J-S35001-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W.C., JR., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 3354 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000643-2012
CP-51-DP-0055444-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.D.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 3355 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000223-2012
CP-51-DP-0055445-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.L.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 3356 EDA 2014
J-S35001-15
Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000224-2012
CP-51-DP-0055446-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.M.C.C., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 3357 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000225-2012
CP-51-DP-0055447-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.E.A.D.C., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: Y.C., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 3358 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000226-2012
CP-51-DP-0055448-2010
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J-S35001-15
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2015
Appellant, Y.C. (Mother), appeals from the October 10, 2014 decrees
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to five of her minor children:
S.W.C., Jr., a male, born in January 2000; J.D.C., a female, born in
September 2001; Y.L.C., a female, born in July 2002; K.M.C.C., a male,
born in April 2005; and H.E.A.D.C., a male, born in January 2010
(collectively, the Children). After careful review, we affirm.1
This Court set forth the factual and procedural background of this case
in our review of the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights
to the Children. See J.D.C., supra at 3-5. Therein, we stated, in relevant
part, as follows.
Mother and Father’s three oldest children, Do.L.C.
(female), Jaz.C[.] (female), and Du.C[.] (male), ages
16, 17, and 18, are all under … Department of
Human Services’ (“DHS”) supervision, but are not
subject to the current termination petitions….
DHS became involved with the Children in May
2010 following numerous calls to DHS’ hotline that
the Children were coming to school dirty and hungry,
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
By separate decrees the same date, the parental rights of the Children’s
father, S.W.C., Sr., a/k/a S.C., were involuntarily terminated. Father
appealed the decrees, which this Court affirmed by separate memorandum.
See In re J.D.C., Y.L.C., K.M.C.C., H.E.A.D.C., and S.W.C., Jr., --- A.3d -
--, 3208, 3214-3217 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished
memorandum).
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that the Children’s home was cluttered and
disorganized, that Do.L.C. was not attending school,
and that Father had hit Y.L.C. At the time, the
Children were living with Mother; Father was not a
custodial caregiver.
Dependency petitions were filed on May 24,
2010, and granted on June 10, 2010. Initially, the
Children remained in Mother’s custody. However,
the Children were placed in foster care in November
2010 ….
DHS filed petitions for goal change to adoption and
involuntary termination of parental rights to the four
youngest children, H.E.A.D.C., K.M.C.C., Y.L.C., and
J.D.C. on May 24, 2012. On December 21, 2012, a
petition was filed as to S.W.C., Jr.
…
Hearings were held on the termination petitions on
April 22, 2014 and October 10, 2014.2 DHS
presented five witnesses: Henry Bullock, the original
DHS worker assigned to the case from April 2010 to
November 2010; Bianca Lahara, the first case
manager assigned to the case from November 2010
to January 2014; Latoya Carr-Hermitt, case manager
assigned to the case from December 2010 through
the October 2014 termination hearing; Ms. Griffin3 of
First Home Care, current case manager; Antoinette
Bogan, First Home Care Social Worker, assigned to
the case in July 2014 to present….[2]
__________________________________________
2
A partial termination hearing took place in 2013
before the Honorable E. Wright. Due to time
constraints, the remainder of the hearing was
continued. Before the remainder of the case could
be heard, Judge Wright recused himself on
September 25, 2013, following an ex parte
____________________________________________
2
Mother testified on her own behalf during the hearing.
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communication of Mother’s former counsel to the
court. The case was reassigned to the Honorable
Allen Tereshko, who ordered the termination
proceedings start again de novo.
3
Ms. Griffin’s first name was inaudible when she
testified.
Id. (citations omitted; footnotes in original).
On October 10, 2014, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On
November 10, 2014, Mother filed timely notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i).3 This Court consolidated Mother’s
appeals sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. On December 10, 2014, the trial
court issued an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review.
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in relying on
inadmissible evidence to render its findings of fact[?]
2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its
discretion by terminating the parental rights of
[M]other … pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), where the findings of fact were not
supported by clear and convincing evidence[?]
____________________________________________
3
On November 21, 2014, Mother filed amended notices of appeal, which
included separate captions reflecting the separate decrees that were entered
on separate dockets. See TCPF Ltd. P’ship v. Skatell, 976 A.2d 571, 574
n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that taking one appeal from several orders is
not acceptable practice and is discouraged, but declining to quash the appeal
where appellant filed an amended appeal).
