TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-14-00690-CV
A. E., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RUNNELS COUNTY, 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 842, HONORABLE BEN WOODWARD, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final decree, following a bench trial, terminating the parental
rights of a mother, A.E., to her one-year-old daughter, E.M.S.E. A.E.’s court-appointed counsel has
filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without
merit.1 Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record and demonstrating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal.2 A.E. was provided
with a copy of counsel’s brief and was advised of her right to examine the appellate record and to
file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
1
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied)
(applying Anders procedure in appeal from termination of parental rights).
2
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646-47.
At the termination hearing, the district court heard evidence tending to show that A.E.
had tested positive for methamphetamines at the time E.M.S.E. was born and had subsequently
admitted to using methamphetamines and marihuana during her pregnancy. Christie Antczak, a
caseworker for the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), testified
that the Department had given A.E. a family-service plan, which required, among other things, that
A.E. comply with a supervised visitation plan, submit to random drug and alcohol testing, notify
the Department of any involvement with law enforcement, and keep the Department informed of
her current address and contact information. When asked if A.E. had complied with all of the
requirements, Antczak responded that she had not. Antczak also testified that she was not aware of
A.E.’s current address, observing that A.E. tended to move from “place to place.” She added that
on more than one occasion A.E. had lived in a garden shed; another time, she had resided in a “very
dirty” house that had no utilities. Antczak further testified that A.E. had last visited the child
approximately one year prior to the hearing, after which visitation was stopped based on A.E.’s
lack of progress in her service plan and threats by A.E. that she was considering suicide. Antczak
also recounted that A.E. had admitted to using methamphetamines and marihuana as recently as
four weeks prior to the termination hearing. According to Antczak, A.E. had not demonstrated any
ability to provide a home for, or take care of, E.M.S.E. Antczak testified that the Department was
recommending termination of A.E.’s parental rights and opined that termination of her parental
rights was in the child’s best interest.
Additionally, Antczak testified that A.E. had previously had her parental rights to
another child terminated. A copy of that termination order was admitted into evidence. The order
indicated that A.E.’s rights had been terminated based in part on findings that she had “knowingly
2
placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the
physical or emotional well-being of the child” and “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of the child.”3
Other evidence considered by the district court included the testimony of
Randall Davis, the Chief of Police of Winters, Texas, who testified that he had been notified several
days prior to the termination hearing that A.E. was living in a vacant house. Davis added that he had
filed a complaint against A.E. that summer for criminal trespass. Davis also testified that he had
earlier responded to a domestic dispute involving A.E. and another individual while A.E. was still
pregnant with E.M.S.E. During the incident, Davis testified, A.E. had attempted to cut her wrists
with a butcher knife and razor blade. After he had subdued A.E., Davis recounted, he found
marihuana in her possession. According to Davis, A.E. told him that she had smoked marihuana
during her first pregnancy and that it had “made the baby healthier.”
The district court also heard evidence tending to show that E.M.S.E. currently
resides with two foster parents and her half-brother, whom the foster parents had previously adopted
after A.E.’s parental rights to that child were terminated. Antczak testified that E.M.S.E. has
special medical needs and that the child’s foster mother, who is a nurse, has been able to monitor
and address those needs. Antczak opined that E.M.S.E. was doing “outstanding” in her current
placement. The foster mother similarly testified that E.M.S.E. was doing “wonderful,” that she was
“very bonded” to the family, and that the foster parents intended to adopt her.
3
See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(D), (E).
3
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the Department’s requested
relief and terminated A.E.’s parental rights. As specified in the termination decree, the district court
found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child and that
A.E. had: (1) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in
conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child; (2) had her parent-child
relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that her conduct was in
violation of section 161.001(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code; (3) constructively abandoned the child;
and (4) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions
necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child.4 This appeal followed.
Having reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, we agree that the appeal is frivolous.
We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.5 We affirm the district court’s
termination decree and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
__________________________________________
Bob Pemberton, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland
Affirmed
Filed: April 28, 2015
4
See id. § 161.001(E), (M), (N), (O).
5
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 741-44; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646-47.
4