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NUMBER 13-01-406-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI
___________________________________________________________________
IDA SALINAS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 105th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
__________________________________________________________________
O P I N I O N
Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
In February 1993, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Ida Salinas, pled guilty to the offense of delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court deferred adjudicating appellant=s guilt, and placed her on community supervision for a period of eight years. In March 2001, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant=s community supervision. On May 24, 2001, the trial court found appellant had violated the conditions of her community supervision, revoked her community supervision, found her guilty of delivery of cocaine, and sentenced her to ten years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Appellant=s counsel has filed a brief in which he concluded this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), as it presents a professional evaluation of why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel certifies in his brief that he served appellant with a copy of the brief and informed appellant of his right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No such brief has been filed.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, an appellate court must conduct Aa full examination of all proceedings to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.@ Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have carefully reviewed the record in this appeal and, finding nothing that would arguably support an appeal in this cause, agree that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.
Furthermore, because the trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with a plea bargain agreement, appellant was required to comply with the additional notice requirements of rule 25.2(b)(3). Rule 25.2(b)(3) requires a defendant, appealing from a plea bargained conviction, to file a notice of appeal stating the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect, from a ruling on a pre-trial motion, or show that the trial court granted appellant permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3); White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Appellant=s notice of appeal did not allege any of the additional notice requirements of rule 25.2(b)(3).
In addition, article 42.12, section 5(b) of the code of criminal procedure provides that in a case involving deferred adjudication, no appeal may be taken from the trial court=s decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002); Connolly v. State, 983 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). If appellant=s notice of appeal does not comport with rule 25.2(b)(3), this Court only has jurisdiction to consider issues relating to: (1) the process by which appellant was sentenced; or (2) whether the original judgment deferring appellant=s adjudication is void. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also White v. State, 61 S.W.3d at 428. However, these issues have not been raised by appellant, nor do any such errors appear in the record. We conclude we are without jurisdiction. White, 61 S.W.3d at 428.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ,
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.
Opinion delivered and filed
this 3rd day of July, 2002.