Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 12, 2007.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-06-00442-CR
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ROBERT TREVINO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 2
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1327958
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant, Robert Trevino, was convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated and sentenced by the trial court to 180 days= confinement, probated for one year, and a $200.00 fine. In his sole point of error on appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the scope of his detention illegally exceeded the justification for the initial detention. We affirm.
During the early morning hours of September 15, 2005, Berry Levitt of the Houston Police Department was operating a hand-held radar in the 9400 block of Westheimer when he clocked a white Cadillac Escalade going 72 miles an hour where the posted speed limit is 35 miles an hour. Levitt pursued the Escalade and stopped it in the 9500 block of Westheimer. As Levitt approached the driver=s side door, Officer Egdorf of the HPD DWI Task Force pulled up in his patrol car behind Levitt=s vehicle.
Egdorf remained in his patrol car while Levitt approached appellant and asked for his driver=s license and insurance. Appellant had difficulty finding his driver=s license. Appellant told Levitt he was a Fort Bend County Sheriff=s Deputy. Levitt, without having issued a citation for speeding, then asked Egdorf to investigate appellant for DWI. At this point, Levitt=s involvement with the speeding investigation had ended.
Egdorf=s investigation became part of Levitt=s investigation. When Egdorf made contact with appellant, he noticed slurred speech, a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on appellant=s breath, and glassy eyes. When asked, appellant responded that he had had five beersChis last beer at 10:00 p.m., and he was coming from a bar. Appellant was not able to say what he had eaten or what time he had eaten. Appellant stated he was drunk and, later, during the field sobriety test, appellant again said he was intoxicated. Egdorf conducted the field sobriety test and determined appellant had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties. Egdorf believed appellant was intoxicated. Appellant later refused a breath test.
In his sole point of error, appellant argues the scope of his detention illegally exceeded the justification for the initial detention. The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). A routine traffic stop resembles an investigative detention. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). An investigative detention is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we apply the two-pronged Terry[1] test: (1) whether the officer=s action was justified at its inception and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstance that justified the initial interference. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19B20).
Under the first prong of the Terry test, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion. Id. at 242B43. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articuable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or will soon be engaged in criminal activity. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The second prong of the Terry test concerns the scope of the detention. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no more than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Id. at 245. Investigative methods used should be the least intrusive reasonably available to dispel the officer=s suspicion in a short period of time. Id. The propriety of the duration of the stop is determined by assessing whether the police diligently pursued a method of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly. Id.
Appellant does not challenge the justification for the initial traffic stop. Instead, he asserts Levitt did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the investigation for speeding into an investigation for DWI. Levitt stated appellant maintained his lane of traffic without swerving into other lanes. Levitt also testified appellant=s driving behavior for slowing down, changing lanes, pulling over, and stopping were all indicative of normal physical and mental faculties. Part of Levitt=s duty is to look for possible signs of intoxication and he has been trained in sobriety field-testing. Levitt did not mention an odor of any alcoholic beverage, bloodshot or glassy eyes, slurred speech, or erratic driving.
The State argues that although Levitt=s speeding investigation had ended, that does not mean any suspicions of DWI or other criminal activity had ended or that the speeding investigation had ended. See State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and no/100 ($30,660) in U.S. Currency, 136 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (explaining, after a traffic stop for speeding, the officer may continue to detain the suspect after concluding the investigation of the traffic violation if he has reasonable suspicion another offense is being committed). We agree. Egdorf pulled in behind Levitt almost immediately after the stop and his investigation became part of Levitt=s investigation. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest a citation for speeding was issued at all, much less before Egdorf became involved. See id. (explaining whether the officer was required to release the defendant depended on whether he had developed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before issuing the speeding ticket). We conclude there was reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention and investigate the DWI offense. Appellant=s sole point of error is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
/s/ J. Harvey Hudson
Justice
Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 12, 2007.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Hudson and Guzman.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).