Robert Joseph LeJeune v. State

NO. 07-07-0507-CR

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL D


JANUARY 11, 2008


______________________________



ROBERT JOSEPH LEJEUNE, APPELLANT


V.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE


_________________________________


FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY;


NO. 99269-M; HONORABLE JOHN STEVENS, JUDGE


_______________________________



Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.



MEMORANDUM OPINION



          Appellant, Robert Joseph LeJeune, acting pro se, has filed with this Court a Petition for Acquittal and Arrest of Judgment pertaining to the judgment entered against him in Cause No. 99269-M, filed in the Criminal District Court in and for Jefferson County, Texas. Finding that we lack jurisdiction to consider this matter, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

          This Court is obligated to determine, sua sponte, its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) overruled on other grounds, State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 901-03 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). This Court’s appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to cases appealed from trial courts in our district. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §22.201 (Vernon 2004). Jefferson County is not within this Court’s district. See id. at (h).

          Although not a part of Appellant’s petition, this Court has determined that the judgment in question is the subject of an appeal pending before the 9th Court of Appeals as Cause No. 09-07-00408-CR, styled Robert Joseph LeJeune v. The State of Texas. As of this date, an Anders brief has been filed, but no judgment has been rendered. Appellant’s prayer seeks to have this Court “review the defendant’s Petition for Acquittal and Arrest of Judgment and render an opinion of acquittal of defendant’s conviction.”

          Appellant relies upon Rule 17.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which concerns instances in which a court of appeals is unable to take immediate action, and Rule 17.2, providing for action by “the nearest court of appeals that is able to take immediate action,” as a basis for maintaining that this Court has jurisdiction to review this matter. Appellant, relying upon his incorrect reading of Rule 19.1, postulates that the plenary power of the 9th Court of Appeals expired 60 days after entry of the trial court’s judgment. Appellant further maintains that because the 9th Court of Appeals did not take action within that period of time, it was unable to take immediate action. Not only has Appellant failed to grasp the distinction between the trial court’s judgment and the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Appellant has provided no explanation how, given the distance between the 9th Court of Appeals in Beaumont and the 7th Court of Appeals in Amarillo, this Court could be considered “the nearest available court of appeals.” Because the 9th Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal, absent a valid transfer to this Court, we have no jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s request, and nothing in the documents Appellant has filed demonstrates we otherwise have authority to grant any relief he seeks. See Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522-23.

          Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

 

                                                                           Patrick A. Pirtle

                                                                                 Justice


 

 




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  NO. 07-10-0294-CR

 

                                                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

                                       FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

                                                                 AT AMARILLO

 

                                                                     PANEL D

 

                                                               AUGUST 4, 2010

                                            ______________________________

 

 

                                                     JAMES RICHARD DOWNS,

 

Appellant

 

                                                                             v.

 

                                                        THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 

Appellee

                                         _________________________________

 

                        FROM THE 43rd DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY;

 

                           NO. CR09-0578; HON. DON CHRESTMAN, PRESIDING

                                           _______________________________

 

                                                          On Motion to Dismiss

                                           _______________________________

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

Appellant James Richard Downs, by and through his attorney, has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal because he no longer desires to prosecute it.  Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a) and dismiss the appeal.  Having dismissed the appeal at appellant=s request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

 

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