William A. McIntosh v. State

William A. McIntosh v. State






IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS


No. 10-01-409-CR

No. 10-01-410-CR

No. 10-01-411-CR

No. 10-01-412-CR

No. 10-01-413-CR

No. 10-01-414-CR

No. 10-01-415-CR

No. 10-01-416-CR

No. 10-01-417-CR

No. 10-01-418-CR


     WILLIAM A. McINTOSH,

                                                                              Appellant

     v.


     THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                              Appellee


From the 40th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 20084CR, 20085CR, 20086CR, 20087CR

20379CR, 20380CR, 20381CR, 20382CR, 20383CR and 20384CR

                                                                                                                

MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                                                                                                

      William A. McIntosh appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motions for appointment of trial counsel in a series of DNA proceedings under chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We notified McIntosh in a published order dated December 11, 2002 that these are not appealable orders and that these appeals would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if supplemental clerk’s records containing orders adjudicating the merits of his motions for DNA testing were “not filed with the Clerk of this Court on or before 5:00 p.m. on December 27, 2002.” McIntosh v. State, No. 01-409-CR, slip op. at 3-4, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8879, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 11, 2002, order).

      We have not received a supplemental record containing an order on the merits in any of these appeals. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction.

                                                                   PER CURIAM


Before Chief Justice Davis,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Gray

Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Opinion delivered and filed March 5, 2003

Do not publish

[CR25]

nts under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 52; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878.  When reviewing matters committed to the trial court's discretion, we may not substitute our own judgment for the trial court's judgment.  See Flores v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989), modified on other grounds by National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993).

            The defendants essentially argue the merits of Durgin’s claim, relying on documents and information outside of the reports.  After reviewing the reports, we agree with Durgin that the trial court was justified in finding that they discuss the standard of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to fulfill the two required purposes: (1) inform the defendants of the specific conduct the plaintiff has called into question; and (2) provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit.  Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 52; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.[1]

            Appellants’ issues are overruled, and the trial court’s order is affirmed.

 

 

 

BILL VANCE

Justice

 

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed November 5, 2008

[CV06]

 

 



[1] Our conclusion would be the same if we did a de novo review of the expert reports, as we suggested may be proper in Wooten v. Samlowski, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ n.1, 2008 WL 2133072 at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco May 21, 2008, pet. filed).