Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 27, 2006.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-05-00108-CR
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DERRICK STEPHENS TYSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 984,318
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of possession of a controlled substance. On January 21, 2005, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant raises several issues on appeal.
Appellant was charged with possession of more than 50 pounds and less than 2,000 pounds of marijuana. He entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, at a hearing conducted after completion of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report, appellant stated he knew nothing about the large quantity of marijuana his co-defendant was buying. Appellant admitted to possessing one plastic Abaggy@ of marijuana but denied being involved in the Awhole activity.@ Based on those assertions, appellant raises the following issues:
$ Was appellant=s plea voluntary in accordance with due process?
$ Was the trial court obligated to sua sponte withdraw appellant=s guilty plea?
$ Was the trial court obligated to further inquire into appellant=s plea to ensure it was voluntary?
$ Was the trial court obligated to find appellant not guilty?
$ Is the evidence factually sufficient for the trial court to have found appellant possessed more than 50 pounds and less than 2,000 pounds of marijuana?
The record reflects appellant was admonished by the trial court orally and in writing in accordance with the requirements of article 26.13. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.23 (Vernon 2005). A showing in the record that a defendant was admonished by the trial judge, as appellant was, is prima facie proof that a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See Ex parte Williams, 704 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show he did not understand the consequences of his plea. See Miller v. State, 879 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.App.‑Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). Once an accused attests that he understands the nature of his plea and that it is voluntary, he has a heavy appellate burden to prove involuntariness. See Edwards v. State, 921 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex.App.‑Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet).
Appellant contends his claim of innocence shows his plea was involuntary. However, protestations of innocence do not render a plea involuntary. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). Additionally, we note that even when a defendant protests his innocence, various considerations may motivate him to plead guilty. See Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). Therefore, appellant has not met his burden of proving his plea was involuntary. Accordingly, issues one, two, and three are overruled.
In issues four and five, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to have found him guilty. A defendant who pleads guilty to the court by executing a valid judicial confession waives any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Brink v. State, 78 S.W.3d 478, 484 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, ). Issues four and five are overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
PER CURIAM
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed June 27, 2006.
Panel consists of Justices Hudson, Fowler, and Seymore.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).