This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1849
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Grady Dean Pederson,
Appellant.
Filed August 31, 2015
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Cottonwood County District Court
File No. 17-CR-12-150
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and
Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of failing to register as a predatory offender,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find that he knowingly
violated the predatory-offender-registration statute. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Grady Dean Pederson is a person required to register as a predatory
offender until April 15, 2020. According to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension’s (BCA) records, Pederson’s registered primary residence in March 2012
was in Fulda in Murray County. On March 27, 2012, a Windom police officer was
informed that Pederson was staying at an address in Windom in Cottonwood County.
Pederson had not notified authorities that he was no longer staying at his registered
primary residence in Fulda. The officer spoke to Pederson on March 28, and Pederson
stated that he had just starting living at the Windom address. Pederson would not tell the
officer where he had been staying prior to March 28 but indicated that he had been
dropped off at the Windom address on March 23.
The state charged Pederson with one count of knowingly failing to register as a
predatory offender in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2010). The state
later moved to amend the complaint to add two other counts of predatory offender
(knowingly violates registration requirement), and the district court granted the motion.
Count one alleged that Pederson “failed to give written notice of the new primary
address” at least five days before he started living there. Count two alleged that Pederson
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“did not give written notice to the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the
area of [Pederson’s] primary address that [he] is no longer living or staying at an address
in that jurisdiction immediately after [he] is no longer living or staying at that address.”
Count three alleged that Pederson, “if homeless, did not register with the law
enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area where [he] is staying within 24
hours after entering the jurisdiction.”
At the beginning of the jury trial, Pederson stipulated to the fact that he was a
predatory offender required to register during the applicable time frame of March 23 to
March 27, 2012. After the conclusion of the trial testimony, the district court granted
Pederson’s motion to dismiss counts one and two because it found that Pederson did not
have a primary residence in March 2012. The district court then submitted count three to
the jury, and the jury found Pederson guilty of failing to register as a predatory offender
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a (2010). The district court sentenced
Pederson to 21 months in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Pederson argues that the state failed to prove that he knowingly violated the
predatory-offender-registration statute. When addressing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge, our review is limited to determining whether the evidence “was sufficient to
permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426,
430 (Minn. 1989). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State
v. Chavarria-Cruz, 839 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). This is
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particularly true when resolution of the matter depends on conflicting testimony “because
weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the jury.” State v.
Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). We will not reverse a conviction when the
jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of
overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” could reasonably conclude that the
appellant was proven guilty of the offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476
(Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
The elements of Pederson’s failure-to-register offense are that (1) Pederson is a
person required to register as a predatory offender, (2) the time period during which
Pederson was required to register had not elapsed, (3) Pederson knowingly violated any
of the requirements to register, and (4) Pederson’s acts took place on or about March 23
to March 27, 2012, in Cottonwood County. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2010). Pederson
stipulated to the first two elements. For the third element, the state was required to prove
that Pederson knowingly violated the requirement that if he lacked a primary address, he
had to “register with the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area where
[he] is staying within 24 hours after entering the jurisdiction.” Id., subd. 3a(c).
Pederson’s probation officer testified at trial that he explained the registration
requirements to Pederson and advised him to complete “change of information” forms
when necessary. The probation officer recalled telling Pederson that he had to register a
new primary address five days prior to moving but did not specifically recall telling
Pederson “what needed to happen if he became homeless.” Pederson’s sister testified
that she dropped Pederson off at a residence in Windom on March 23. She stated that he
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did not return to her house that night and that she did not see him at his registered
primary residence in Fulda between March 23 and March 27. His sister also testified that
she “asked through a bunch of friends; and, yes, he was staying at the [Windom]
address.” A.R.S. testified that she owns the Windom residence where Pederson was
dropped off on March 23, that Pederson stayed overnight from March 23 to March 24,
that he was at the residence “on and off” through March 28, and that he stayed overnight
“[m]aybe a night or two after” or “maybe three of the nights” between March 23 and
March 28. The police officer testified that Pederson came to the Windom law-
enforcement center on March 28 to register the Windom address as his new primary
address.
Pederson testified that he was living at the Fulda address in October and
November 2011, until he was committed for mental illness. Pederson acknowledged that
the Fulda address was his registered primary address at the time of his commitment. He
testified that after he was discharged from his commitment, he “was, in effect, homeless,”
and stayed with his sister for a few days. Contrary to the testimony of his sister and
A.R.S., Pederson testified that after his sister dropped him off at the Windom residence
on March 23, she came back to get him later that night, so it “wasn’t like an overnight
stay.” Pederson stated that he did not start staying at the Windom residence until March
27 or March 28.
