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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13788
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00007-WCO-JCF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FRANCISCO VARGAS-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(September 18, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Francisco Vargas-Gonzalez appeals his 24 month sentence, imposed at the
low end of the advisory guidelines range, for one count of illegal reentry after
deportation. He contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.
I.
Vargas-Gonzalez, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after
deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). The presentence
investigation report (PSR) recommended a total offense level of 13 and a criminal
history category of IV, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 24 to 30 months
imprisonment. The statutory maximum for the offense is 20 years.
The PSR detailed Vargas-Gonzalez’s criminal history. In 2004, he pleaded
guilty in Clayton Country, Georgia to driving under the influence, improper lane
change, and driving without a valid license. He was sentenced to one day in
custody and a term of probation. In 2008, he pleaded guilty in Hall County,
Georgia to forgery in the first degree (for possessing a forged driver’s license with
a false name), giving false information to a law enforcement officer, a violation of
the Family Violence Act (for intentionally causing bodily harm to a female he
lived with at the time), and cruelty to children in the third degree (for allowing a
child under the age of 18 to witness the act of violence). He was sentenced to five
years imprisonment, with six months to be served in custody and the balance
probated. In November 2008, he was deported to Mexico.
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In January 2012, Vargas-Gonzalez was arrested again in Hall County,
Georgia and charged with, among other things, driving without a license and
giving false information to a police officer. He pleaded guilty and was deported
for a second time on February 21, 2012.
About nine months later, in November 2012, Vargas-Gonzalez was arrested
yet again in Hall County, Georgia. This time he was charged with aggravated
assault (for pulling a knife on his girlfriend in their home), two counts of cruelty to
children in the third degree (for allowing two children under the age of 18 to
witness the assault), and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony.
He was sentenced in state court to one year imprisonment and nine years
probation. On December 4, 2013, he was transferred to ICE custody and, on
February 20, 2014, he was indicted on the instant charge and made his first
appearance in the district court.
At sentencing, both parties confirmed that they had no objections to the
PSR. Vargas-Gonzalez asked the court to “depart downward” from the low end of
the advisory guidelines range (i.e., 24 months) as a way of “giv[ing] him credit”
for the 2 months and 20 days of time he had served between December 4, 2013,
when he was first taken into ICE custody, and February 20, 2014, when he was
indicted. The government responded that a sentence in the middle of the advisory
guidelines range (i.e., 27 months) would be a reasonable sentence to deter another
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illegal reentry, to promote respect for the law, and to protect the public. The
government also noted that “the [c]ourt could account for [the 2 months and 20
days spent in ICE custody] by simply sentencing [him] to . . . 24 months.”
The court sentenced Vargas-Gonzalez to 24 months imprisonment and 3
years supervised release. The court stated that it had considered all of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and that it believed that 24 months was an adequate
sentence to deter another illegal reentry.
II.
Vargas-Gonzalez argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
because the district court did not adjust the sentence to account for the 2 months
and 20 days he spent in ICE custody.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). We will not vacate a
sentence as substantively unreasonable unless we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court clearly erred in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and
imposed a sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts
of the case. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing it is unreasonable
in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d
566, 573 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Vargas Gonzalez’s low-end of the guidelines sentence is not so long that it is
substantively unreasonable. The record does not reflect whether the district court
specifically accounted for the 2 months and 20 days he spent in ICE custody, but
that does not matter. The court stated that it had considered all of the § 3553(a)
factors and explained that deterrence was an important factor in light of Vargas-
Gonzalez’s multiple reentries. The sentence is at the low end of the advisory
guidelines range and well below the statutory maximum of 20 years, both of which
are indicators of reasonableness. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746
(11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e ordinarily expect a sentence within the [g]uidelines range
to be reasonable.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum).
In sum, Vargas-Gonzalez has failed to meet his burden of showing that a 24 month
sentence is unreasonably long in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the facts of his
case. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 n.16.
AFFIRMED.
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