United States v. Sarault

USCA1 Opinion









September 15, 1992





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No. 92-1180

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

BRIAN J. SARAULT,

Defendant, Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
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Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges,
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and Zobel,* District Judge.
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Kevin J. O'Dea for appellant.
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Edwin J. Gale, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
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Lincoln C. Almond, United States Attorney, was on brief, for the
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United States.


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*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.














SELYA, Circuit Judge. In a postscript to a sordid tale
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
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of greed and corruption, defendant-appellant Brian J. Sarault,

the former Mayor of Rhode Island's fourth largest city, assails

the district court's imposition of a sentence exceeding the

guideline sentencing range (GSR). Finding, as we do, that the

upward departure was fully justified, we affirm the judgment

below.

I
I
_

Background
Background
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On November 14, 1991, the former mayor of Pawtucket,

Rhode Island, pleaded guilty to a criminal information which

charged him with heading an enterprise engaged in a pattern of

racketeering activity, in violation of the RICO statute, 18

U.S.C. 1962(c) (1988). The predicate offenses described in the

information consisted of fifteen acts of extortion committed in

connection with the award of municipal contracts, each in

violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (1988). On January

31, 1992, appellant was sentenced to sixty-six months in

prison.1 The court used the November, 1991 version of the

sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d
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1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Barring any ex facto problem, a
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defendant is to be punished according to the guidelines in effect

at the time of sentencing.").

We trace the architecture of the sentence step by step.

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1Sarault was also sentenced to three years of supervised
release, fined $20,000, directed to make restitution in the
amount of $80,829, and ordered to pay a $50 special assessment.

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The court began to design the sentence by referring to

U.S.S.G.

2E1.1 which, in respect to a RICO conviction, provides a base

offense level of nineteen or, if greater, "the offense level

applicable to the underlying racketeering activity." The

application notes indicate that, in order to determine which base

offense level results in the greater offense level, the court

should make the appropriate adjustments under Parts A through D

of Chapter Three of the guidelines, using the two base offense

levels in turn, and compare the results. U.S.S.G. 2E1.1,

comment. (n.1). Following this protocol, the court determined

that the level nineteen floor would produce the greater adjusted

offense level (twenty-five) when all referenced Chapter Three

adjustments were implemented.2 Hence, the court used level

nineteen as the starting point in constructing appellant's

sentence.

The court then increased the offense level by four to

reflect appellant's role as the organizer/leader of an extensive

criminal activity, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a); elevated it another two

levels to reflect appellant's abuse of a position of public

trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3; and, finally, deducted two levels to

acknowledge appellant's acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G.

3E1.1(a). The court thus arrived at a net offense level of


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2The base offense level for the Hobbs Act violations was
ten. See U.S.S.G. 2C1.1, 2E1.5. After making the interim
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adjustments described in the Application Note, the adjusted
offense level would have been twenty-four.

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twenty-three. Inasmuch as appellant had no prior criminal

history, the court's calculations produced a GSR of forty-six to

fifty-seven months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing
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Table).



This brings us to the heart of the matter. After

settling upon the GSR, the district judge departed therefrom and

sentenced Sarault to a prison term that exceeded the high end of

the GSR by nine months. The judge linked the upward departure to

the significant disruption of governmental functions that

attended appellant's antics.

On appeal, Sarault challenges only the upward

departure. He does not contest any of the sentencing court's

interim calculations.

II
II
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Standard of Review
Standard of Review
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Our review of sentencing departures is governed by the

tripartite methodology set forth in United States v. Diaz-
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Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862
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(1989). We have summarized the methodology as follows:

First, we evaluate the circumstances relied
on by the district court in determining that
the case is sufficiently "unusual" to warrant
departure. If the stated circumstances pass
muster, we proceed to the next rung and
determine whether those circumstances were
adequately documented. After the first two
levels are climbed, the departure must be
measured by a standard of reasonableness. On
the third tier, the district court's leeway
is substantial.


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United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 350 (1st Cir. 1989)
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(citation omitted).

At the first step of departure analysis, appellate

review of the district court's determination is plenary. At the

second step, appellate review is for clear error. At the final

step, we review the extent of the departure for reasonableness.

See Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49. Throughout, we remain
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mindful that a departure is appropriate only when "there exists

an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a

degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing

Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a

sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. 3553(b)

(1988).

