Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Granted and Memorandum Opinion filed November 28, 2006.
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In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-06-00946-CV
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IN RE SARAH ROXANA WILLIAMS, Relator
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Relator Sarah Roxana Williams challenges the trial court=s incarceration of her for a period of 180 days pursuant to an October 12, 2006 order of commitment, which was based on the trial court=s April 25, 2006 hearing, a May 9, 2006 order, a May 10, 2006 motion for contempt, a June 8, 2006 contempt judgment, an August 11, 2006 temporary order, and a September 28, 2006 Acompliance@ order. Among other things, relator claims that her incarceration was illegal because the contempt judgment was void. Because we agree with relator that the court=s judgment and the orders entered pursuant to that judgment were void, we do not address relators= various other claims about the infirmities of the proceedings below. We grant the writ of habeas corpus.
An original habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral attack on a contempt judgment. Ex parte Rohleder, 424 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1967); In re Broussard, 112 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is not to determine the guilt or innocence of the contemnor, but only to determine whether she was afforded due process of law or whether the order of contempt is void. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979). A court will issue a writ of habeas corpus if the order underlying the contempt is void, Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. 1983), or if the contempt order itself is void. Gordon, 584 S.W.2d at 688. An order is void if it is beyond the power of the court, or if it deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law. In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex.2005); In re Broussard, 112 S.W.3d at 831. On review, we do not weigh the proof and determine whether it preponderates for or against the relator; we determine only whether the contempt judgment is void. Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259‑60 (Tex.1995).
The contempt judgment in this case is void. This matter came before the court on the parents= motion to modify their divorce decree. Apparently, after an April hearing involving only relator=s parents, the court entered an order on May 9, 2006, which included several directives to relator, along with several Ainjunctions@ requiring her to refrain from certain activities. Among these, the court ostensibly required relator to (1) Atimely attend each and every scheduled class at school;@ (2) Aobtain the signature of the teacher for every scheduled class at school;@ (3) Ato remain on school campus premises during regularly scheduled classes;@ (4) to refrain from associating with particular individuals; (5) Ato seek, apply for, and obtain summer employment@; and (6) to Afile with the Court a written report . . .advising the court of the details, terms and conditions of the summer employment.@
Although relator was then the minor child of the parties to the proceedings, she was not present at the hearing in which the court entered these orders and injunctions. In addition, she was not represented by counsel at the time of these proceedings. It is not clear when or whether relator was ever informed of this order. Relator did not receive a copy of this order until she was served with the motion for contempt filed by the court itself on May 11, 2006, two days after the order was entered. Relator states that no one ever explained to her what the court required concerning her conduct. Indeed, even the motion for contempt, filed the day after the order was entered, fails to explain exactly what relator did to violate the court=s orders or when those orders were allegedly violated, stating instead only that the court Ahas been informed on good authority@ that relator had violated Aone or more@ of them.
The infirmities in this case are numerous, though without further discussion, the lack of notice to relator establishes that the court=s contempt judgment is void. Relator was a minor and was not before the court. On the record before us there is no indication that relator had either notice of the court=s order or of what that order required. The motion for contempt and show cause orders failed to apprise relator of exactly what the court believed she had done to warrant punishment. ADue process of law demands that before a Court can punish for a contempt not committed in its presence, the accused must have full and complete notification of the subject matter, and the show cause order or other means of notification must state when, how, and by what means the defendant has been guilty of the alleged contempt.@ Ex parte Edgerly, 441 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex.1969). A constructive contemnor must be given complete notification and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges by way of defense or explanation. Gordon, 584 S.W.2d at 688. Among the due process rights accorded an alleged contemnor is the Aright to reasonable notice of each alleged contumacious act.@ Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex.1990) (Cook, J., concurring). Without that notice, the contempt judgment is void. Gordon, 584 S.W.2d at 688. Consequently, we hold that relator was improperly incarcerated.
The content of the court=s order suggests that the court was frustrated with the parties= minor child and sought to correct her behavior. We are aware of no legal basis for the court=s action, however, and we find that it was not proper. We therefore conclude that the trial court=s contempt judgment is void, and we order relator, Sarah Roxana Williams, discharged and the bond returned.
PER CURIAM
Memorandum Opinion filed November 28, 2006.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Hudson and Seymore.