IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-04-00258-CR
John David Sickles,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
From the 128th District Court
Orange County, Texas
Trial Court No. A-030589-R
ORDER
By order dated September 14, 2005, we abated this appeal for a hearing in the trial court to determine whether John David Sickles had voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel in connection with a motion for self-representation he filed with this Court. See Sickles v. State, 170 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, order) (per curiam). Sickles has since filed a motion to withdraw his motion for self-representation. In addition, due to the damage caused by Hurricane Rita, the trial court has advised that she will not be able to conduct the contemplated abatement hearing in the foreseeable future because the Sheriff’s Department is unable to keep or transport inmates.
In light of these developments, we reinstate this appeal, grant Sickles’s motion to withdraw the motion for self-representation,[1] and notify counsel for the State that the State’s brief is due thirty days after the date of this Order.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Chief Justice Gray concurring)
Order issued and filed November 9, 2005
Publish
[1] It may be argued that considering the merits of Sickles’s motion for self-representation and/or his motion to withdraw that motion bestows on him a right of hybrid representation, which is not generally permitted. See Ex parte Taylor, 36 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Sossamon v. State, 110 S.W.3d 57, 61 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, order) (per curiam). However, the prohibition on hybrid representation is not absolute. See e.g. Warren v. State, 98 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d). In the context of a case in which a criminal appellant has asserted his right of self-representation, there will undoubtedly be pleadings filed by both the appellant and his attorney until the issue of self-representation is determined.