IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-40202
Summary Calendar
JACK W. HAWKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:01-CV-189
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October 29, 2002
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jack W. Hawkins, a former federal prisoner, challenges the
district court’s denial of relief on his case arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671 et seq.
Hawkins sought return of property seized in relation to his drug
conviction, monetary compensation for returned property that had
been damaged, and the return of fees and payments made in
Hawkins’s criminal and prior civil actions. Hawkins also raised
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
claims that the Government had breached its contractual
obligations to him and had retained his property without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Hawkins asserts that the district court erred in concluding
that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over tort claims under
28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), the detention-of-goods exception to the
FTCA. The exception covers the seizure of property by any
federal law enforcement officers performing their lawful duties.
Halverson v. United States, 972 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1992).
Hawkins’s assertion that the 2000 amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(c) permit him to raise his argument is a new legal theory
raised for the first time on appeal, which this court will not
consider. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339,
342 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1138 (2000). Even if
we were to consider the argument, it is without merit because the
property in question was seized in conjunction with a criminal
conviction.
Hawkins also contends that the district court erred in
concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his
non-tort claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and
1491(a). Because the value of Hawkins’s constitutional and
contractual claims exceeded $10,000, the district court lacked
jurisdiction. See Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112, 118
(5th Cir. 1995).
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Hawkins maintains that the district court erred in
dismissing his tort claims for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. To the extent that any claims
survived the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
this court has not ruled whether Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), applies to FTCA claims. However, this court need not
determine whether Heck applies to FTCA claims in general, or
Hawkins’s claims in particular, because the district court’s
grant of summary judgment will also result in dismissal of the
claims. See Bickford v. Int’l Speedway Corp., 654 F.2d 1028,
1031 (5th Cir. 1981).
Hawkins contends that the district court erred in not giving
him notice of the court’s intention to convert a FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. There is no
indication that such a conversion occurred. Hawkins also
maintains that the district court erred in not advising him of
the requirements for a summary-judgment motion before ruling on
it. The notice provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure and the
local rules concerning the time for filing a response is
sufficient for a pro se litigant. Martin v. Harrison Co. Jail,
975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
Hawkins maintains that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on his tort claims. The hold-harmless agreement
signed by Hawkins stated that he agreed to hold the Government
harmless for any claims arising from the “seizure, search,
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possession and custody” of his property. As Hawkins’s claims
relate to these matters, the court’s judgment is affirmed.
The district court dismissed Hawkins’s request for the
return of fees and fines paid in earlier cases for failure to
state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Hawkins does
not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Texas law does
not permit such relief, and he has therefore not appealed on that
ground. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813
F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court’s denial of
relief to Hawkins is AFFIRMED.
Hawkins also seeks appointment of counsel. He has not shown
“exceptional circumstances” requiring the appointment of counsel.
See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). The
motion is therefore DENIED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
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