in Re Commitment of Richardo Zamora

In The



Court of Appeals



Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-06-504 CV

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IN RE COMMITMENT OF RICHARDO ZAMORA


On Appeal from the 284th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 06-01-00241-CV




MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court civilly committed Richardo Zamora after a jury found that Zamora suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Zamora raises three issues in his appeal from his commitment as a sexually violent predator. We hold the trial court ruled within the bounds of its discretion in permitting the State's two experts to testify and that their testimony need not be excluded in considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.

Zamora's first issue challenges the qualifications of the State's testifying psychiatrist, Dr. Sheri Gaines, and the reliability of Dr. Gaines's opinion that Zamora suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. The Rules of Evidence permit expert testimony on scientific, technical, or other specialized subjects if the testimony would assist the fact finder in understanding the evidence or determining a fact issue. See Tex. R. Evid. 702. "A trial court's acceptance of a witness's qualifications as an expert is reviewable for an abuse of discretion." Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 718-19 (Tex. 1998). We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on the reliability of the expert's opinion unless the record shows that the court abused its discretion by acting without reference to the pertinent guiding rules or principles. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995).

Zamora argues Dr. Gaines possesses insufficient experience and training to assist the jury in understanding the evidence in the specialized area of diagnosing sex offenders and evaluating their risk for recidivism. Dr. Gaines received her bachelor's degree in biology from The University of Texas and graduated from The University of Texas Medical School in Houston, where she completed her residency in general psychiatry, a fellowship in child psychiatry, and served as chief resident in the Division of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. Dr. Gaines is board certified in psychiatry as well as child and adolescent psychiatry. She has several years of experience working as a prison psychiatrist. At the time of trial, Dr. Gaines had evaluated fourteen individuals for civil commitment proceedings. The witness possessed education in the field in which she offered her opinion, and she had experience working with sexually violent offenders and evaluating them for civil commitment. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Gaines to be qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry and qualified to testify to the opinions she expressed.

In assessing the reliability of an expert's testimony, we consider non-exclusive factors such as: (1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique's potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. For psychiatric or psychological expert testimony, courts have applied the "analytical-gap" analysis in reviewing the trial court's gatekeeping for abuse of discretion. See In re Estate of Robinson, 140 S.W.3d 782, 792 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied); In re Commitment of Martinez, No. 09-05-493 CV, 2006 WL 2439752, *3 (Tex. App.--Beaumont Aug. 24, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). Expert testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge must have some basis in principles, research, and methodology to demonstrate its reliability. See generally Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726. Expert testimony is unreliable if there is "too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Id.

Zamora argues that Dr. Gaines's testimony is unreliable because she used her clinical discretion in making her diagnosis and in determining that Zamora met the criteria for pedophilia. Zamora contends the lack of a clinical check on her clinical discretion and her failure to independently verify the information provided in Zamora's referral packet make Dr. Gaines's diagnoses of pedophilia, alcohol dependency, antisocial personality disorder, and sexual sadism inadmissible. Zamora's arguments regarding peer review are similar to those presented in another civil commitment proceeding in which the appellant challenged the reliability of Dr. Gaines's expert opinion. See In re Commitment of Gollihar, No. 09-06-243 CV, 2007 WL 1438585 (Tex. App.--Beaumont May 17, 2007, no. pet. h.). In Gollihar, we noted that the record did not show that the clinical judgments of physicians generally, or psychiatrists specifically, are subjected to peer review. Id., 2007 WL 1438585 at *8-*9. We must, therefore, consider whether Dr. Gaines sufficiently articulated her methodology to demonstrate the reliability of her opinion.

In Zamora's trial, Dr. Gaines described the methods she used to evaluate Zamora for a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. She examined the victim statements, offense reports, sex offender treatment program data, prison medical records, and prison disciplinary records. She examined the report of the psychologist who administered psychological testing. She interviewed Zamora for one and one-half hours, beginning with non-threatening open-ended questions and proceeding to specific questions as the interview progressed. Dr. Gaines noted that Zamora minimized his behavior, such as the level of his alcohol abuse and whether he engages in sexual fantasies, and determined that he was untruthful and unreliable. The witness statements revealed frequent acts of vaginal, anal, and oral sexual assault on more than one child living in the household and an incident in which Zamora kidnapped and attempted to sexually assault a stranger. Zamora either denied the offenses or refused to discuss them. In assessing Zamora's risk to reoffend, Dr. Gaines considered that Zamora had twenty major disciplinary infractions while in prison, that he is not in a sex offender treatment program, and that on three occasions Zamora failed to complete supervised release. Dr. Gaines testified that she diagnosed anti-social personality disorder because Zamora met the criteria for a conduct disorder before age eighteen: in the course of her interview with him, Zamora admitted he "had lots of trouble when he was in the eighth grade, that he was constantly in the principal's office and he was getting in fights."

