Boston v. Acura

USCA1 Opinion









August 5, 1992 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 91-2319

BOSTON CAR COMPANY, INC.,
d/b/a ACURA OF BOSTON,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

ACURA AUTOMOBILE DIVISION,
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Lay,* Senior Circuit Judge,
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and O'Scannlain,** Circuit Judge.
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Robert C. Gerrard with whom Thomas S. Fitzpatrick and Davis, Malm
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& D'Agostine, P.C. were on brief for appellant.
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J. Donald McCarthy with whom Lyon & Lyon, P.C., Hope E. Melville,
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William H. Baker, Christopher R. O'Hara and Nutter, McClennen & Fish
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were on brief for appellee.
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* Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
** Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.


















O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: This diversity case arises
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from a dispute about the terms of an automobile franchise

agreement entered into by American Honda Motor Co.

("American Honda"), the distributor of the Acura line of

cars, and Boston Car Co., Inc. ("Boston Car"), holder of an

Acura dealer franchise. The district court ruled for

American Honda, and Boston Car appeals. We affirm.

I

In 1985, James Carney, the principal of Boston Car,

began discussions with the Acura Automobile Division of

American Honda with the object of obtaining an Acura

dealership. Damien Budnick represented American Honda in

these discussions.

On May 7, 1985, Carney signed a letter of intent

("LOI") setting forth the conditions under which American

Honda would grant Carney an Acura dealership, to be located

in the town of Newton in suburban Boston. In the vernacular

of the trade, Carney was to be granted the Newton "point,"

or dealership location. The LOI listed several other points

American Honda expected to establish as part of their

marketing plan for the Boston metropolitan area.

Carney was unable to secure a suitable location in

Newton but identified a fitting site in the Brighton area,

near Newton but within the city limits of Boston. Based on

this location, Carney sought the so-called "Boston point"

from American Honda. Since his prospective location


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remained close to Newton, Carney wanted the Newton point

deleted from American Honda's marketing plan. He also

expressed concerns about the Lexington and Natick points.

Both parties agree that several discussions ensued between

Carney and Budnick on the subject of the location and

planned opening date of other points in the Boston area.

Eventually, American Honda granted Carney the Boston

point as the first Acura dealership in the Boston

metropolitan area. The Newton point was dropped, and

replaced by a Dedham point. American Honda kept the

Lexington and Natick points, although it apparently agreed

to delay the opening of the Lexington point. The final LOI

issued by American Honda on August 2, 1985 and accepted by

Carney stated:

The primary market area that you have
applied for is only part of our market
representation plan. It is our intention
to establish additional Acura dealers in
the surrounding primary market areas:
Danvers, Lexington, Dedham, Natick, Norwood
and Norwell.

By January 1988, American Honda had filled four of the

six points mentioned in the LOI. The Norwood point was

filled by a dealership in the neighboring town of Walpole,

the Danvers point was filled by a dealership in the

neighboring town of Peabody, the Natick point was filled by

a dealership in the neighboring town of Framingham, and the

Norwell point was filled by a dealership in Norwell. In

each case, American Honda sent a letter to Boston Car


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informing it of the new dealership. Each letter stated that

"[t]his action is consistent with our previously stated

marketing plan as contained in your original Letter of

Intent dated August 2, 1985."

On April 27, 1988, American Honda issued an LOI to

William York to establish an Acura dealership in Revere.

This dealership was to replace the Dedham point because the

planned Dedham site turned out to be contaminated. On May

4, 1988, York signed the LOI. The following day, Budnick

hand delivered a letter to Boston Car and to other area

dealers giving notice of American Honda's intent to start a

dealership in Revere. This letter, unlike the previous

notice letters, did not state that establishment of the new

dealership was consistent with Boston Car's LOI.

In response to notice of the Revere LOI, the principal

of the Peabody dealership formally notified American Honda

on May 26, 1988, of its intent to file suit. The Peabody

dealership also informed Boston Car that, in order to sue

under the Massachusetts franchise law, Boston Car would have

to give notice within thirty days of American Honda's notice

of intent to establish the Revere dealership. On June 28,

1988, Carney sent a letter to American Honda objecting to

the new franchise in Revere. The letter did not state an

intention to sue American Honda, however. The Peabody

dealership proceeded to file suit. That suit was settled in

the fall of 1988.


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On January 24, 1989, Boston Car filed this action

against American Honda in state court, alleging violations

of the Massachusetts automobile franchise law, Mass. Gen. L.

Chap. 93B, misrepresentation and breach of contract.

American Honda removed the case to federal court on the

basis of diversity of citizenship.1 American Honda also

brought a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that

it had the legal right to establish a dealership in Revere.

