FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 04 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES MARK HINKLEY, No. 13-35973
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05178-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SCOTT RUSSELL; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner James Mark Hinkley appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process violations arising out of a disciplinary hearing and the disposal of his
personal property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo. Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s due
process claim based on the unauthorized deprivation of his property because
Hinkley had an adequate postdeprivation remedy under Washington law. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional
deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s due
process claim based on his placement in administrative segregation because
Hinkley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was
deprived of a cognizable liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-
84 (1995) (holding that a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only
when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s due
process claim based on his loss of his good time credits because Hinkley failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was denied any procedural
2 13-35973
protections that were due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974)
(setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings).
We reject Hinkley’s contention that the district court erred in treating his
claims as state law claims.
We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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