Viewing this evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict and assum[ing]
that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict,” Chavarria-
Cruz, 839 N.W.2d at 519 (quotation omitted), and recognizing that “weighing the
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credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the jury,” Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d at
584, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jurors to find Pederson
guilty of not registering within 24 hours of entering the jurisdiction.
“Staying”
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(c), states:
A person who lacks a primary address shall register
with the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the
area where the person is staying within 24 hours after
entering the jurisdiction. Each time a person who lacks a
primary address moves to a new jurisdiction without
acquiring a new primary address, the person shall register
with the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the
area where the person is staying within 24 hours after
entering the jurisdiction.
Pederson argues that “staying” in subdivision 3a(c) means “a continuing presence
for 24 hours.” But this interpretation defeats the primary purpose of the predatory-
offender-registration statute, which is “to create a sexual-offender registry to assist law
enforcement with investigations.” State v. Ulrich, 829 N.W.2d 429, 430 (Minn. App.
2013). Under this interpretation, persons required to register could escape from ever
having to register by moving to a different jurisdiction every 23 hours. This type of
loophole was not the legislature’s intention. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014) (stating that
the objective of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature”). Even if we were to adopt Pederson’s interpretation of “staying,” his
argument is unavailing because his sister’s testimony and A.R.S.’s testimony provide
sufficient evidence to permit the jurors to find that Pederson maintained a continuing
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presence at the Windom residence for more than 24 hours between March 23 and March
27, 2012.
“Knowingly”
Pederson argues that even if there is sufficient evidence to prove that he violated
subdivision 3a(c), there is insufficient evidence to prove that he did it knowingly.
“Construction of a criminal statute is a question of law,” which we review de novo. State
v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2002). “A statute must be construed according to
its plain language. If ambiguous, the intent of the legislature controls. A rule of strict
construction applies to penal statutes, and all reasonable doubt concerning legislative
intent should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citations omitted).
The statute provides that it is a crime to “knowingly violate[] any of [predatory-
offender-registration] provisions or intentionally provide[] false information.” Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). No published caselaw defines “knowingly” in the registration
statute. But in State v. Gunderson, this court interpreted “knowingly” as used in the
violation-of-a-harassment-restraining-order statute and held that a person is guilty of
violating that statute if he is “aware” that his conduct is “prohibited.” 812 N.W.2d 156,
160-61 (Minn. App. 2012). More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted
“knowingly” in the context of the domestic-abuse-no-contact-order statute and held that
the defendant must “perceive directly” that the conduct violated the statute. State v.
Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 29 (Minn. 2013). The supreme court stated that “[t]he question
of whether Watkins knowingly violated the DANCO statute turns on Watkins’
knowledge that his conduct violated the DANCO at the time of the offense.” Id. at 30.
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Here, Pederson received his first predatory-offender notification in 1996.
Pederson then received annual address-verification notices from the BCA that stated,
“Please be reminded that you must continue to advise authorities of any address changes
five days prior to moving. . . . It is currently a felony to fail to register and notify proper
authorities of any change in address.” Pederson submitted multiple “change of address”
notices over the years. In addition, Pederson signed registration advisory forms every
year, from at least 2007 to 2012, that stated, “I have been notified of my duty to register
in accordance with M.S. § 243.166 and/or 243.167.” The form also stated:
I understand that if I do not have a primary address I must
report to the law enforcement authority with jurisdiction in
the area where I will be staying within 24 hours of leaving my
former primary address. . . . I understand that if I move to a
new jurisdiction I must report to that law enforcement
authority within 24 hours of entering the jurisdiction.
Pederson testified that, after he was discharged from his mental-health commitment, he
was “homeless.” He also testified that he could not return to his registered primary
address in Fulda.
Pederson argues that he did not “perceive directly” that his conduct violated the
statute because neither the advisory forms nor his probation officer informed him of his
“general duty to register . . . with any jurisdiction in which he was staying.” Pederson
argues that he was only aware that he had to register if he left a primary residence or
moved to another jurisdiction. Pederson contends that because he lacked a primary
address and because he interpreted “move” to mean “relocate” to an “established” new
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place, he did not “perceive directly” that he had left a primary residence in March 2012
or that he “moved” to another jurisdiction before March 28, 2012.
But based on the evidence produced at trial, including the numerous signed
registration advisory forms, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that
Pederson (1) knew he was required to register, (2) left his primary residence at some
point prior to March 2012, (3) lacked a primary residence, (4) stayed at the Windom
residence for one or more nights between March 23 and March 27, and (5) had been
advised of his “duty to register in accordance with M.S. § 243.166.” Therefore, there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Pederson knew that he was required to
register with law enforcement within 24 hours of entering a new jurisdiction and that he
knowingly violated the provisions of subdivision 3a(c) by not registering with law
enforcement between March 23 and March 27, 2012.
Affirmed.
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