NUMBER 13-03-720-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ADAM VERA DIAZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
Appellant, Adam Vera Diaz, pled guilty to driving while intoxicated and was assessed an enhanced sentence of two years of imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In his sole issue before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the traffic stop that led to his arrest was made without reasonable suspicion. Because we conclude that the officer who stopped appellant had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we hold that the traffic stop was not unreasonable and therefore overrule appellant’s sole issue.
A trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Almost total deference is given to the trial court’s evaluation of the historical facts of the case. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Where a finding of fact is not explicit, we are obligated to view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ultimate ruling. Ballentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Likewise, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling when the resolution of these questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. However, pure questions of law on the subject of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. Id. at 87 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)).
If the initial stop is illegal, then all evidence gathered pursuant to the stop must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963). To justify even a brief investigative detention, such as the stop that occurred in this case, an officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (applying the standard equally to the stop of an automobile as that of a pedestrian); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The articulable facts “must create some reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detainee with the unusual activity, and some indication the unusual activity is related to crime.” Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The knowledge forming the basis of the suspicion need not be derived from the officer’s personal observation but may be the result of information submitted by an informant. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Furthermore, in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, we disregard the officer’s subjective intent and look for an objective basis for reasonable suspicion. See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). It cannot be overstated that reasonable suspicion requires a lower degree of certainty than probable cause. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145–46.
Only a brief detention occurred in this case: appellant was stopped for limited questioning about a specific crime that was committed in the same city earlier that night by someone driving a car of the same color, make, and model as appellant’s car. During this questioning, the officer who detained appellant smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from appellant and noticed other signs of intoxication, which prompted him to eventually arrest appellant for driving while intoxicated. Appellant contends that the officer stopped him illegally because he lacked sufficient articulable facts to substantiate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Appellant, however, fails to cite even one case reaching such a conclusion under similar circumstances. Considering the specific facts known to the officer in this case—including that the city of Harlingen is a relatively small city, that there was not “much activity going on [in Harlingen] in the first place,” and that appellant’s detention occurred during a “low activity time,” the “wee hours of the morning”—and all the rational inferences that can be taken from those facts, the marginality of the intrusion on appellant’s expectation of privacy that was inflicted by the officer, and the absence of case precedent prohibiting such police conduct under similar circumstances, we hold that the detention was based on reasonable suspicion. In doing so, we note that other courts have found reasonable suspicion in cases involving similar circumstances. See, e.g., Louis v. State, 825 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (holding that a description of two black males in a white Oldsmobile somewhat matched broadcast description of suspects arrested (three black men in a tan Cadillac) sufficiently to give officers reasonable suspicion to stop suspect after a recent robbery that occurred nearby).
Appellant, however, argues that we should not consider any of the information that was broadcast to the officer over the police radio because the police dispatcher received that information from an anonymous informant. Appellant argues that because the State did not prove the independent reliability of the anonymous informant or otherwise corroborate the information supplied by the informant, this information cannot be used to justify the officer’s reasonable suspicion. Thus, according to appellant, the detention should be evaluated as if the officer did not know that a theft had occurred earlier that night at a nearby convenience store and that the perpetrators fled the crime scene in a red Chevrolet Camaro, the same color, make, and model car that appellant was driving at the time of the stop.
Appellant’s contention is made without citation to any supportive authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). Appellant has not directed this Court to any case law discussing the reliability of anonymous informants or explaining under what circumstances the victim of a specific crime, such as the one that was reported in this case, is to be labeled an “anonymous informant.” Even more fundamentally, appellant has not established that the information known to the officer in this case originated from an anonymous informant. Appellant has failed to support his contention with the relevant jurisprudential analytical framework necessary to evaluate the merits of his claim. This Court will not make novel legal arguments for appellant. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The issue is therefore inadequately briefed and cannot be sustained. See Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (overruling appellate issue because party failed to provide any legal analysis supporting its position); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). It is therefore overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_______________________
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
Justice
Do not publish.
Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
Memorandum Opinion delivered
and filed this the 26th day of August, 2004.