|
|
NUMBER 13-04-108-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ALFREDO SUAREZ, Appellant,
v.
MELISSA SUAREZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Castillo
Concurring and Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Castillo
In this post-answer default divorce case,[1] appellant Alfredo Suarez asserts that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion for new trial and, (2) on sufficiency grounds, ordering a disproportionate division of the community estate. Sustaining the second issue, the majority finds the evidence insufficient to support the division of the community estate. I concur with the majority's result in overruling Mr. Suarez's first issue. Because I conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the division of the marital estate and, thus, no abuse of discretion, I respectfully dissent as to the second issue.
I. The Record
At the prove-up hearing, Mrs. Suarez testified as to Mr. Suarez's earned and rental income from his separate property. She attested that, because of his history of changing jobs, Mr. Suarez inconsistently provided financial support. On Mrs. Suarez's proffer, the trial court admitted six exhibits in evidence. Exhibit 1 was her inventory and appraisement. We note that Mr. Smith did not request the trial court to order an inventory and appraisement of separate and community property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. _6.502(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005). She testified as to her inventory and appraisement and as to the nature and value of the separate and community property.[2] The trial court also admitted in evidence Mrs. Suarez's Exhibit 2, her proposed division of the marital estate. Mrs. Suarez requested that the trial court divide the community estate consistent with that document. The proposal calculated the division of the community estate as 52.70% to her and 47.30% to Mr. Suarez. The trial court divided the estate and awarded the property consistent with the request.
II. The Standards
A. Abuse of Discretion
The trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and we presume that the trial court exercised its discretion properly. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698‑99 (Tex. 1981); see Garcia v. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.BEl Paso 2005, no pet.); Handley v. Handley, 122 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Tex. App.B Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). A trial court has wide discretion in making a just and right division. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698-99. A trial court abuses its discretion when it divides property on values that were not in evidence. Id. Further, a trial court's division of property that is manifestly unjust is an abuse of discretion. Id. While the appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's valuation of a particular asset or division, he must also contend that the erroneous valuation caused the court to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. See Garcia, 170 S.W.3d at 648. In reviewing the equitable remedy fashioned by the trial court in achieving a just and right division, we must determine not only whether the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence, but we must also determine whether error, if established, caused the trial court to abuse its discretion. Id. at 649. Once it has been determined that the abuse of discretion standard applies, an appellate court should engage in a two‑pronged inquiry: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion. See id. The traditional sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first question; however, our inquiry cannot stop there. Id. We must then determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. See id. We will not reverse a division of property unless it is manifestly unfair. See Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980). Even in a default decree, the trial court has discretion to make an unequal division. Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659 passim (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
I would hold that Mr. Suarez did not preserve error as to his sufficiency challenges. I am mindful that, in a non-jury case, a complaint regarding the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence may be made for the first time on appeal in the complaining party's brief. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d). However, the preservation rule contemplates that in a civil case, whether jury or non-jury, preservation of error is implicated when a motion for new trial was filed and evidence was necessary to properly present the complaint in the trial court.[3] Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(b), 21.2. Mr. Suarez filed a motion for new trial asserting as grounds the reasons for non-appearance at the final hearing. He did not present to the trial court a complaint as to the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the disproportionate division of the community estate. Further, he presented no evidence to the trial court as to the specific complaint regarding valuation of the property, as more fully discussed below. Taking evidence of valuation was necessary to properly present his complaint to the trial court. See id. Because he did not adduce facts not in the record, he did not preserve error. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(b), 21.2. However, because the majority reverses on the sufficiency issue, I tender my separate analysis.
In a non‑jury trial where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, we presume that the trial court made all the findings necessary to support its judgment. Holt Atherton Industries, Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). When a reporter's record is part of the appellate record, these implied findings may be challenged by legal or factual insufficiency points. Id. at 84. The applicable standard of review is the same as that applied in the review of jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact. Id.
1. Legal Sufficiency
In challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding on which an adverse party bore the burden of proof, the appellant must show the record presents no evidence to support the adverse finding. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). We sustain a legal sufficiency challenge when (1) the record conclusively establishes the complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997); Hines v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 28 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2000, no pet.). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). In performing a legal sufficiency review, we consider only the probative evidence and inferences that support the challenged finding, disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005) ("The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable a reasonable and fair‑minded person to reach the verdict under review.").
2. Factual Sufficiency
Unlike legal sufficiency challenges, factual sufficiency issues concede that the record presents conflicting evidence on an issue. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 1988, writ denied). Like legal sufficiency challenges, the standard of review on factual sufficiency issues depends on the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 275. The party attacking a finding on which an adverse party bore the burden of proof must show that there is "insufficient evidence" in the record to support the finding. Gooch v. Am. Sling Co., 902 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1995, no writ). In reviewing an insufficient‑evidence issue, we examine and consider all of the evidence, not just the evidence that supports the verdict, to see whether it supports or undermines the finding. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex. 1998). We set aside the finding for factual insufficiency if the "evidence adduced to support the vital fact, even if it is the only evidence adduced on an issue, is factually too weak alone to support it." See Ritchey v. Crawford, 734 S.W.2d 85, 86‑87 n.1 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
C. The Murff Factors
The Texas Family Code requires the trial court in a divorce decree to divide "the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. '7.001 (Vernon 1998). The trial court may consider various factors in making a just and right division including (1) spouses' capacities and abilities, (2) benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from the continuation of the marriage, (3) business opportunities, (4) relative physical conditions, (5) relative financial conditions and obligations, (6) disparity of ages, (7) size of separate estates, (8) the nature of the property, and (9) disparity of earning capacity. Handley, 122 S.W.3d at 907‑08; see Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698‑99; Garcia, 170 S.W.3d at 653. The value of community assets is generally determined at the date of divorce. Handley, 122 S.W.3d at 908.
