NO. 07-07-0065-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
JUNE 12, 2008
______________________________
ELIZABETH HILL,
                                                                                                 Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                                                                 Appellee
          _________________________________
FROM THE 403RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY;
NO. D-1-DC-05-300771; HON. BRENDA KENNEDY, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Memorandum Opinion
_______________________________
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Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
          Elizabeth Hill was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty years in prison. She appeals that conviction in four issues by 1) attacking the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, 2) challenging the courtâs failure to instruct the jury that a negative finding on sudden passion must be unanimous, and 3) attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to prove sudden passion. We affirm.
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          Issues 1 and 2 - Legal and Factual Sufficiency
          The standards by which we review legal and factual sufficiency are well established. We refer the parties to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) for explanation of them.
          The evidence at trial was uncontested that Hill shot and killed her husband Joseph Lucas. She contended she did so, however, in self defense and as a result of an abusive relationship. Hill argues that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defense. When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the factfinderâs rejection of self defense in a murder case, we do not look to whether the State presented evidence that refuted the theory of self defense but instead determine whether any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and would have also found against the defendant on the issue of self defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller v. State, 177 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist. 2005, pet. refâd). Furthermore, at the time of trial, a person could use deadly force in her own defense to the degree she reasonably believed the force was immediately necessary to protect herself against the otherâs use or attempted use of unlawful force and if a reasonable person in the actorâs situation would not have retreated. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §9.32(a) (Vernon 2003).
          The record shows that 1) appellant was perceived by persons who knew the couple to have the stronger personality, 2) appellant was very angry over Joseph having disciplined their son in an inappropriate manner and requested that he move out, 3) she gave opposite stories to persons about whether the marriage was over or could be saved after a joint counseling session, 4) during that counseling session, the counselor did not perceive appellant to feel personally threatened by Joseph but found her to be concerned that Joseph not take any of her personal belongings, 5) appellant called Joseph abusive names during the counseling session but Joseph did not reciprocate and took responsibility for his inappropriate behavior with his son, 6) although appellant testified she was afraid of Joseph and asked a neighbor to be at the house when Joseph came to collect his personal belongings, the neighbor never heard any arguments or raised voices while appellant and Joseph were downstairs discussing finances and perceived the couple to be friendly, 7) although appellant testified she was afraid of Joseph, she agreed to accompany him alone upstairs to collect his belongings without asking the neighbor to accompany them, 8) about 20 or 30 seconds after appellant and Joseph went upstairs, appellant began screaming that Joseph should let go of her but the neighbor never heard sounds of a struggle or Joseph say anything, 9) appellant continued to scream for several minutes, but the neighbor never heard any sounds from Joseph until he heard an âugh,â 10) four shots were fired into Joseph with two of them having a trajectory sharply downward, 11) forensic evidence showed the first two shots were probably in the face and the hand which then penetrated into Josephâs chest causing him to fall and the last two shots were fired into his shoulder and head, 12) any of the four shots could ultimately have been fatal, 13) there were no obvious signs of a struggle in the coupleâs bedroom or closet where Joseph was found, 14) the blood spatter was found no higher than four feet above the ground and blood spatter was consistent with Joseph being no higher than one and one-half to two feet from the floor when he was shot in the head, 15) no blood was found outside of the closet, 16) appellant never saw a weapon on Joseph that night and appellant had never known him to carry or own a weapon, 17) appellant had been a Travis County jailer and had firearm training, 18) appellant had no visible blood, red marks, bruises, or scratches on her after the murder, 19) a fellow prisoner stated that appellant told her she had antagonized Joseph into attacking her and then shot him, 20) the detective questioning appellant believed that her tears were forced since she tended to look at him for his reaction, 21) appellant expressed no remorse to investigating officers over the death of her husband, 22) appellant informed her cell mate that she was âtrying to save her house through the insurance on the husband,â and 23) appellant had previously disclosed to an officer that she was not in an abusive relationship with her husband. The foregoing is some evidence upon which a rational jury could conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant murdered her husband and did not act in self-defense.
          Admittedly, there had been an incident that appellant reported to police in 1997 when Joseph had allegedly pushed appellant into the bed causing her to fall to the floor and bruise herself. There was also expert testimony that appellant fell within the pattern of an abused wife in spite of her outwardly stronger personality. Appellant herself explained that she was so afraid of Joseph after she asked him to move out that she slept with a gun under her pillow. During the incident, she averred that Joseph had pulled her into the closet and locked her in a bear hug with his hand over her mouth while screaming and threatening to kill her and their sons. She further stated that she kneed him in the groin and, after he grabbed her leg, she reached for her gun in a shoe case (which she had just placed in that location that morning) and shot Joseph twice. Two more shots were fired inadvertently, according to her, after she fell in the outer closet and Joseph lunged at her. Yet, this testimony and other of its ilk simply raised issues of credibility. And, selecting the witness and testimony to believe falls within the bailiwick of the jury. For instance, it was up to that body to decide whether appellant spoke truthfully when she alleged that the decedent grabbed and screamed at her; again, the neighbor testified that he heard no noises coming from Joseph except a final grunt.