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Mother’s Brief at 7.
We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. If the
factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error
of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result.
We have previously emphasized our deference to
trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
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status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, we conclude the trial court properly terminated Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows.4
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
____________________________________________
4
In light of our disposition regarding Section 2511(a)(2), we need not
consider Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and
(8). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)
(stating that this Court need only agree with any one subsection of 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the
termination of parental rights), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
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…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following
elements.
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination [of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs
and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In this case, the trial court made the following factual findings.
Mother’s FSP [Family Service Plan] Objectives
were established on May 25, 2010. Mother was
ordered to comply with housing, mental health
treatment; visitation, bonding evaluation; signing for
mental health therapists; and attending medical
appointments. The record shows that Mother has
minimally complied with her FSP Objectives.
Mother has failed to comply with her housing
FSP Objective. When asked for her current
residence, Mother refused to provide the information
and directed DHS to send all correspondence to her
mother’s address. She has also failed to avail herself
to any of the housing programs available through
ARC.
Mother has also failed her bonding evaluation
FSP Objective. Mother was referred to ATA to
complete a bonding evaluation, but missed the first
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appointment and never rescheduled. Moreover,
Mother was previously ordered at multiple court
hearings to reschedule the bonding evaluation, but
did not comply.
Mother has failed to comply with her mental
health FSP Objective. Mother was ordered to comply
with DHS mental health but had never completed the
goal. She was referred to services at ARC but
stopped attending because she didn’t want to go on
Saturdays. Even though Mother provided notice of
attending treatments in March and April of 2014, she
did not attend any treatment between 2011 and
March of 2014.
Additionally, Mother has minimally complied
with her visitation FSP Objective. The Case Manager
[Bianca Lahara] testified that there were concerns
about Mother’s attendance at the visits.
…
Further, Mother has minimally complied with
the FSP Objective requiring her to consent to the
[C]hildren’s medical treatment. [Lahara] testified
that she ran into issues when contacting Mother for
consent. Mother never picked up the phone when
someone from the agency called and would rarely
return[] calls. In addition, [Lahara] testified that in
one instance Mother did not want to sign a document
for Y.L.C.’s psychiatrist appointments because of
scheduling issues resulting in a lapse of time for the
child’s appointments. The DHS Worker [Latoya Carr-
Hermitt] also testified,
One time [Y.L.C.] needed to have services
signed for TSS and DHS services, for emotional
support. That was scheduled through the
school psychiatrist on several occasions.
[Mother] was supposed to come, she didn’t
show up. I would offer to bring her, provide
tokens, she never came. On several occasions
K.M.C.C. was hospitalized after being 302’d.
Mom was requested to come to the hospital for
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intake, she never did, so DHS had to get a
consent to treat. So he could be released from
the hospital.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 12-14 (internal citations omitted).
Turning to the merits of Mother’s appeal, she first asserts that the trial
court erred in relying on inadmissible evidence in terminating her parental
rights. In addition, Mother asserts that the trial court’s “opinion cites
liberally from evidence not introduced at the termination hearing, and as
such its findings are not supported by the record.” Mother’s Brief at 14.
Significantly, Mother does not support her argument with legal
discussion and analysis. In fact, Mother does not specify which evidence the
court relied on that was allegedly either inadmissible or not introduced at the
hearing. As such, we conclude that Mother’s first issue is waived. See
Giant Food Stores, LLC v. THF Silver Spring Dev., L.P., 959 A.2d 438,
444 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that, “[t]he Rules of Appellate Procedure
state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported
by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Failure to do so
constitutes waiver of the claim[]”) (citations and quotation marks omitted),
appeal denied, 972 A.2d 522 (Pa. 2009); accord Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Even if
Mother’s issue was not waived, we would conclude that her issue is without
merit because the testimonial evidence supports the trial court’s factual
findings.
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In her second issue, Mother argues that the termination of her
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) is not warranted, as follows.
[T]he evidence presented at trial showed that
[M]other has remedied the conditions that caused
the [C]hildren to come into foster care and, but for
housing, is now able to care for her [C]hildren.
Additionally, DHS did not provide [M]other with
reasonable efforts to reunify her with her [C]hildren.
Mother’s Brief at 11.
