in Re James Andrew Walker, II

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied, and Memorandum Opinion filed June 10, 2008

 

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied, and Memorandum Opinion filed June 10, 2008.

 

In The

 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-08-00401 -CV

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IN RE JAMES ANDREW WALKER, II, Relator

 

 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

 

 

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

On May 13, 2008, relator James Andrew Walker, II filed paperwork thatBbased upon the relief requested thereinBwe have construed as a petition for writ of mandamus.[1]  No record has been filed.  See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7.  As best we can determine, Walker has asked that we order the respondent to rule on relator=s  pending habeas corpus petition and request to be released on bond.  We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.


When a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, the act of considering and ruling upon that motion is a ministerial act, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act.  Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding).  A trial court has a reasonable time to perform the ministerial duty of considering and ruling on a matter that was properly filed and before the court.  See In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).  Whether the judge has acted within a Areasonable@ time depends upon the particular circumstances of the case.  Id.

The absence of a mandamus record prevents us from evaluating the circumstances of this case and, consequently, the merits of Walker=s complaints.  We must therefore conclude that relator has not established his entitlement to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus.  Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus in case number 14-08-00401-CV, and all other requests for relief contained in that petition.

PER CURIAM

 

Petition Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed, June 10, 2008.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Brown.



            [1]           We are to liberally construe the pleadings of a party acting pro se.  See Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).