James Hinkley v. Bernard Warner

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 04 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAMES MARK HINKLEY, No. 14-35603 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-05030-EFS v. MEMORANDUM* BERNARD WARNER; et al., Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 25, 2015** Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Washington state prisoner James Mark Hinkley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims arising out of a random urinalysis drug test. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Hinkley’s Fourth Amendment claim because Hinkley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his random urinalysis drug test was unreasonable. See Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 702-03 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth factors to determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and holding that a prisoner’s non-random urinalysis drug test was a reasonable search). Moreover, the district court properly dismissed Hinkley’s challenge to the urinalysis policy because it concluded the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. The district court properly dismissed Hinkley’s Eighth Amendment claim because Hinkley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of physical or mental harm to Hinkley when he was selected for a random urinalysis drug test. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally 2 14-35603 involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief). We reject Hinkley’s contention that the district court failed to permit discovery. Hinkley’s contempt motion, cross-noticed in Appeal Nos. 14-35602 and 14- 35603 and filed on January 2, 2015, is denied. AFFIRMED. 3 14-35603