          So, based on the entire record before us, we cannot say that the juryâs verdict is supported by weak evidence or so against the great weight of the evidence as to undermine our confidence in the outcome. Simply put, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to uphold the verdict, and issues one and two are overruled.
          Issue 3 - Charge Error
          Appellant next complains of the trial courtâs failure to make clear to the jury in the charge on punishment that a finding either for or against sudden passion must be unanimous per Sanchez v. State, 23 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We overrule the issue.
          Here, the trial court instructed the jury, via separate paragraphs, about its need to decide whether or not appellant acted under sudden passion. So too did it inform the jury of the range of punishment applicable in either situation. It subsequently closed its instructions by telling the jurors that â[y]our verdict must each be unanimous.â (Emphasis added). After deliberating, the jury returned one form addressing the matter of sudden passion and another setting punishment. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court fulfilled its obligation in question through informing the jury that each verdict must be unanimous. See Cartier v. State, 58 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. App.âAmarillo 2001, pet. refâd) (finding the general instruction that the verdict must be unanimous sufficient to instruct the jury that its finding on sudden passion must be unanimous).
          Issue 4 - Evidence to Support Sudden Passion
          Finally, appellant argues that the jury finding against sudden passion was in error. It is not clear whether appellant is challenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence or both of them. However, appellant does not prevail under either one, and we overrule the issue.
           Sudden passion is passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §19.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). Next, adequate cause is cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. Id. §19.02(a)(1).
          Evidence appears of record that, if believed, could support a finding of sudden passion. Yet, the very same evidence depicting that appellant did not act in self-defense also constitutes some evidence that she acted from cool reflection or otherwise planned the murder. Again, there were no signs of a struggle in the bedroom or closet or on appellant. Moreover, the only surviving witness at the scene, other than appellant, heard no screams or threats purportedly uttered by Joseph, only those of appellant. This and other matter of record tended to contradict appellantâs version of events.
          As already stated, the jury was free to disbelieve appellantâs story. Even if Joseph had been abusive to appellant in the past, it had before it some evidence upon which it could decide, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellantâs actions did not result directly from or arise out of provocation at the time of the offense. And, we cannot say that the evidence supporting such a decision was weak or overwhelmed by contrary evidence.
          Having overruled all of appellantâs issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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                                                                           Per Curiam
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NO. 07-08-00509-CR
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
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FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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AT AMARILLO
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PANEL C
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MARCH 31, 2010
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TIMOTHY RAMBER, APPELLANT
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v.
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THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
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FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
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NO. 2008-418,717; HONORABLE CECIL G. PURYEAR, JUDGE
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Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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Appellant, Timothy Ramber, appeals his conviction for the offense of driving while intoxicated[1] (DWI), third or more offense,[2] enhanced by one prior felony conviction and subsequent sentence of 25 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (ID-TDCJ). By one issue, appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to use appellantÂs prior DWI convictions to elevate the current offense to felony status. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant was involved in an automobile accident in Lubbock, Texas. As a result of the accident investigation, appellant was charged with DWI. Appellant was ultimately indicted for DWI, third or more offense, with one prior felony alleged for punishment enhancement. AppellantÂs trial counsel filed a motion to quash and an exception to the substance of the indictment. The indictment against appellant contained allegations of four prior DWI convictions, one from Galveston County, Texas, in 1994, and three from Matagorda County, Texas, in 1991. In the motion, appellant argued that the prior convictions used to elevate the DWI charge to a felony were the result of pro se pleas and were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Additionally, the motion alleged that the prior convictions were obtained via plea negotiations with the State and the use of these prior pleas violated the terms of the agreement and, therefore, violated the contract between the appellant and State.[3] According to appellant, a violation of the contract between himself and the State resulted in a constitutional violation under the United States Constitution.Â
The trial court conducted hearings on appellantÂs motion to quash on September 22, 2008, and October 29, 2008. During the September 22nd hearing, appellant was called to testify about the facts surrounding his prior pleas of guilty. During his testimony, the following occurred:
Q: And you dealt directly with the  I guess the county attorney in Matagorda?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay. And did he make some promises to you in regards to those guilty convictions?
A: Well, I mean, he just said, ÂAs long as you donÂt get another one, you know within ten years, it wonÂt be a felony, you know.
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At the hearing on October 29, 2008, appellantÂs trial counsel called the former county attorney of Matagorda County, Texas, to testify. A number of issues were discussed in his testimony, including:
1.   There was rarely a court reporter present to prepare a record of any of the guilty pleas;
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2.   Even though it was not his role to admonish defendants who wished to plead guilty, because the County Judge was a layman, he did often attempt to visit with the defendants about their rights before they appeared before the judge;
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3.   The only judicial admonishments he recalls the judge giving defendants were to their waiver of an attorney, waiver of a jury trial, and pleading guilty because they wanted to plead guilty;
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4.   He never recalled telling any defendant that, if they did not get another DWI for ten years, the plea they were entering would not be used against them.
Appellant again testified at the October 29th hearing. Upon this occasion, trial counsel framed the questions as:
Q: Did anyone ever make any representations to you that if you went more than ten years without another DWI that it wouldnÂt be used for enhancement purposes against you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And who told you that?
