Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10121
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-01362-CLS
JOSEPH E. KING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ADTRAN, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(September 8, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 2 of 8
Joseph King appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Adtran, Inc. (“Adtran”) in his age discrimination and retaliation lawsuit
filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) and (d), and Alabama Code §§ 25-1-21, 25-
1-28. On appeal, King argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on his age discrimination claim by concluding that although he had
adduced evidence that one of Adtran’s proffered reasons for his termination was
pretextual, he failed to demonstrate that Adtran’s second stated reason was pretext
for discrimination. King further argues that he should not be required to establish
that each of Adtran’s proffered reasons were pretext for discrimination because
such a requirement is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. King also argues that
the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Adtran on his retaliation
claim. We affirm.
I.
We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.
Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n, 446 F.3d 1160, 1161-62 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing all of the
facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; see
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine factual dispute exists if a jury could return a
2
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 3 of 8
verdict for the non-moving party. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,
1085 (11th Cir. 2004).
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), it is unlawful
for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee who is
at least 40 years old on the basis of his age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). A
plaintiff may support his ADEA claim through either direct or circumstantial
evidence. Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.
2014).
Where the plaintiff supports his claim with circumstantial evidence, we
apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. Under that
framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination. Id. If he does so, the burden of production then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
employment action. Id. If the employer satisfies this burden, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. Id.
To ultimately prevail on an age discrimination claim, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was the “but for” cause of
his termination. Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78,
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009)). We have held that the McDonnell Douglas
3
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 4 of 8
framework continues to apply post-Gross. Sims v. MVM Inc., 704 F.3d 1327,
1332 (11th Cir. 2013).
In a traditional age discrimination case, the plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case under the ADEA by showing that: (1) he was a member of the protected
age group, (2) he was qualified for his position, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) he was replaced by a younger individual. Chapman v.
AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
To establish pretext, the plaintiff may demonstrate “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find
them unworthy of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538
(11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). “However, a reason cannot be proved to be a
‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and
that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993). Accordingly, it is not enough to
“disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of
intentional discrimination.” Id. at 519, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. The mere fact that an
employer’s proffered reason was mistaken alone does not establish pretext.
Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1092. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
challenged employment action was in fact motivated by discriminatory animus. Id.
4
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 5 of 8
“If the employer proffers more than one legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the
plaintiff must rebut each of the reasons to survive a motion for summary
judgment.” Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037).
The Supreme Court stated in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 149-50, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-09 (2000), that “a prima facie case
and sufficient evidence to reject the employer’s [non-discriminatory] explanation
[for an adverse employment action] may permit a finding of liability,” and,
therefore, a plaintiff need not always be required to introduce additional,
independent evidence of discrimination. “[O]nce the employer’s justification has
been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the
actual reason for its decision.” Id. at 147-48, 120 S. Ct. at 2108-09.
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2153-54
(2003), the Supreme Court held that direct evidence of discrimination is not
required in order to prove employment discrimination in mixed-motive cases under
Title VII. The Supreme Court noted that the conventional rule of civil litigation
generally applied in Title VII cases, so that a plaintiff could prove his case by a
preponderance of the evidence using direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 99.
5
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 6 of 8
King has provided no evidence to rebut Adtran’s primary legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason – i.e., that King’s handling of the Huntsville City
Schools account was the reason for his termination. King’s own “belief” that
seeing older employees being let go and replaced by younger employees is mere
conjecture and is insufficient to establish discriminatory animus or prove the falsity
of Adtran’s justification. King further failed to provide evidence that he followed
company policy in handling the Huntsville City Schools account.
King’s argument that our holding in Chapman is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Reeves and Desert Palace is likewise without merit. In
Chapman, we discussed Reeves, but still held that a plaintiff was required to
produce sufficient evidence to rebut each of an employer’s proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. 229 F.3d at 1037.1 Chapman is binding precedent in
our circuit, and Desert Palace did not abrogate our holding in Chapman, as it did
1
The district court here noted that Adtran had articulated two primary reasons for
terminating King: (1) his failure to meet the requirements of his pending Performance
Improvement Plan (“PIP”), and (2) his inadequate handling of the Huntsville City Schools
account. The district court assumed that King had offered substantial evidence that the former
was unworthy of belief. Our own review of the evidence leaves us with considerable doubt that
King indeed has adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact in that regard.
Although the final data to confirm that King had failed to meet the requirements of his PIP was
not available when the termination decision was made, Koch – King’s supervisor who had
imposed the PIP and was monitoring King’s performance – testified that King had not met the
requirements and was not likely to be successful in doing so in the very short time remaining. In
any event, even assuming arguendo that the evidence suggests some weakness with respect to
this legitimate reason of Adtran, the evidence certainly does not undermine Adtran’s legitimate
reason relating to the Huntsville Schools account. Rather, the evidence relating to King’s PIP
supports Adtran’s legitimate concerns with respect to King’s performance.
6
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 7 of 8
not address the issue of whether a plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory
reason proffered by a defendant.
II.
The ADEA prohibits retaliation against private-sector employees who
complain of age discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to ADEA retaliation claims. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub.
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff alleging retaliation establishes a
prima facie case by showing that (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected
expression, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a
causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. Id.
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the employer articulates a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the materially adverse action, the plaintiff
must then show that the employer’s proffered reasons for taking the adverse action
were actually a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the
burden of “introducing evidence that could form the basis for a finding of facts,
which when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could allow
a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff has established
pretext, and that the action was taken in retaliation for engaging in the protected
activity.” Hairston, 9 F.3d at 921.
7
Case: 15-10121 Date Filed: 09/08/2015 Page: 8 of 8
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Adtran on
King’s retaliation claim. As discussed previously, Adtran articulated two
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for King’s termination. King has not
pointed to any evidence that would demonstrate that Adtran’s second reason for
terminating him was a pretext for retaliation. See Hairston, 9 F.3d at 921.
AFFIRMED.
8