TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-13-00273-CV
J. A. B., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-FM-11-004474, HONORABLE TIM SULAK, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant J.A.B. appeals the trial court’s final decree terminating his parental rights
to his child, L.I.B., following a jury trial.1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. The jury found by clear
and convincing evidence three predicate grounds and that termination of appellant’s parental rights
was in the best interest of his child. See id. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). The trial court rendered
a final decree of termination on the jury’s verdict. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial
court’s final decree of termination.2
1
We use initials to refer to appellant and his child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.
R. App. P. 9.8.
2
The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother based upon her execution of an
affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(K), .103 (affidavit
of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights). The mother has not appealed the final decree
of termination.
Appellant raises two issues concerning the jury charge. The charge contained
only questions of termination, and the jury returned a verdict that terminated appellant’s
parental rights under each of the three predicate grounds submitted to the jury. See id.
§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). Appellant’s issues do not challenge the questions that were submitted
to the jury but the omission of questions. In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it omitted questions of conservatorship from the jury charge and, in his
second issue, he contends that the trial court’s error in omitting questions of conservatorship caused
him harm. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1) (standard for reversible error in civil cases). He argues
that he has a statutory right under section 105.002 of the family code and a constitutional right under
article I, section 15 of the Texas Constitution to have the jury determine whether or not he should
be appointed as a conservator as an alternative to termination. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 15 (providing
right to trial by jury); Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(1)(A)–(C) (providing that “a party is entitled to
a verdict by the jury and the court may not contravene a jury verdict on the issues of . . . the
appointment of [conservators]”).
Appellant further contends that questions of conservatorship were raised by the
written pleadings and supported by the evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277, 278 (directing trial court
to submit questions, instructions, and definitions that are “raised by the written pleadings and the
evidence” and that are “proper to enable the jury to render a verdict”). His pleadings included a
counter-petition requesting that he be appointed managing conservator or, alternatively, possessory
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conservator, and he contends that there was sufficient evidence to support findings that he was a
good father and bonded with his child.3
We review a trial court’s submission of jury questions under an abuse of
discretion standard. Ayala v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-09-00121-CV,
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7689, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 16, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Rosell v. Central W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably or “without reference to any guiding
rules and principles.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985).
“The trial court has broad discretion in submitting jury questions, subject only to the limitation that
controlling issues of fact must be submitted to the jury.” Ayala, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7689, at *8
(citation omitted); see also Triplex Comms. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. 1995) (“If an issue
is properly pleaded and is supported by some evidence, a litigant is entitled to have controlling
questions submitted to the jury.” (citations omitted)).
In the context of a parental termination case, this Court has squarely addressed the
issue of whether a trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses to submit jury questions concerning
conservatorship. See Ayala, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7689, at *10–11. In that case, we rejected the
appellant parent’s contention that sections of the family code, including section 105.002, gave her
the right to have the jury consider naming her conservator as an alternative to termination.
We explained:
3
At trial, the Department was not seeking to be named conservator in the absence
of termination.
3
The controlling question in this case was whether [the mother]’s parental rights
should be terminated. See Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647,
649 (Tex. 1990); In the Interest of J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 129 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.) (“In parental termination cases, the controlling question is
whether the relationship between the parent and each child should be terminated.”).
The trial court “asked the controlling question,” so it did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to submit additional questions. E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 649.
Id. at *11; see also In the Interest of J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 129 (“It is well settled law that a jury
charge that tracks the statutory language and then asks the controlling question does not amount to
an abuse of discretion.” (citing E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 649)). Similarly, in this case, the trial court
“asked the controlling question[s]” concerning termination of appellant’s parental rights. Thus, it
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit additional questions concerning conservatorship.
See Ayala, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7689, at *10–11. We overrule appellant’s first issue.4
Having overruled appellant’s dispositive issue, we affirm the trial court’s final decree
of termination.
4
Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not include
questions of conservatorship in the jury charge, we do not reach appellant’s second issue concerning
harm based upon the omission of questions of conservatorship. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a), 47.1
(appellate courts “must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses
every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”). We also do not reach the
Department’s arguments concerning preservation of appellant’s issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1;
Tex. R. Civ. P. 274 (addressing preservation of objections and requests to jury charge).
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__________________________________________
Melissa Goodwin, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Rose and Goodwin
Affirmed
Filed: August 14, 2013
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