A: The man that offered, you know, the plea.
Q: Okay. And is that part of the reason you decided to enter into the plea?
A: Yes, sir.
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In addition to the testimony from the former county attorney and appellant, the judgments in each of the three prior pleas of guilty to DWI in Matagorda County were entered into the record. There was, however, no reporterÂs record of the prior pleas of guilty offered. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled the motion and appellant subsequently waived a jury and entered a plea of no contest to the indictment before the court, without a recommendation as to punishment. Appellant also entered a plea of not true to the punishment enhancement paragraph of the indictment. After hearing the evidence on punishment, the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true[4] and sentenced appellant to a term of 25 years confinement in the ID-TDCJ. AppellantÂs right to appeal was certified by the trial court. Pursuant to that certification, appellant presents one issue contending that the trial court erred in allowing the use of the previous DWI convictions. We disagree with appellant and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Standard of Review
           The trial courtÂs ruling on the motion to quash was based upon evidence it heard in the form of testimony from appellant and the former county attorney of Matagorda County, Texas. There were also documentary exhibits from each of the prior pleas of guilty entered into this record. The trial courtÂs ruling was an application of the law to the facts established by this evidence. Accordingly, we will apply a mixed standard of review to the trial courtÂs denial of the motion to quash. Under this standard, great deference is accorded the trial courtÂs determination of historical facts. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We use this deferential standard because the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We do not, however, apply that same deferential standard to an application of the law to the facts. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. These matters are reviewed de novo. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).
Analysis
           AppellantÂs sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing appellantÂs prior DWI convictions to be used to enhance the offense to a third degree felony. This is so, according to appellant, because such use violated the agreement he entered into with the State that, if appellant did not get another DWI within ten years, the convictions could not be used to elevate a subsequent DWI to a felony. Following appellantÂs theory, the use by the State of the prior convictions to elevate the current DWI to a third degree felony violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
           Before turning to the issue of the Contracts Clause, we note that, at the trial, appellantÂs counsel specifically disavowed an intention to attack the indictment on the basis that the use of the prior convictions operated as an ex post facto law. Yet, appellantÂs brief spends a considerable amount of time discussing this issue. To the extent appellant is attempting to interject this issue into the case, the matter is not preserved for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Therefore, this issue is not before us in this appeal. See Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).
           Appellant contends that he had a plea agreement that included a specific promise by the State that, if more than ten years passed before the occurrence of another DWI, then the prior DWI could not be used to elevate the subsequent DWI. To support that proposition, appellant refers to his testimony at the pretrial hearing. In essence, appellant contends that the promises the county attorney for Matagorda County, Texas, made at the time he entered his plea became part of the plea agreement and cannot be violated by the State.
           A plea agreement is contractual in nature. Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). When the court accepts the plea agreement, the terms of the bargain become binding upon all parties. Ex parte Williams, 758 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). However, there are no contractual rights to demand specific performance over terms not appearing in the agreement or the record. Id.
           The record shows that the plea papers in all of the prior pleas of guilty were presented to the court. A review of these documents reveals no promises by the State regarding the use of those particular pleas in a subsequent DWI, within ten years or outside of ten years. Accordingly, the record fails to support appellantÂs contention that the contract appellant contends was breached by the State was ever entered into. The terms appellant attempts to impose on the State do not appear in the record of the pleas. Id.
           Further, the trial court is in a better position to judge the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855. Because of this fact, we afford great deference to the trial courtÂs determination of historical facts. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. In the case before the court, the trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courtÂs ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling so long as those findings are supported by the record. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 353.
           Our examination of the record does not support the contention of appellant. The record reveals that the first time he testified, September 22, 2008, all appellant stated was that he was told that, if he did not get another DWI within ten years, a subsequent DWI would not be a felony. At the later hearing of October 29, 2008, appellant answered yes to the following question: ÂDid anyone ever make any representations to you that if you went more than ten years without another DWI that it wouldnÂt be used for enhancement purposes against you? According to appellant, the man that told him that was the former county attorney for Matagorda County. However, when the former county attorney testified, he said that he did not recall ever telling any defendant that, if they did not get another DWI for ten years, it would not be used against them.Â
The trial courtÂs ruling about the historical facts, based upon his observation of the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, is supported by the record. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 353. If there was no plea agreement contract regarding the future use of the DWI convictions, then the use of the prior DWI convictions to elevate the current DWI to felony status could not violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Based upon our de novo review of the trial courtÂs application of the law to the record, appellantÂs single contention is overruled. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87.
Conclusion
           Having overruled appellantÂs issue, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.Â
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                                                                                               Mackey K. Hancock
                                                                                                           Justice
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Do not publish.      Â
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[1] See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).
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[2] See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.09(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
[3] At the time of the prior pleas, a previous DWI conviction could not be used for enhancement purposes after ten years passed between convictions. See Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3697-98, repealed by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 3, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3363, 3364 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.09 (Vernon Supp. 2009)).
[4] Appellant challenges the use of the three prior DWI convictions, but does not challenge the trial courtÂs finding of true on the prior felony enhancement paragraph.