IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-98-096-CR
     EMANUEL RANDLE,
                                                                              Appellant
     v.
     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                                              Appellee
From the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court # 97-428-C
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O P I N I O N
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     Emanuel Randle was convicted of burglary of a habitation after entering a plea of guilty. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1999). He was sentenced to 15 yearsâ imprisonment. He appeals, presenting two issues for review. Both issues complain of untimely notice of the Stateâs intent to use a prior conviction to enhance his punishment. Finding that Randleâs entry of a guilty plea waived his complaint, we will affirm the judgment.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      Randleâs burglary charge was scheduled to be tried before a jury on Monday, January 20, 1998. On this date, Randle entered a plea of guilty. On the Friday immediately preceding this date, Randle received the Stateâs notice of intent to use a prior conviction for enhancement purposes. He complains that this insufficient notice deprived him of due process because he did not have an adequate opportunity to contest the validity of the prior conviction.
      When an open plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made, all non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea are waived. Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). This includes claimed deprivations of federal due process. Id.
      After his objection to the untimely nature of the notice was overruled, Randle entered a plea of guilty and a plea of true to the enhancement allegation without condition. Nearly two months later, at the hearing on punishment, Randle reurged his objection and requested permission to appeal the courtâs ruling. This was too late. Randle knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty and waived any error concerning the timeliness of the notice which occurred prior to the entry of his plea. Issue one is overruled.
      We leave Randleâs second issue for a habeas corpus proceeding, where the record can be developed on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel he might assert.
      The judgment is affirmed.
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                                                                       BILL VANCE
                                                                       Justice
Before Chief Justice Davis,
          Justice Vance, and
          Justice Gray
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed March 3, 1999
Do not publish
blic place; and (4) it is shown on the trial of the offense that the person has previously been convicted two times of any other offense relating to the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04; 49.09 (Vernon 2004). The language of the charge closely follows the statutory elements. Thus, the charge was only relating the general definition and description of the offense and was therefore proper. We overrule Penrose's sole issue.
Conclusion
         Having overruled Penrose's sole issue we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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                                                                  FELIPE REYNA
                                                                  Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
         Justice Vance, and
         Justice Reyna
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed August 25, 2004
Do not publish
[CR25]