The foregoing factual findings by the trial court belie Mother’s
assertion that she is now able to care for the Children. Further, Mother’s
argument acknowledges that she has not found suitable housing. Indeed,
Mother testified on October 10, 2014, the final day of the hearing, that she
has been living with her aunt “since August 8th …. And I’m getting ready to
move on my own after I leave here today to put a down payment on a
place.” N.T., 10/10/14, at 67. Mother testified on cross-examination by
counsel for DHS that the home she plans to move to has only one bedroom.
Id. at 71. Therefore, more than four years after the Children were placed in
the custody of DHS, Mother remains unable to provide for their physical and
mental well-being.
In addition, to the extent Mother asserts that her conduct does not
warrant termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because DHS failed to
provide her with “reasonable efforts to reunify her with her Children,” we
disagree. Mother’s Brief at 11. In In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014),
our Supreme Court held that neither Section 2511(a)(2) nor Section 2511(b)
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“requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent
prior to termination of parental rights.” Id. at 672. Therefore, Mother’s
assertion is without merit.
Further, Mother argues as follows.
[P]ast incapacity alone is not [a] sufficient basis for
involuntary termination, there must be evidence of a
parent[’]s present incapacity. [Mother]’s unrefuted
testimony was that she received treatment for her
anxiety over ‘probably a total of a year’ of the two
years prior to the filing of the termination petition.
Furthermore, there has been no showing that her
‘anxiety’ was ever so serious as to incapacitate her
as a parent.
Mother’s Brief at 15-16 (citations omitted).5
Because the record supports the trial court’s credibility findings in
favor of the DHS caseworkers that Mother did not comply with her mental
health FSP objective, we will not disturb the decrees. Moreover, we reject
Mother’s argument that the trial court terminated her parental rights on the
basis of her past incapacity, or, in the alternative, that she was ever
incapacitated from performing her parental duties. To the contrary, the
court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to
her neglect and/or refusal to comply with her FSP objectives related to
obtaining housing, a bonding evaluation, mental health treatment, and
providing consents for the Children’s medical treatment. We discern no
____________________________________________
5
The record reveals that Mother was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder in
2011. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 8.
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abuse of discretion by the trial court. Indeed, Mother’s repeated neglect or
refusal to comply with her FSP objectives has caused the Children to be
without essential parental care, control, or subsistence for their physical or
mental well-being since 2010. Further, the causes of Mother’s neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied. Therefore, Mother’s issues on appeal
fail.
Although Mother does not present an issue on appeal with respect to
Section 2511(b), in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we consider it.
See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (addressing
Section 2511(b) although “Mother does not expressly challenge the trial
court’s determination that termination would best serve C.L.G.”). Our
Supreme Court has explained that, “the mere existence of a bond or
attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a
termination petition.” In re T.S.M., supra. The Court further stated that,
“[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also
consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they
have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation omitted).
In considering the affection a child may have for his or her natural
parents, this Court has stated the following.
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a
parent simply because the child harbors affection for
the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically
unsound. If a child’s feelings were the dispositive
factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare
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child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse,
is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and
completely disavow a parent. …. Nor are we of the
opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or
when considered in connection with a child’s feeling
toward a parent, to establish a de facto beneficial
bond exists. The psychological aspect of parenthood
is more important in terms of the development of the
child and its mental and emotional health than the
coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Instantly, the trial court concluded that “because there was not a
strong bond between Mother and her [C]hildren, terminating Mother’s
parental rights would not cause the [C]hildren irreparable harm and would
be in the best interest of the [C]hildren pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).”
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 14. We discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court.
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The trial court based its decision on the testimony of DHS workers,
Carr-Hermitt and Griffin “concerning the lack of relationship between Mother
and her children in contrast to the bond that exists between [the Children]
and their respective foster parents.” Id. at 14; see also id. at 15 (citing
relevant testimonial evidence). Further, the trial court found credible the
testimony of Lahara and Griffin that, “[the Children] would not suffer
irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated[.]” Id. at 15.
Upon careful review, the testimony of Carr-Hermitt, Griffin, and Lahara
supports the trial court’s conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the Children. We further note that the Children’s right to a
permanent and safe environment has been delayed far too long in this case.
See In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating “a
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment”), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa.
2005).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the October 10, 2014 decrees
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2015
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