American Honda moved for summary judgment. Judge Wolf

heard oral argument on the motion, but then requested

testimony from Carney and Budnick. Thus, the summary

judgment proceeding turned into something like a short bench

trial, after which the judge made findings of fact.2

Following these proceedings, on November 25, 1991,

Judge Wolf issued an oral opinion granting judgment for

American Honda. In a thorough and lucid opinion, Judge Wolf

ruled that the LOI between Carney and American Honda was an

enforceable agreement. Nonetheless, he concluded, the

listing of future points was not a promise but merely a

statement of American Honda's present intention. Further,

Judge Wolf found no evidence that American Honda had acted

in bad faith or misrepresented its true present intentions

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1 Boston Car is a citizen of Massachusetts, while
American
Honda is a citizen of California.

2 Neither party has objected to this procedure. We
assume, without deciding, that it was proper. Because the
judge resolved disputed issues of fact, we will review as we
would an ordinary bench trial pursuant to federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52.

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at the time the letter was executed, and he therefore

rejected Boston Car's misrepresentation claim.

Regarding Boston Car's claim under Chapter 93B, Judge

Wolf found that Boston Car had waived any cause of action

under the statute, because it had failed to give notice to

American Honda of its intention to sue within thirty days of

receiving notification of the new franchise. Judge Wolf

found that American Honda's letter of May 5, 1988

constituted the statutorily required notice to existing

franchisees of a proposed new franchise, and that Boston Car

had failed to give notice of intent to sue within thirty

days of receipt of that letter. Boston Car filed a timely

notice of appeal.

II

We must first determine if we have jurisdiction over

this appeal. Boston Car filed its notice of appeal on

December 4, 1991. On December 20, 1991, this court issued

an order to show cause why the appeal should not be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the order

appealed from did not expressly dispose of American Honda's

counterclaim. The parties then filed with the district

court a "Joint Motion For Amended Order and Entry of Final

Judgment On All Claims," asking the district court to amend

its order of November 25, 1991, to grant judgment for

American Honda on its counterclaim. Judge Wolf granted the

joint motion of the parties and adopted their proposed order

on January 30, 1992. No new notice of appeal was filed.

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We conclude that the November 25 order was final and

appealable and that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

Judge Wolf's order stated that American Honda's motion for

summary judgment was granted. The motion requested "summary

judgment on all issues in this case." Although American

Honda's counterclaim was not specifically mentioned in the

accompanying opinion, it was necessarily resolved by the

November 25 order.

Nor did the subsequent Joint Motion undermine the

effectiveness of Boston Car's notice of appeal. True, under

Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a

notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of a timely

motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 52(b) or

Rule 59 is a nullity. However, the Joint Motion, if

construed as a Rule 52 or Rule 59 motion, was not timely.

It was filed January 2, 1992, more than thirty days after

entry of judgment. Because motions under Rules 52(b) and 59

must be served within ten days, if the Joint Motion were

brought under these rules it was untimely and had no effect

on the notice of appeal. See Flint v. Howard, 464 F.2d
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1084, 1086 (1st Cir. 1972) ("an untimely motion for

reconsideration . . . is a nullity").

In any event, we think it more reasonable to construe

the Joint Motion as a request for correction of an error

arising from oversight or omission, pursuant to Rule 60(a).

Rule 60 motions can be brought at any time, and do not


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disturb a notice of appeal previously filed. We therefore

conclude that, because the order was final and appealable

and the notice of appeal was effective, we have jurisdiction

and may proceed to the merits.

III

Boston Car contends that the district court erred in

holding that American Honda was not bound by the recitation

of its market plan in the August 1985 LOI. We must

determine whether the district judge properly considered

evidence of the party's intent beyond the four corners of

the LOI, and if he correctly determined that the listing was

not a promise. Our standard of review on these questions is

bifurcated. "The determination of whether a contract

provision is ambiguous is a question of law subject to

plenary review." ITT Corp. v. LTX Corp., 926 F.2d 1258,
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1261 (1st Cir. 1991). If the contract provision is

ambiguous, "a finding as to the meaning of a writing will be

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard." Gel
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Systems, Inc. v. Hyundai Eng. & Constr. Co., 902 F.2d 1024,
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1027 (1st Cir. 1990).

The document's denomination as a letter of intent does

not determine whether it was binding upon the parties. In

Massachusetts, a letter of intent is binding to the extent

the parties so intend. See Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul
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Corp., 592 N.E.2d 1289, ____ (Mass. 1992). The parties do
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not dispute that the LOI was in some respects binding. We


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are asked to determine here only whether one specific

provision, the market plan listing, was promissory or

informational.

