In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-06-00004-CV
______________________________
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
RUSSELL BEN JONES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 10457
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Moseley
O P I N I O N
The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), upon receiving notice that Russell Ben Jones had been charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), suspended Jones's concealed handgun license. The issue of the suspension was presented to a Lamar County justice of the peace court and, after a hearing, the justice court ruled in favor of the DPS, sustaining the suspension. Thirty-one days after entry of the order by the justice court, Jones appealed to the County Court at Law of Lamar County for further review. The county court at law entered an order which purported to reverse the suspension ordered by the justice court and denied the suspension of the concealed handgun license; the DPS has appealed from that ruling.
Pursuant to Chapter 411, subchapter H of the Texas Government Code, licenses to carry concealed handguns can be issued to those who meet certain qualifications. However, even after a person has been granted a license, that license can be suspended or revoked in the event that certain circumstances arise. These suspensions or revocations are tightly regulated by statute (e.g., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 411.180, 411.186 (Vernon 2005); § 411.187 (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
It is undisputed that Jones was charged with DWI, that when this charge came to the notice of the DPS it suspended his license, and that Jones requested judicial review. The DPS filed a petition and scheduled a hearing to review the suspension, giving proper notice to Jones. (1) A hearing was held in the proper justice of the peace court within the prescribed time frame, the justice of the peace court affirmed the suspension of Jones's concealed handgun license, and an appeal of that order was not filed in the county court at law until thirty-one days after the entry of the order for suspension.
The DPS filed with the county court at law a plea to the jurisdiction, citing Section 411.180(e) of the Texas Government Code, alleging that the justice court determination had become final after thirty days.
The county court at law denied the DPS's plea to the jurisdiction, taking the position that since this was an appeal from a justice court that the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure apply; the trial court then applied Rules 10.5 and 26.3 to permit a late filing of the appeal, ruled for Jones, and denied the suspension of Jones's concealed handgun license. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5, 26.3.
Although the parties raise issues which go to the merits of whether the proper procedure was followed by the DPS in pursuit of the suspension of Jones's license, the cogent question is whether the county court at law possessed the jurisdiction to entertain those inquiries. We determine that it did not.
Section 411.180(e) of the Texas Government Code provides that:
A party adversely affected by the court's ruling following a hearing under this section may appeal the ruling by filing within 30 days after the ruling a petition in a county court at law in the county in which the applicant or license holder resides or, if there is no county court at law in the county, in the county court of the county. A person who appeals under this section must send by certified mail a copy of the person's petition, certified by the clerk of the court in which the petition is filed, to the appropriate division of the department at its Austin headquarters. The trial on appeal shall be a trial de novo without a jury. A district or county attorney or the attorney general may represent the department.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.180(e) (emphasis added).
The "may" (which indicates a choice) as used in the statute applies to the word "appeal," not to the term "within 30 days." In other words, if the person whose license has been suspended elects to do so, he has the option of appealing the justice court ruling. If he does so, he must evidence the choice to appeal by filing his appeal within thirty days; upon the expiration of thirty days, the ruling becomes final. It appears that the sole reason for the failure to file an appeal within thirty days was due to a calendaring error by Jones's counsel; there is no allegation that this late filing occurred due to any misrepresentation by a clerk of the court or other court official but, rather, to an oversight due to the fact that the month of May has thirty-one days, not thirty.
Some other appeals from a justice court to a county court require the posting of a bond to perfect the appeal, such as in cases of forcible detainer. Tex. R. Civ. P. 749. The failure to file such an appeal bond in a timely manner is jurisdictional; absent such a timely filing, the county court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. See RCJ Liquidating Co. v. Village, Ltd., 670 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1984); Wetsel v. Fort Worth Brake, Clutch & Equip., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1989, no writ). Likewise, Section 411.180(e)'s thirty-day requirement has been considered jurisdictional in nature. See Sullivan v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 93 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (concluding that Section 411.180(e), when satisfied, gave to the county court at law "exclusive and independent jurisdiction" and permitted the county court at law to conduct a trial de novo on the issue of revocation); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Kreipe, 29 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (concluding that filing a petition in the county court at law within thirty days after the justice court's ruling "perfects the appeal and vests jurisdiction with the county court at law"). Although the appeal of the suspension of a concealed handgun license does not require the filing of a bond, it does require the appeal to be filed within thirty days. In other words, on the expiration of the thirtieth day after the justice court ruled, the case became final and the county court at law had no jurisdiction over the matter.
Jones attempts to rely, however, on his contention that the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to cases which are appealed from a justice court to a county court or county court at law. If the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure apply, then the county court at law possessed the authority to extend a time for late filing pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 10.5 and 26.3.
