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NUMBER 13-04-320-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
CHRISTOPHER BROOKS, Appellant,
v.
TDCJ-ID, ET AL., Appellees.
On appeal from the 156th District Court
of Bee County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Castillo, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Castillo
Appellant, Christopher Brooks, an indigent inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeBInstitutional Division (TDCJ-ID), appeals the dismissal of his pro se claim under chapter fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.[1] See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003 (Vernon 2002). We affirm the trial court's chapter 14 dismissal of the claim.
I. Issue Presented
The sole issue Brooks presents for review is whether the trial court erred in dismissing his prisoner's in forma pauperis suit under section 14.005(b) of the civil practice and remedies code. He argues the suit was timely filed when placed in the possession of prison officials for mailing and filing.[2]
II. Background
Brooks's original petition shows the file date as September 22, 2003. He sued appellees, the TDCJ-ID and various departmental employees, seeking district court de novo review of an administrative disciplinary decision[3] and damages for a slip-and-fall accident.[4] On October 9, 2003, TDCJ-ID and the employees filed a joint motion to dismiss, asserting that (1) Brooks failed to file the claim within the thirty-one day statute of limitations; and (2) even assuming that the mailbox rule applied, Brooks filed the claim on the thirty-sixth day of receiving the final agency decision. Brooks filed a response, with an accompanying unsworn declaration, asserting that he timely filed his claim because he received the administrative decision on August 20, 2003, and, thus, he had until September 20, 2003, to file his claim. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. This appeal ensued.
III. Standard and Scope of Review
The proper standard of review for the dismissal of a frivolous claim pursuant to chapter fourteen is an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice‑Institutional Div., 28 S.W.3d 811, 813 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2000, pet. denied). To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show the trial court's actions were arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. Id. (citing Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1984)). The standard is clarified by asking whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 735‑36 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
IV. Discussion
Chapter 14, also known as the "Inmate Litigation Act," applies to a suit brought by an inmate in a district court in which an inmate files an unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. _ 14.002(a) (Vernon 2002); Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 683-84 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that "a pro se inmate's claim under section 14.004 of the Inmate Litigation Act is deemed filed at the time the prison authorities duly receive the document to be mailed."). The parties do not dispute that chapter 14 applies. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) ("In a civil case, the court will accept as true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them."). Brooks concedes that the deadline for filing his claim was September 20, 2003. The original petition was filed on September 22, 2003.
Court documents show that Brooks lists his address as the prison facility located in Beeville, Texas. The original petition was filed with the Bee County District Clerk's Office, also in Beeville. The record does not establish the date Brooks properly deposited the original petition into the prison mail system. That date is material to the disposition of his issue on appeal because his claim is deemed filed at the time the prison authorities duly receive the document to be mailed. See Warner, 135 S.W.3d at 684.
We are mindful that a party who is incarcerated does not have direct access to either the clerk's office or a United States mailbox for first‑class mail, and, thus, as Warner instructs, a pro se inmate's petition that is placed in a properly addressed and stamped envelope is deemed filed at the time the prison authorities duly receive the document to be mailed. Id. Here, the record does not contain a copy of the post‑marked envelope, if any, containing Brooks' petition. The record includes copies of his in forma pauperis documents, all dated either September 15 or September 16, 2003. In his response to the dismissal motion, Brooks did not state that he timely tendered his petition to the appropriate prison authority; rather, Brooks focused his response on the date he received the administrative decision.
Because the record contains no evidence that Brooks' claim was timely received by the proper prison authority, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his claim as untimely filed. See _ 14.005(b) (Vernon 2002); Warner, 135 S.W.3d at 684.
V. Conclusion
We overrule Brooks' sole issue and affirm the order of dismissal.
ERRLINDA CASTILLO
Justice
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed
this 28th day of July, 2005.
[1] "Claim" means a cause of action governed by chapter 14. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.001 (Vernon 2002).
[2] "A court shall dismiss a claim if the inmate fails to file the claim before the 31st day after the date the inmate receives the written decision from the grievance system." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.005(b) (Vernon 2002).
[3] The department denied Brooks' grievance regarding a disciplinary action and determined that there was no medical reason excusing his failure to report to his work assignment.
[4] In his live pleading, Brooks alleged that he fell after exiting a shower stall and sustained injuries to his neck and back. He sued departmental employees claiming, in part, that they failed to provide medical care. Brooks raises no issue regarding the propriety of the dismissal of his other claims.