IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1071
Filed September 10, 2015
DAVID JAMES STEFFEN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Stephen B. Jackson
Jr., Judge.
David Steffen appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Jeff Norris of Norris Law Firm, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney
General, and Patrick L. Wilson, Special Assistant Tama County Attorney, for
appellee State.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
2
DOYLE, P.J.
David Steffen appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief (PCR), asserting the PCR court erred in not finding his trial counsel was
ineffective. We affirm.
We adopt the detailed recitation of facts made by this court on Steffen’s
direct appeal:
On June 27, 2010, David Steffen went to the home of his ex-
wife, Cynthia Steffen, at about 6:00 a.m. and parked in her
driveway. He left after about ten minutes. At about 9:00 a.m.,
Steffen returned. He got out of the car and rang the front doorbell
three or four times. Cynthia did not want to speak to him so she did
not answer the door. Steffen walked to the back of the house, and
then returned to the front door where he again rang the doorbell
and knocked on the door. He also telephoned Cynthia, leaving
three messages on her answering machine demanding that she
open the door. Steffen was very angry, yelling and swearing at
Cynthia.
Cynthia decided to open the inner door, but left the screen
door closed. She stated she decided to “let him yell at me, get it
out of his system, and then hopefully he would leave.” Steffen
stated he wanted to talk to Cynthia about some jointly-owned
property, but would not talk to her through the screen door. Cynthia
refused to come outside or allow Steffen inside the house. Cynthia
stated, “[h]e continued to rant and yell and curse and not want to
talk about anything constructive,” so she shut the inner door and
locked it.
Steffen crashed through the screen door and the inner door
and came into Cynthia’s house. Cynthia yelled at him to leave,
stating she was going to call the police. Steffen kept coming
toward her with his arms raised. Cynthia picked up a cordless
telephone, and Steffen caught up to her. Cynthia testified Steffen
grabbed her robe. She stated, “it appeared he was trying to grab
my arm or a part of my body so he would have a firm grip, but all he
was getting was my robe.” With his other hand Steffen was batting
at Cynthia’s hand in an attempt to get the telephone to keep her
from calling the police.
Cynthia was able to run out the back door onto the patio.
Steffen followed her and stood about three or four feet away.
Cynthia called 911. Steffen stood staring at her, calling her names.
As she was talking to the dispatcher, he left and drove away.
3
Steffen was charged with domestic abuse assault, second
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A (2009); assault
while participating in a felony, in violation of section 708.3, with the
underlying felony being burglary; and burglary in the second
degree, in violation of section 713.5. He was charged with assault
while participating in a felony and second-degree burglary as a
habitual offender.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on May 2 and 3, 2011.
Cynthia testified as outlined above. Steffen admitted kicking in
Cynthia’s doors, stating he was frustrated and angry. He testified
he entered the home and followed her, asking her not to call the
police. Steffen denied attempting to grab Cynthia or making any
effort to lay a hand on her.
At the close of the evidence, defense counsel made a
motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming there was insufficient
evidence Steffen had any intent to cause harm to Cynthia. There is
no indication in the record that the district court specifically ruled
upon the motion. The court, however, submitted all three charges
to the jury. The jury found Steffen guilty of domestic abuse assault,
assault while participating in a felony, and second-degree burglary.
Regarding his habitual offender status, Steffen admitted to two
previous felony convictions.
The court sentenced Steffen to ninety days in jail on the
domestic abuse assault charge, giving him credit for ninety days
previously served. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
not to exceed fifteen years on the charge of assault while
participating in a felony and a term not to exceed fifteen years on
the charge of second-degree burglary, to be served concurrently.
State v. Steffen, No. 11-1536, 2012 WL 2129344, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 13,
2012).
In November 2012, Steffen filed an application for postconviction relief,
asserting several claims. Steffen subsequently amended his PCR application,
asserting, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to question [Steffen] regarding his past mental health history,
discuss with [Steffen the] possibility of a mental health aspect to his
defense, failed to explore [Steffen’s] mental health issues in relation
to the offenses charged, [Steffen] being a person with among other
diagnoses bipolar affective disorder, [Steffen] thus being prejudiced
that a defense to the intent element of the burglary charge was not
broached or considered by his counsel, history upon inquiry should
4
have led at least to a psychiatric evaluation and a consideration of
a psychiatric defense.
Steffen also claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising these
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.
A trial on Steffen’s PCR application was held in April 2014. There, Steffen
testified he had been diagnosed in the past as being bipolar and having anxiety
and an obsessive-compulsive disorder, and his trial counsel did not ask him
about his mental-health history. Steffen’s trial counsel testified and admitted he
did not make any inquiry into Steffen’s past mental health issues, but counsel
testified “Steffen was as intelligently and engagingly involved with his trial as any
client [he] had ever had,” and Steffen “knew what was going on, he knew what
the issues were, and [he and Steffen] continuously talked. . . . [Steffen] was
continuously there and involved with what we were doing. [Steffen] never gave
[him] any impression that there was any mental issue at all whatsoever.”
Following the trial, the PCR court entered its order denying and dismissing
Steffen’s application for PCR. As to Steffen’s claim his counsel was ineffective
for not investigating a diminished responsibility defense, the court found Steffen
failed to establish he was prejudiced. The court explained Steffen’s trial counsel
indicated that he had not had a client who was as engaged in his
defense and as intelligent in helping with his defense as was
Steffen. [Trial counsel] testified that Steffen did not present in any
manner that he might have a significant psychological condition that
would raise the prospect of a diminished capacity defense. Finally,
at the [PCR] hearing, Steffen presented no evidence whatsoever
through expert testimony that a diminished responsibility defense
could have been raised at the time of the trial.
5
Steffen now appeals. He asserts the PCR court erred in failing to find his
trial counsel ineffective for not investigating his mental health to determine if a
diminished capacity defense should have been asserted.
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. See
Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015). To succeed on such a
claim, Steffen must prove both that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential
duty, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s failure. See id.
Because reversal is only warranted if both prongs of this test are proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, see id., we can affirm the PCR court’s rejection
of Steffen’s claim if we determine either prong is absent. See Lamasters v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866 (Iowa 2012).
Under the prejudice prong, “a claimant must establish that prejudice
resulted from counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty.” Dempsey, 860
N.W.2d at 868. Specifically, Steffen must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that there was a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding
would have been different had his counsel not erred. See id. We consider “the
totality of the evidence, what factual findings would have been affected by
counsel’s errors, and whether the effect was pervasive or isolated and trivial” in
making our determination. See id.
Upon our de novo review, we agree with the PCR court that, even
assuming without deciding his trial counsel breached an essential duty, Steffen
failed to prove he was prejudiced by the breach. Steffen did not volunteer to his
trial counsel that he had had mental health issues in the past, and counsel did
not witness any behaviors by Steffen that would lead him to inquire as to
6
Steffen’s past mental health diagnoses as a possible defense to his offenses.
Though it is true Steffen established he had been diagnosed with some mental
health disorders in 2004 and 2006, he presented no evidence he was suffering
from those same disorders at the time of the incident in 2010, nor did he provide
any evidence that a diminished capacity defense would have been applicable to
negate the specific intent elements of his crimes even if he had those same
mental health disorders at the time of the 2010 incident. Steffen failed to show
that there was a reasonable probability the result of his proceedings would have
been different had his counsel asked about or investigated Steffen’s mental
health to determine if a diminished capacity defense should have been asserted.
Accordingly, we affirm the PCR court’s denial and dismissal of Steffen’s PCR
application.
AFFIRMED.