Courts of appeals (which include the Texas Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the various courts of appeals throughout the State) are those whose powers are granted and defined in Chapter 22 of the Texas Government Code. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 22.001-.302 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006). County courts at law are those which are the subject of Chapter 25, Texas Government Code, and constitutional county courts are the subject of Chapter 26, Texas Government Code; both of these are trial courts, not appellate courts. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 25.0001-.2656, 26.001-.353 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006).
When an appeal is taken from a justice court to a county court at law or a county court (to which reference is made generically hereafter as "county court"), the county court hears the matters de novo; that is, when the case is heard in the county court, there is to be a new trial on the entire case, on both questions of fact and issues of law, conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance. Lamar County Appraisal Dist. v. Campbell Soup Co., 93 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2002, no pet.). There are no provisions in Texas law for trials de novo in the courts of appeals. In contrast to a de novo hearing, it is well settled in Texas that an appellate court's review is confined to the record in the trial court when the trial court acted. See, e.g., Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 52 n.7 (Tex. 1998); Univ. of Tex. v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1961); Monsanto v. Davis, 25 S.W.3d 773, 781 (Tex. App.--Waco 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
Whereas trial courts have the ability to shepherd the development of the evidence, the appellate courts are restricted to the record as produced at the trial level. Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979); Carlton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Luckette v. State, 906 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd). A county court or county court at law, hearing appeals from justice courts on a trial de novo basis, are not considered a court of appeals.
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure are simply not applicable to the appeal of a matter from a justice court to a county court. See Tex. R. App. P. 1.1. Accordingly, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure do not vest the judge of the county court at law with the authority to extend the time for the filing of an appeal past the thirty days set out in Section 411.180(e) of the Texas Government Code.
When the thirty days had elapsed from the date that the justice court had issued its ruling which affirmed the suspension of Jones's concealed handgun license, that judgment became final; the county court at law did not possess any jurisdiction over the matter and, hence, lacked the authority to enter any orders of any nature concerning the case. The order the county court at law entered denying the suspension of the license is a nullity.
The other of Jones's complaints on appeal deal with matters concerning the actions of the
justice court and its authority to enter the order of suspension. Because Jones failed to properly
follow his remedies for review as provided by statute, neither the county court at law nor this Court
have the authority to deal with those complaints in this case. The trial court, having no jurisdiction
to render judgment, the judgment entered by it is void. This Court may only declare such judgment
void, set it aside, and dismiss the appeal. (2)
Bailey C. Moseley Justice Date Submitted: March 28, 2007 Date Decided: April 13, 2007
1. 2. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa. v. Martinez, 18 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2000, no
pet.); Bahr v. Kohr, 928 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
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In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-09-00227-CR
______________________________
DONALD DEWAYNE HOOD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 202nd Judicial District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 08F0188-202
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Facts and Procedural Background
While intoxicated, Donald Dewayne Hood drove his vehicle off the roadway, striking and fatally injuring Paul Fisher. Hood later pled guilty to intoxication manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. The trial court also revoked his community supervision based on a burglary of a habitation offense and sentenced him to ten years for that offense, with the sentences to be served consecutively.[1]
On appeal, Hood argues that the trial court erred (1) by ordering the punishment to run consecutively to that of a previous, unrelated offense; (2) by entering a finding of a deadly weapon without proper notice to Hood; and (3) because there was insufficient evidence that Hood used a deadly weapon. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because (1) fulfilling a condition of community supervision does not commence a sentence; (2) Hood received proper notice of the States intention to seek a deadly weapon finding; and (3) there is sufficient factual evidence that the vehicle was used as a deadly weapon.
II. Fulfilling a Condition of Community Supervision Does Not Commence a Sentence
Several years prior to the events that led to Fishers death, Hood pled guilty to burglary of a habitation[2] and was placed on community supervision. As a condition of the community supervision, Hood completed a Substance Abuse Felony Program (SAFP). After pleading guilty to intoxication manslaughter, the trial court revoked his community supervision, sentenced him to ten years imprisonment for the burglary of a habitation, and ordered the sentence be served consecutively with the twenty-year sentence for intoxication manslaughter. In his first point of error, Hood argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the sentences to be served consecutively.
Our law accords trial courts with a great degree of discretion in deciding whether to order sentences to run consecutively or concurrently.
[I]n the discretion of the court, the judgment in the second and subsequent convictions may either be that the sentence imposed or suspended shall begin when the judgment and the sentence imposed or suspended in the preceding conviction has ceased to operate, or that the sentence imposed or suspended shall run concurrently with the other case or cases . . . .