III
III
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Analysis
Analysis
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A.
A.
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The sentencing court based its upward departure on

U.S.S.G. 5K2.7, which provides:

If the defendant's conduct resulted in a
significant disruption of a governmental
function, the court may increase the sentence
above the authorized guideline range to
reflect the nature and extent of the
disruption and the importance of the
governmental function affected. Departure
from the guidelines ordinarily would not be
justified when the offense of conviction is
an offense such as bribery or obstruction of
justice; in such cases interference with a
governmental function is inherent in the
offense, and unless the circumstances are
unusual the guidelines will reflect the
appropriate punishment for such interference.


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U.S.S.G. 5K2.7. Sarault argues that the second sentence of

section 5K2.7 is applicable here, and that the circumstances

attendant to his malefactions are not sufficiently extraordinary

to overcome the strong presumption that the GSR reflects the

appropriate range of punishment. We disagree with this analysis.



As the guideline implies, if appellant had been

charged with, and sentenced on the basis of, the substantive

crime of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, an upward

departure would not be sustainable unless the disruption was so

atypically great as to exceed the level of interference inherent

in the offense. Compare, e.g., United States v. Riviere, 924
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F.2d 1289, 1308-09 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing upward departure

under 5K2.7 where disruption of governmental function was no

greater than that normally associated with the underlying offense

of assault on a federal marshal); United States v. Goodrich, 919
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F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing upward departure under

5K2.7 where governmental disruption was no greater than that

which normally accompanied the crime of perjury); and United
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States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1990) (reversing
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upward departure under 5K2.7 because disruption of governmental

function was inherent in the offenses of conviction, viz., tax

evasion and perjury) with, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 943
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F.2d 1543, 1550 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding 5K2.7 departure

where defendant's attempted jailbreak resulted in the crash of a

helicopter in the prison yard, disrupting the normal functioning


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of the prison "far beyond the level of . . . a run-of-the-mill

escape attempt"), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3816
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(U.S. Apr. 30, 1992) (No. 91-1848); United States v. Roth, 934
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F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1991) (upholding upward departure under

5K2.7 where defendant's theft of government property was

unusually extensive); and United States v. Garcia, 900 F.2d 45,
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49 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding upward departure under 5K2.7

where defendant's mail theft was on so grand a scale that the

resulting disruption of service was well beyond that normally

associated with the crime). In this case, however, we need not

undertake the qualitative scrutiny demanded by the second

sentence of section 5K2.7.3

U.S.S.G. 5K2.7 must be applied to charged crimes on a

categorical basis. Sarault was not charged directly with the

predicate Hobbs Act offenses. Rather, he was charged with,

convicted of, and sentenced on the basis of, racketeering. In

categorical terms, racketeering is not a crime that fits within

the second sentence of section 5K2.7. Although a RICO enterprise

can, as here, be conducted so as to impair the functioning of a

governmental unit, that element is by no means "inherent in the

offense" of racketeering. To the contrary, RICO violations come

in many different shapes, sizes, and manifestations most of

which do not involve direct impedance of any governmental


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3We express no opinion on whether the squalid circumstances
of this case were sufficiently unusual to permit a departure
under the more restrictive standard contemplated by the second
sentence of section 5K2.7.

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operations.

Nor does it assist Sarault's cause that the RICO charge

in this case rests on a series of Hobbs Act violations. Section

5K2.7 requires us to take a categorical approach. We cannot,

therefore, overlook the forest (the offense of conviction, on

which the sentence was based) to focus on individual trees (the

predicate acts described in the charging papers). Moreover, this

court has held, squarely and recently, that RICO, as an offense

of conviction on which a sentence is based, does not bring with

it the inherent characteristics of the underlying predicate acts

described in the charging papers. See United States v. Butt, 955
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F.2d 77, 89 (1st Cir. 1992) ( 2E1.1(a)(1) establishes "a generic
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base offense level for RICO crimes, one that 'includes' no

particular offense characteristic or special skill").

In sum, the first sentence of section 5K2.7, rather

than the second sentence, controls in this case. Under that

rubric, a district court may depart upwardly if it supportably

finds that the defendant's criminal conduct caused "a significant

disruption of a governmental function." U.S.S.G. 5K2.7.

Hence, the initial prong of the Diaz-Villafane test is satisfied
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in this instance.

