                                   

 

 

 

                                          Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

                                              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

                                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

            Tony Clarkston Johnson, appellant, has filed with this Court a motion to dismiss his appeal.  The motion is signed by Johnson and by his counsel in compliance with Rule 42.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a).  As authorized by Rule 42.2, we grant the motion.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2.

            Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

 

 

 

 

                                                                                    Jack Carter

                                                                                    Justice

 

Date Submitted:          November 16, 2010   

Date Decided:             November 17, 2010

 

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