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon Supp. 2009). In light of the discretion granted to the trial court by Article 42.08(a), we review a complaint about consecutive sentences for an abuse of that discretion. Malone v. State, 163 S.W.3d 785, 803 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2005, pet. refd) (citing Macri v. State, 12 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1999, pet. refd)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles of law, or when it otherwise acts outside the wide zone of reasonable disagreement. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Warren v. State, 236 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
Article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure gives the trial court great discretion to cumulate a sentence with prior outstanding sentences if the later sentence is imposed for the first time following the revocation of community supervision. See Pettigrew v. State, 48 S.W.3d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Ex parte March, 423 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)). However, if the applicant has already served a portion of his or her sentence before the sentence is suspended or probated, then a cumulation order may not be entered to stack the probated sentence on a subsequent sentence because such would violate the constitutional protection against being twice punished for the same offense. Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Ex parte Barley, 842 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
Hood argues that the Legislature intended Article 42.12, Section 23(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to mean that completing a substance abuse treatment program constituted serving part of the sentence, similar to shock probation under Article 42.12, Section 6 or boot camp under Article 42.12, Section 8.
Article 42.12, Section 23(b) states in part that:
no part of the time that the defendant is on community supervision shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve, except that on revocation, the judge shall credit to the defendant time served by the defendant as a condition of community supervision in a substance abuse treatment facility . . . but only if the defendant successfully completes the treatment program in that facility.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 42.12, § 23(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The statute unambiguously contemplates that completion of a substance abuse treatment program (SAFP) will be a condition of community supervision and that credit for the time spent completing the program is the only credit the defendant is to receive should his or her community supervision be revoked. Id.
In the case of Barley, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that shock probation and boot camp are alternative incarcerations that take place prior to being placed on community supervision, and effectively commence the sentence. 842 S.W.2d at 69495. Here, however, Hood merely completed a drug program after he had been placed on community supervision and did nothing more than comply with a condition of his community supervision. He had not commenced serving the underlying sentence. Hood does not direct our attention to any cases supporting his position that compliance with a condition of community supervision is tantamount to commencing to serve a sentence and, indeed, we are not aware of any such cases. See Barnes v. State, Nos. 14-97-01390-CR & 14-98-00910-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 6280 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 14, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Washington v. State, No. 06-98-00067-CR, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 6140 (Tex. App.Texarkana Oct. 1, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (trusty camp confinement as condition of community supervision did not commence period of confinement).[3] Therefore, the trial court did not err in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively.
III. Notice of the States Intention to Seek a Deadly Weapon Finding
The indictment alleges that while intoxicated, Hood caused the death of another, namely, Paul Fisher . . . by driving [a] motor vehicle into the person . . . . Hood argues that the trial court erred in finding that Hood used a deadly weapon because the State failed to give Hood proper notice that it would seek such a finding.[4]
An accused is entitled to some form of written notice at the time of prosecution that the use of a deadly weapon will be a fact issue at his or her trial. Ex parte Minott, 972 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Luken v. State, 780 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 52627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Such notice can be contained in the indictment, or the indictment necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon, which is anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Blount v. State, 257 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Brooks v. State, 847 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also Flenteroy v. State, 187 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A pleading notifying the defendant that the State will seek a finding as to the use of a deadly weapon is a proper notice. Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
Looking first at the indictment, we find that Hood was given notice of the charge that his operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated caused the death of Fisher by driving said motor vehicle into the person of the said injured party. Our highest court has held that any allegation which avers that a death was caused by a named instrument necessarily includes an allegation that the named instrument was in the manner of its use . . . capable of causing (since it did cause) death. Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Beck, 769 S.W.2d at 526. So in this case, the indictment itself gave notice of the deadly weapon allegation.
As to the more specific notice, neither statute nor caselaw specifically defines what constitutes timely notice for intent to seek the finding of a deadly weapon. The timing requirements depend upon the facts of each case. Hocutt v. State, 927 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1996, pet. refd). Written notice given several days in advance of a punishment hearing has been held to be sufficient, while a notice faxed late on a Friday for a jury trial set to begin on Monday was held to be insufficient. Spelling v. State, 825 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1992, no pet.); Hocutt, 927 S.W.2d at 203. In a concurring opinion, Judge Overstreet suggested that notice is adequate if it is given any time prior to trial. See Johnson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 707, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Overstreet, J., concurring); see also Nolasco v. State, 970 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. App.Dallas 1998, no pet.) (written notice received hours before trial held sufficient when defendant admitted knowing about weapon and filing motion to suppress it).
Here, eight days before trial, the State filed a motion of its intent to seek affirmative findings as to the use of a deadly weapon. Nothing in the record indicates that the State withdrew or altered its intention to seek a deadly weapon finding.[5] At trial, Hood entered an open plea of guilty and stated that he understood that he was entering his plea without a negotiated plea agreement.[6] The trial court found that the vehicle Hood was driving in, and the manner and the means that [he was] using that vehicle was a deadly weapon and did in fact cause[] the death of an individual.