Zamora's expert, Dr. Jason Dunham, described a similar process he engaged in while evaluating Zamora. Dr. Dunham, a licensed psychologist, interviewed Zamora for one hour and forty-five minutes, beginning with benign open-ended questions and proceeding to questions the records showed were important to ask. Dr. Dunham decided some of the offenses described did not happen as claimed by the victims. He rejected the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder because he did not have any information about Zamora's childhood, and instead diagnosed Zamora as a psychopath. Dr. Dunham agreed that a psychopath would have a behavioral abnormality if he were a sexual deviant, but concluded that Zamora sought control and dominance and was not a sexual deviant. Dr. Dunham believed Zamora had not tried to force one of the alleged victims to engage in nonconsensual sex because "[t]hat would not be consistent with his psychopathy, minus a sexual deviancy." Dr. Dunham testified Zamora did not meet the criteria for pedophilia because the repeated acts of sexual intercourse with the eleven-year-old and the twelve-year-old in the household ceased with Zamora's arrest approximately three months after the children moved in with him. Dr. Dunham agreed that the sexual assaults stopped because of Zamora's arrest, and that the sexual assaults would have continued for some period of time, but that he could not say whether the sexual assaults would have continued for the six months required to meet the criteria for pedophilia. According to Dr. Dunham, the actuarials show Zamora would be at a 26 to 33 percent risk to reoffend, but it is possible for a person to have low scores and still be at high risk to reoffend, and that was why "you have to use some clinical judgment." The methodology described in Dr. Dunham's testimony does not illuminate an analytical gap in Dr. Gaines's methodology.

On this record, the trial court did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in concluding that there was not too great an analytical gap between Dr. Gaines' opinion testimony and its basis. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Gaines's opinion-that Zamora has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence-was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence. We overrule issue one.

In his second issue, Zamora contends the trial court erred in denying a request to conduct a Robinson hearing during the trial. Although Zamora complains that the trial court did not require the State to demonstrate the admissibility of the evidence, Zamora does not challenge the reliability of this testimony. Instead, he complains that the trial court failed to exercise its function as evidentiary gatekeeper. On appeal, Zamora claims he challenged Dr. Charles Woodrick's foundational data.

Called as a witness for the State, Dr. Woodrick testified that he obtained a bachelor's degree in sociology from Hartwick College, Oneonta, New York, a master's in counseling from State University College in Oneonta, New York, and a Ph.D. in counseling psychology from Texas A&M University. Dr. Woodrick testified that he is a licensed psychologist in the State of Texas and that he has worked as a staff psychologist at Texas A&M, as director of the counseling center at Lamar University, and held a position at the MHMR center in Beaumont, and as a staff psychologist for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Counsel for Zamora then requested the trial court to conduct a Robinson hearing to "show that he's not a qualified expert." The trial court denied the motion because Dr. Woodrick had already established his qualifications for the record. When counsel for the State asked Dr. Woodrick what he is asked to determine when he receives an individual for possible civil commitment, the trial court permitted Zamora's counsel to take Dr. Woodrick on voir dire for the purpose of establishing the psychologist's familiarity with the definitions in the sexually violent predator commitment statutes.

"A two-part test governs whether expert testimony is admissible: (1) the expert must be qualified; and (2) the testimony must be relevant and be based on a reliable foundation." Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001). Zamora's initial request to proceed outside the hearing of the jury concerned the first part of the test-the expert's qualifications-and the witness had already stated his qualifications without objection. The trial court provided Zamora with an opportunity to test the reliability of Dr. Woodrick's opinion testimony without the jury being present. Whether Dr. Woodrick's opinion testimony was shown to be reliable is not at issue in this appeal. The Rules of Evidence permit the procedure employed by the trial court in this case. See Tex. R. Evid. 705(b) ("Prior to the expert giving the expert's opinion or disclosing the underlying facts or data, a party against whom the opinion is offered upon request . . . in a civil case may[] be permitted to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based."). We overrule issue two.

Zamora's third issue asks this question: "Whether in the absence of testimony from a qualified expert witness whose methodology could be established as reliable, the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Zamora suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence?" This question and the supporting argument in Zamora's brief to this Court presuppose that Zamora prevails upon his first two issues. Because we have found no abuse of discretion in admitting the expert opinion testimony of Dr. Gaines and Dr. Woodrick, there

is no reason to analyze the sufficiency of the remaining evidence. (1) Zamora does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict with Gaines's and Woodrick's testimony included. (2) We overrule issue three and affirm the judgment.

AFFIRMED.











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STEVE McKEITHEN

Chief Justice

Submitted on June 13, 2007

Opinion Delivered July 26, 2007



Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.

1. Because we find no error in admitting the expert witnesses' testimony, we do not reach the issue of whether Zamora stated the correct standard of review for his issue or whether improperly admitted evidence may be excluded in analyzing the record for legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. This opinion should not be understood to imply that we would exclude from our factual sufficiency analysis any of the evidence presented to a jury during a trial.

2. An expert's testimony may be so unreliable that it bears no evidentiary weight. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 804 (Tex. 2006); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005).