"Under Massachusetts law, parol evidence may not be

admitted to contradict the clear terms of an agreement, or

to create ambiguity where none otherwise exists." ITT
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Corp., 926 F.2d at 1261. However, we have recognized that:
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in order to utilize extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intent, a court need not
invariably find facial ambiguity. The
Massachusetts courts have said:

When the written agreement, as
applied to the subject matter, is in
any respects uncertain or equivocal
in meaning, all the circumstances of
the parties leading to its execution
may be shown for the purpose of
elucidating, but not of contradicting
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or changing its terms.
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Keating v. Stadium Mgmt. Corp., 508 N.E.2d
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121, 123 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied,
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511 N.E.2d 620 (Mass. 1987).

ITT Corp., 926 F.2d at 1264.
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Thus, the threshold question is whether the term at

issue is ambiguous, or at least uncertain or equivocal. The

disputed provision of the LOI states:

The primary market area that you have
applied for is only part of our market
representation plan. It is our intention
to establish additional Acura dealers in
the surrounding primary market areas:
Danvers, Lexington, Dedham, Natick,
Norwood and Norwell.

On its face, the language appears clear: American Honda is

merely stating its "intention" to establish certain


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additional dealerships. On the other hand, the context may

impart uncertainty. The remaining provisions of the LOI set

forth a detailed list of binding conditions on the grant of

the dealership. Moreover, the market plan roster is quite

specific, naming six particular towns where dealerships will

be located. On balance, we are persuaded that Judge Wolf

did not err in considering parol evidence with respect to

the parties' intentions for the purpose of elucidating the

terms of the LOI.

Considering the language of the provision and the

testimony of Carney and Budnick, Judge Wolf's finding that

the market plan listing was merely an expression of American

Honda's present intentions rather than a binding promise is

not clearly erroneous. As just stated, the language

supports the view that the provision is merely a statement

of present intention. Indeed, the provision states, "[i]t

is our intention . . . ." This language stands in

conspicuous contrast to the other provisions of the LOI,

which are couched in promissory terms such as "we agree" and

"you shall."

Carney's own testimony confirms this understanding.

Carney conceded that he understood at the time he signed the

provision that the number and location of dealerships as

stated in the letter was not irrevocably fixed, but was

subject to change as market conditions changed. Carney

clearly realized that the precise locations of the listed


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points were subject to change: he himself had insisted on

changing the location of his original point, and three of

the four subsequently filled points were established in

towns other than those listed in the LOI, with no objection

from Carney.

Boston Car makes much of the fact that Carney and

Budnick had extensive discussions regarding where the other

Boston area points would be located and when they would

open. Boston Car argues that these discussions demonstrate

the binding nature of the provision setting forth the

points, because sophisticated businessmen would not waste

their time negotiating a non-binding term. An equally

plausible account, however, is that Carney indeed was

concerned about the number and location of the other Boston

area points, that he and Budnick talked extensively on the

subject, but that ultimately American Honda, which was

unwilling to bind itself to an inviolable plan, prevailed.

In any event, the mere fact of negotiations on the number

and location of the Boston points does not persuade us that

the statement of intention regarding such points is binding.

IV

Boston Car also appeals the rejection of its claim

under Chapter 93B of the Massachusetts General Laws.

Chapter 93B forbids the grant of a new franchise by an

automobile manufacturer or distributor "arbitrarily and

without notice to existing franchisees." Mass. Gen. L. ch.


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93B, 4(3)(l). Notice must be provided at least "sixty
_

days prior to granting such franchise" to all existing

dealers within a twenty-mile radius of the proposed new

franchise. Id. An existing dealer may bring an action
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under this section to challenge the grant of a new

franchise, but only if it "first give[s] written notice of

its intention to do so . . . within thirty days from the

date on which it received notice of such intention to grant

or enter into the additional franchise or selling

agreement." Id. American Honda contends, and the district
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court found, that Boston Car failed to give notice of its

intention to sue within thirty days of receiving word of the

new Revere franchise, and that accordingly Boston Car's

statutory claim was barred. Boston Car argues that it never

received proper notice from American Honda of the intent to

grant the Revere franchise, and hence could bring its

statutory claim anytime before the franchise actually began

business.

The district court determined that American Honda's May

5, 1988, letter to Boston Car informing it of the execution

of an LOI for a new Revere dealership was the statutorily

required sixty day notice. It is undisputed that Boston Car

did not respond to this letter until June 28, 1988, well

past the thirty day limit for giving notice of intent to

sue. Moreover, Boston Car's response did not state an

intention to sue, but merely expressed generalized


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opposition to the Revere dealership. If American Honda's

May 5 letter was effective notice of the proposed new

franchise, therefore, Boston Car's Chapter 93B claim is

barred by its failure to issue a timely notice of intent to

sue.