III. Discussion
In general, Mr. Suarez maintains that there is no evidence of value of the community estate and, thus, there is no evidence to support the community judgment. In particular, Mr. Suarez asserts that there is no or, alternatively, insufficient evidence to prove the value of the certificates of deposit at the time of the divorce because its valuation on Exhibit 1 was not based on the 2003 balance but, rather, a 1998 balance. Exhibit 1 shows one certificate of deposit with a "current balance (as of August 21, 1998)." The proposed distribution of the marital estate in Exhibit 2 reflects the request for award of the certificate of deposit in question to Mr. Suarez. The district court entered a final decree reflecting the division of the marital estate consistent with Exhibit 2, Mrs. Suarez's proposed division.
Mr. Suarez concedes that, although the trial court is not required to divide the community estate equally, its division must be equitable. He also concedes that although courts are vested with wide discretionary powers in suits for divorce, the division of property must be just and right.
Mrs. Suarez's inventory and appraisement contained in her Exhibit 1 itemized the community and separate property and assigned to each a fair market value where applicable. The document was admitted in evidence without objection. Unobjected to evidence has probative value as substantive evidence and is probative. See Tex. R. Evid. 802 ("Inadmissible hearsay admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely because it is hearsay."); see Freedom Newspapers v. Cantu, 168 S.W.3d 847, 858 n. 37 (Tex. 2005); In re Estate of Steed, 152 S.W.3d 797, 808 (Tex. App.BTexarkana 2004 pet. denied); Transmission Co. v. Hollins, 682 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.B Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). Because the evidence in Exhibit 1 was admitted without objection, the evidence cannot be said to have no probative value. See Tex. R. Evid. 802. Consequently, the document was properly before the trial court for purposes of the division of the marital estate, including the challenged certificate of deposit. More importantly, because Mr. Suarez did not avail himself of the opportunity to provide values on any of the property to the trial court, he cannot now complain of the trial court's lack of complete information in dividing that property. See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 761 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1988), aff'd, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 955 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1997, writ denied) (holding that error could not have been preserved if the appellant did not participate at trial). Thus, I conclude that the evidence adduced through the inventory and appraisement amounts to more than a scintilla of evidence upon which the trial court could base its equitable division of the estate. Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient. See Formosa Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 48. There was no contrary evidence. I cannot conclude that the evidence is too weak alone to support the division. See Ritchey, 734 S.W.2d at 86‑87 n.1. Thus, the evidence was factually sufficient. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Mrs. Suarez's inventory and appraisement in dividing the estate.
I turn to the question of the disproportionate division of the estate. The trial court heard evidence relating to Mr. Suarez's non-support of the family due to job changes and income. Mrs. Suarez also briefly testified as to family violence. The inventory and appraisement provided the size of the parties' separate and community estates. While the trial court awarded Mrs. Suarez the encumbered homestead, among others, it also awarded Mr. Suarez another unencumbered residence. A trial court may also consider fault in dividing the marital estate, but is not required to do so. Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980). The trial court could have reasonably assigned fault or disproportionately divided the estate based on evidence of family non-support or violence or both. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that a disproportionate division was just and right. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698‑99; Handley, 122 S.W.3d at 907‑08; Garcia, 170 S.W.3d at 653. Under the circumstances, I conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Mrs. Suarez a disproportionate share of the community estate because of fault. Further, the percentages are within the court's discretion. Golias v. Golias, 861 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. App.BBeaumont 1993, no writ).[4] It is presumed that the trial court exercised its discretion properly. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. The division is not manifestly unfair. See Mann, 607 S.W.2d at 245. I find no abuse of discretion in the disproportionate division. Finally, Mr. Suarez has not shown harm. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).
IV. Conclusion
I join the majority in overruling the first issue presented. However, finding the evidence sufficient, I conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the division of the community estate. Consequently, I would overrule the second issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ERRLINDA CASTILLO
Justice
Concurring and Dissenting Memorandum Opinion
delivered and filed this the 4th day of May, 2006.
[1]Appellant filed the original divorce petition and a motion for continuance on the date before the final hearing. Noting that the final contested hearing had previously been set with notice to the parties and counsel and that the motion was untimely filed, the trial court denied the motion.
[2] Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. _3.003(a) (Vernon 1998). The degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate property is clear and convincing evidence. Id. at '3.003(b).
[3]I observe that in jury cases, a motion for new trial is one of five ways to preserve error for no evidence challenges. Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510‑11 (Tex.1991). To preserve error, the motion must be sufficient to call the trial court's attention to the matter at issue. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie, 997 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). Additionally, the issue on appeal must correspond to the motion made at trial. See In the Matter of T.R.S., 931 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. App.BWaco 1996, no writ). In other words, a motion which states one legal theory cannot be used to support a different legal theory on appeal. Id.
[4] In Golias v. Golias, 861 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. App.BBeaumont 1993, no writ), the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 79 percent of the community estate to the wife. Id. The Golias court cited several other cases upholding similar property awards. See Oliver v. Oliver, 741 S.W.2d 225, 228‑229 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1987, no writ) (80 percent); Rafidi v. Rafidi, 718 S.W.2d 43, 45‑46 (Tex. App.BDallas 1986, no writ)(85 percent ‑ 90 percent); Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. App.BDallas 1986, writ dism'd) (83 percent); Jones v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. App.BTexarkana 1985, no writ) (86 percent); Campbell v. Campbell, 625 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1981, writ dism'd) (96 percent); Huls v. Huls, 616 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (85 percent).