IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
JANUARY 16, 2002
______________________________
ROBERT MILLER, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 106TH DISTRICT COURT OF LYNN COUNTY;
NO. 98-2406; HONORABLE GEORGE H. HANSARD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
Appellant Robert Miller, acting pro se, moves for an extension of time to file a motion requesting permission to file an out-of-time appeal or an out-of-time motion for new trial. We overrule the motion.
On September 28, 2001, this court issued an opinion and entered judgment affirming appellant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. After considering a motion for rehearing filed by appellant's counsel, we overruled the motion for rehearing, withdrew our opinion of September 28th, and issued an opinion dated December 4, 2001, affirming appellant's conviction.
On December 27, 2001, the clerk of this court received and filed a pleading in this matter entitled "Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant's Motion Requesting permission to File Out of Time Appeal or Out of time Motion for a New Trial" ("the motion"). The motion is signed by appellant, acting pro se, and does not reflect the signature of his counsel. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.1(a). (1) The motion references TRAP 49.8, which specifies times and procedures for requesting extensions of time to file motions for rehearing of appellate decisions. The motion contains a certificate of service dated December 19, 2001, and a filing letter dated December 19, 2001.
There is no constitutional right in Texas to hybrid representation, that is, partially pro se and partially by counsel. See Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 280 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). Nevertheless, even though the record does not reflect that his appellate counsel has been discharged or relieved of his representation duties, we have considered appellant's pro se motion.
The motion asserts, in substance, that (1) numerous errors were committed in the conduct of appellant's trial, (2) his appellate counsel refused to present appellate issues concerning those errors, and (3) the trial errors and ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel warrant some type of relief.
The motion presents matters previously urged by appellant in pro se letters and other documents filed with the clerk during the pendency of his appeal. The motion, which we construe as a motion for extension of time to file a further motion for rehearing, see TRAP 49.8, is overruled.
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
1. Further reference to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure will be by reference
to TRAP _____.
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NO. 07-10-0275-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
SEPTEMBER 15, 2010
GERALD BROWDER,
Appellant
v.
JAMES LOWELL PENTON, JR., AS THE INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES LOWELL PENTON, DECEASED,
Appellee
_____________________________
FROM THE PROBATE COURT OF DENTON COUNTY;
NO. PR-2008-00217-02; HONORABLE DON R. WINDLE, PRESIDING
______________________________
Order of Dismissal
______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant timely noticed his appeal and both records were timely filed. On July 20, 2010, appellant and appellee filed an agreed motion to remand in order to effectuate a settlement agreement. On July 30, 2010, this Court remanded the case to the trial court and advised the parties that a copy of any orders executed effectuating the settlement must be filed in a supplemental clerks record along with a joint motion of the parties requesting the reinstatement and dismissal of the appeal on or before August 30, 2010. They were also told that the failure to file either would result in the dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution. August 30th passed and neither party has contacted the Court as directed. Thus, pursuant to Rule 42.3(b) and (c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, this cause is dismissed for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with a court order.
It is so ordered.
Per Curiam