B.
B.
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As we have already mentioned, the district court

premised its departure from the GSR on what it perceived to be a

significant disarticulation of Pawtucket's city government

resulting from appellant's extortion scheme. The court


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enumerated several ways in which this disruption manifested

itself. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the district

court's mantra. For present purposes, it suffices that the court

excoriated, among other things, the wholesale derangement of the

city's bid processes caused by the mayor's prodigious appetite

for extortionate payments. This factor alone supports the

court's finding that a significant disruption occurred. We

explain briefly.4

A city must purchase supplies and services in order to

fulfill its rudimentary obligations to its inhabitants. In this

case, it is clear that appellant conspired with his chief aide

and the city's acting director of public works to prey on

municipal vendors, extorting payments from businesses that were

interested in obtaining municipal contracts and extracting

kickbacks from businesses that had succeeded in obtaining

municipal contracts. Sarault and his cohorts instructed those

who agreed to play along how bids and change orders should be

prepared. On occasion, they suggested that bids be inflated to

cover the cost of the illegal payments. One general contractor,

for example, was told "not to bid on any [City of Pawtucket] job

without first . . . adding '10% for the mayor.'"

The charging papers allude to fifteen separate

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4Because this case was resolved on a guilty plea, we draw
the facts from appellant's admissions, the uncontested portions
of the presentence investigation report (PSI Report), and the
transcripts of the hearings below. See, e.g., United States v.
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Garcia, 954 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Dietz,
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950 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1991).


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incidents in which city contractors were asked to make

extortionate payments. The PSI Report affords detailed accounts

of these meretricious encounters. The record makes it painfully

plain that the web of corruption was much more widespread; in the

sentencing court's words, appellant "systematically shook down

vendors on a regular basis for a period spanning at least two

years, and for an amount that was at least $250,000." Based on

the tawdry record in this case, the court's finding is

unimpugnable.



We will not paint the lily. Sarault's scheme was

suffusive; it engulfed city government. As the district court

accurately observed, appellant's actions "distorted the process

of awarding bids for Public Works projects from one which is

supposed to see that the lowest responsible bidder gets the job,

to one that resulted in the bidder who was most willing to play

ball getting the job." It follows from this supportable finding

that appellant was responsible for a significant disruption of

the City's governmental functions. Put bluntly, he threw a large

monkey wrench into a vital cog in the machinery of Pawtucket's

operations. His brazen conduct constituted an aggravating

circumstance not adequately taken into account in framing the

sentencing guidelines for RICO cases a circumstance that

distinguished his case from the mine-run of RICO violations and






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validated an upward departure.5

C.
C.
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We turn next to the third part of the required Diaz-
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Villafane analysis. The nine-month upward departure represents
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an increase of approximately fifteen percent in the appellant's

sentence. Although this court has not previously had occasion to

assess the reasonableness of a section 5K2.7 departure, other

courts have upheld departures of a far greater magnitude where

U.S.S.G. 5K2.7 is in play. See, e.g., United States v. Hatch,
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926 F.2d 387, 397-98 (5th Cir.) (upholding 5K2.7 departure of

ten months where defendant's fraud deprived the parish of a

significant portion of its budget and undermined confidence in

law enforcement; high end of GSR was fourteen months), cert.
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denied, 111 S. Ct. 2239 (1991); United States v. Murillo, 902
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F.2d 1169, 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding 5K2.7

departure of twenty-seven months where defendant's sale of

illegal immigration papers disrupted government amnesty program;

high end of GSR was twenty-one months); cf. Roth, 934 F.2d at 252
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5Although we need not discuss the other dislocations caused
by Sarault's behavior, we detour briefly in order to mention the
district court's comment that appellant's inability to function
effectively as mayor during the period between his arrest and his
eventual resignation contributed to the disruption of city
government. In the clear light of hindsight, it is easy to
criticize the appellant for causing further pain to his community
by continuing in office. But, we question whether his failure to
resign at an earlier date can provide a legitimate basis for an
upward departure. One of the most fundamental tenets of our
system of justice is the presumption of innocence. This
presumption would be substantially undermined if an
officeholder's failure to resign when he was first arrested
could, in and of itself, support an upward departure.

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(remanding 5K2.7 departure of eighty-three months for further

explanation of degree of departure; high end of GSR was thirty-

seven months). In light of the extensive and pervasive nature of

appellant's scheme, its ubiquity, its duration, the amount of

booty involved, and the havoc occasioned in Pawtucket, we believe

that a nine-month upward departure was well within the realm of

reasonableness.

IV
IV
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Conclusion
Conclusion
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We need go no further. It is difficult to overstate

the gravity of Sarault's offense. He betrayed the trust of the

citizens of Pawtucket, abused the high office to which he had

been elected, pressured municipal vendors, and relentlessly

pursued emoluments to which he was not entitled. Beyond

question, Sarault's course of conduct seriously disrupted the

normal functioning of a vital arm of city government. In these

sorry circumstances, the sentencing court did not err in

formulating and imposing a modest upward departure.



Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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