Boston Car argues that the franchise was effectively

granted by the LOI, and consequently the May 5 letter did

not provide sixty days notice of the new franchise. Boston

Car contends that the LOI entered into with York amounted to

the grant of a franchise because it obligated American Honda

to grant a sales agreement if York fulfilled all of the

listed conditions.3


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3 Boston Car suggests for the first time on appeal that

the issue of whether the LOI constituted the grant of a

franchise within the meaning of Chapter 93B should be

certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We decline to certify this question. We have previously

noted that failure to request certification in the district

court "considerably weakens" the case for certification on

appeal. Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking and Trust Co., 857
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F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1988). We agree with the Eighth Circuit

that "[t]he practice of requesting certification after an

adverse judgment has been entered should be discouraged.
Otherwise, the initial federal court decision will be

nothing but a gamble with certification sought only after an

adverse decision." Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co., 823 F.2d
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207, 210 (8th Cir. 1987). Boston Car does not cite any


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Chapter 93B defines a franchise as an agreement in

which a manufacturer or distributor grants a dealer a

license to use the manufacturer's trade name or service

mark, "and in which there is a community of interest in the

marketing of motor vehicles or services related thereto."

We conclude that this definition does not encompass the

relationship established by the LOI between American Honda

and York. The major premise of Boston Car's argument, that

the LOI obligated American Honda to enter into a dealership

agreement with York, is fatally flawed. The LOI was

entirely contingent. Significantly, it specifically stated

that American Honda was not obligated to grant the franchise

if legal problems developed. Although American Honda's

freedom to opt out of a dealership agreement was somewhat

circumscribed by the LOI, the franchise was not a fait

accompli once the LOI was executed. American Honda remained

free to decline to enter a dealership agreement if it

appeared that establishment of a new dealership would

violate Chapter 93B.

Boston Car cites Ricky Smith Pontiac v. Subaru of New
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England, 440 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. App. 1982), in support of its
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compelling reason for certification. There is no split of

authority, the words of the statute itself provide

sufficient guidance that our decision will not be merely

conjectural, and we do not find the question particularly

close.


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contention that the issuance of an LOI constitutes the grant

of a franchise within the meaning of Chapter 93B. In dicta,

Ricky Smith states that section 4(3)(l) "plainly
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contemplates written notice to existing dealers of a

manufacturer's or distributor's intent to appoint a new

dealer within their relevant market area followed by

discussion between the parties of the reasons which warrant

the appointment." Id. at 43. According to Boston Car,
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unless notice is given before the LOI is issued, such

discussions will be reduced to an empty formality. We

disagree. As already pointed out, the LOI issued to York

expressly conditioned the grant of a sales agreement on the

absence of any legal bar to establishment of the dealership.

Nothing in the LOI, therefore, would forestall American

Honda from terminating its agreement with York if

discussions with existing dealers showed that Chapter 93B

would bar the grant of the Revere franchise. Moreover, the

notice sufficiently predated the projected opening date of

the Revere dealership to allow for effective negotiations,

with both York and existing dealers, on the exact location

of the new dealership, or other accommodations. Discussions

engendered by the notice would not necessarily be futile

gestures.4


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4 We need not decide for purposes of this appeal

precisely what action, event, or document did or would


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We also reject Boston Car's argument that even if

American Honda's letter of May 5 constituted effective

notice, American Honda was required to renew that notice

when it extended the projected opening date for the Revere

dealership from January 1989 to January 1990. American

Honda never abandoned its plan to establish a Revere point,

nor was Carney ever given to understand that the Revere

point would be dropped. The existing dealers were already

on notice and had been given an opportunity, which they

exercised, to protest the new dealership. Requiring

republication of the notice when opening of that dealership

was delayed would serve no purpose.

This case is readily distinguishable from Smith's
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Cycles, Inc. v. Alexander, 219 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. App. 1975),
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upon which Boston Car also relies. In Smith's Cycles, the
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distributor served notice that it would grant a new

dealership on or before a certain date. When that date
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passed, the notice lapsed by its own terms, and existing

dealers were entitled to assume that no new dealership was

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constitute the grant of a franchise to York within the

meaning of Chapter 93B. We hold only that issuance of the

LOI was not the grant of a franchise, and that American

Honda's letter of May 5 satisfied its obligation to provide

notice of its intention to grant a franchise. Accordingly,

Boston Car's failure to comply with the notice of intent to

sue provision of Chapter 93B bars its claim under that

chapter.

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contemplated. The distributor could not, therefore, rely on

the earlier notice when it opened a new dealership more than

a year after the date stated.

By contrast, American Honda's notice of intent to grant

a Revere franchise stated that the new franchise would open

no earlier than January 1, 1989. It did not state or imply
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that if the new dealership did not open on that date it

should be considered abandoned. The delays in opening the

Revere dealership did not require republication of the

notice.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.
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