IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-04-00258-CR
John David Sickles,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
From the 128th District Court
Orange County, Texas
Trial Court No. A-030589-R
ORDER
Sickles’s counsel has filed in this Court a motion to withdraw as counsel. Counsel attached 1) a letter from Sickles requesting his withdrawal and 2) a copy of a motion for self representation signed by Sickles. Sickles also filed a motion to represent himself on appeal. Both motions are denied.
Sickles does not have a constitutional right to represent himself on appeal. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163-64, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597, 120 S. Ct. 684 (2000). At least two courts of appeals have determined that there is no right for an appellant in a criminal case to represent himself on appeal. See Cormier v. State, 85 S.W.3d 496, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, order); see also Crawford v. State, 136 S.W.3d 417, 418 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, order). In determining whether to grant Sickles’s request for self-representation, we consider whether the interests of Sickles, the State, and the administration of justice would be best served by Sickles’s self-representation. Id.
Counsel represented in correspondence that he has done a considerable amount of work on this appeal, but does not want to jeopardize Sickles’s right to represent himself on appeal. We have reviewed the legal materials filed by Sickles and determine that it is in the best interest of Sickles, the State, and the administration of justice if Sickles continues this appeal represented by counsel.
Accordingly, we deny counsel’s request to withdraw and Sickles’s motion to represent himself. This appeal will proceed with Sickles being represented by counsel. Sickles’s brief is due 25 days from the date of this order.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Justice Vance concurs with note)*
Motions denied
Order issued and filed June 15, 2005
Do not publish
[CR25]
* “(Justice Vance concurs with a note. This order does not fully explain how it discounts Court of Criminal Appeals authority, cited by counsel, saying that a defendant has the right to represent himself on appeal. See Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (“We hold here that the right of an accused to reject the services of counsel and instead represent himself extends beyond trial into the appellate process. . . . Regardless of the point in the appellate process at which an appellant chooses to assert his right of self-representation, he will be required to comply with all relevant rules of appellate procedure set forth in our Code of Criminal Procedure.”); Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“[W]e now hold that appellant timely asserted his right of self-representation. . . . We now remand the appeal to the Court of Appeals and instruct them to direct the trial court to hold a hearing during which the trial court must make the appellant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and the trial court must develop evidence as to whether appellant's apparent decision to relinquish benefits associated with counsel and to proceed pro se is knowingly and intelligently made.”). Cormier notes that these two cases were decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals before the Martinez case, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000, said that the states are clearly within their discretion to conclude that the government's interests in the fair and efficient administration of justice outweigh the invasion of the appellant's interest in self-representation. But Martinez has been cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals in a footnote. Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 510 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“neither does [Appellant] have a constitutional right to represent himself on direct appeal.”). Crawford says: “Therefore, we review requests for self-representation in appeals from criminal convictions on a case-by-case basis, considering the best interests of the appellant, the State, and the administration of justice.” Applying those factors, I concur in the order.)”
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ORDER
The Attorney General appeals an order granting Appellee Ernest Smith’s motion to set aside an order reducing unpaid child support to judgment.
On April 6, 1981, the judge of the 20th District Court, which had jurisdiction in Robertson and Milam Counties, signed a Decree of Legitimation which declared that Ernest Smith is the father of N.L.A. and ordered him to pay child support. In 1983, the 20th and 82nd judicial districts were reorganized so that the 20th District became composed solely of Milam County, and Robertson became part of the 82nd District with Falls County.[1] On October 21, 1985, the judge of the 82nd District Court, which then had jurisdiction in Robertson and Falls Counties, signed a “Dismissal Judgment” that dismissed the cause for want of prosecution. On February 8, 2000, the judge of the 20th District Court, which then had jurisdiction only in Milam County, signed an Order Reducing Unpaid Child Support to Judgment. In May 2001, Smith filed in the 82nd District Court a motion to set aside the 2000 unpaid child support judgment. After a hearing, the judge of that court signed an order granting the motion.
The Attorney General argues that the 82nd District Court lacked jurisdiction either to dismiss the cause for want of prosecution in 1985 or to set aside the 2000 arrearage judgment. The Attorney General contends that the 20th District Court is the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over this case because it issued the legitimation decree and ordered child support in 1981.
A jurisdictional ruling in this case runs the risk of invalidating judgments and orders in other cases. If we were to rule that all cases on the docket in Robertson County on September 1, 1983, in which there was continuing jurisdiction stayed with the 20th District Court, we run the risk of invalidating judgments or orders in family law cases signed thereafter by the 82nd. On the other hand, a ruling that the 82nd acquired jurisdiction based on territorial jurisdiction alone could effectively invalidate judgments and orders signed thereafter by the 20th.
The submission is set aside. We request additional briefing from the Attorney General on the issue of the effects of the respective jurisdictional holdings on cases pending in the 20th and 82nd District Courts on September 1, 1983. The Attorney General’s supplemental brief is due forty-five days after the date of this Order.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
Order issued and filed June 8, 2005
Do not publish
[1] 20th and 82nd Judicial Districts—Reorganization, 68th Leg., R.S. ch 468, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2743.