Under the circumstances of this case, the indictment and the States motion provided sufficient notice of the States intent. Hood failed to object or move for a continuance. The motion plainly indicated the States intention, and nothing in the record indicates that the State withdrew or altered its intention to seek a deadly weapon finding. Accordingly, we overrule Hoods second point of error.
IV. There Is Sufficient Factual Evidence that the Vehicle Was Used as a Deadly Weapon
In his final point of error, Hood argues that the trial court lacked legally sufficient evidence to find that he used a deadly weapon.[7] We disagree.
In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We must give deference to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 31819 (1979)). We are not required to determine whether we believe that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, when faced with conflicting evidence, we must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution.
To hold evidence legally sufficient to sustain a deadly weapon finding, the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the object meets the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2009); (2) the deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the transaction from which the felony conviction was obtained, Ex parte Jones, 957 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); and (3) other people were put in actual danger,[8] Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Hood only challenges the third requirementthat other people were put in actual danger. The authorities cited by Hood are Mann v. State, 13 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.Austin 2000), affd, 58 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Ochoa v. State, 119 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App.San Antonio 2003, no pet.); and Davis v. State, 964 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). Mann was a DWI case in which the defendant drove in a dangerous manner, but was not involved in a collision. Mann, 13 S.W.3d at 91. Likewise, the offense in Ochoa was a DWI case and so it was necessary to prove other people were endangered by Ochoas action. Ochoa, 119 S.W.3d at 828. The Davis case also involved a DWI not involving any actual injury or harm to others. Davis, 964 S.W.2d at 354. In each of those cases, the defendant committed the offense of DWI and in so doing endangered others, even though no one was actually harmed, so it was necessary to prove such actual endangerment. Those cases are distinguishable from the facts where Hood was charged with intoxication manslaughter: the elements of proof are that he drove a vehicle while intoxicated and by reason of such intoxication Hood caused the death of another person. The basic facts of the offense, which he admitted by his guilty plea, prove beyond question that the manner in which Hood operated the vehicle endangered othersFisher was killed by Hoods actions. When one uses a vehicle and actually causes the death of another, no greater proof could ever be provided that the vehicle was used as a deadly weapon. Actually causing the death of another person supplies all the proof necessary that the vehicle is capable of causing death and that another person was actually endangered. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that anything, including a motor vehicle, which is actually used to cause the death of a human being is a deadly weapon. Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); McKithan, 838 S.W.2d at 561. This is necessarily so because a thing which actually causes death is by definition capable of causing death. Tyra, 897 S.W.2d at 798.
If anything else could possibly be necessary to prove, the stipulated facts here are plentiful. There is undisputed evidence that Hoods actions while behind the wheel of his vehicle put others, besides the victim who was killed, in actual danger. Officer William Buttram was traveling in his personal vehicle with his wife and child when he saw Hood traveling at a high rate of speed and almost hit [a] white chevy extended cab truck who was waiting to turn. When Hood cut into Buttrams lane of travel, Buttram had to slam on his brakes to avoid colliding with Hood. A westbound truck had to swerve extremely hard into the outside lane to prevent a head on collision with Hood.
There is more than ample evidence to support the trial courts finding that a deadly weapon was used during the commission of this offense. Therefore, we overrule Hoods third point of error and affirm the trial courts judgment.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: July 28, 2010
Date Decided: August 13, 2010
Do Not Publish
[1]In his motion for new trial, Hood contended that the trial court erred in cumulating the sentences and that the punishment assessed was contrary to the law and evidence.
[2]Bowie County District Court, cause number 03F0601-202.
[3]Although these unpublished cases have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them as an aid in developing reasoning that may be employed. Carillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2003, pet. refd).
[4]Hood did not argue unfair surprise, prejudice, or inadequate time to prepare at trial and likewise does not raise such arguments on appeal.
[5]The trial court rejected a previously negotiated plea agreement. The record does not mention whether the rejected plea agreement included or otherwise referenced the finding of a deadly weapon. In his brief, Hood cites a letter that indicates that the State abandoned its intention to find the use of a deadly weapon as a part of the plea agreement. Hood attached a copy of the letter to his brief. However, the letter was not presented to the trial court or otherwise included in the record at trial. An appellate court may not consider factual assertions that are outside the record, and a party cannot circumvent this prohibition by submitting evidence for the first time on appeal. See Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Therefore, we do not consider the letter for any purpose.
[6]Hood intended to plead guilty for quite some time prior to the hearing.
[7]In his brief, Hood does not specifically state whether he is arguing legal sufficiency or factual sufficiency. However, he does argue that the State offered no evidence regarding the use of a deadly weapon. Therefore, we find that Hood is arguing legal sufficiencys no evidence point of error.
[8]Specific intent to use a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon is not required. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Walker v. State, 897 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).