United States v. Soltero Lopez

USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 93-1170

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

LUIS SOLTERO-LOPEZ,

Appellant.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


[Hon. Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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Frank Catala Morales for appellant.
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Epifanio Morales, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
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Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles Espinosa, Senior
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Litigation Counsel, Criminal Division, and Jeanette Mercado Rios,
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Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.


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December 13, 1993
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BREYER, Chief Judge. Appellant Luis Soltero pled
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guilty to importing cocaine (and related charges) under

circumstances for which the Sentencing Guidelines set forth

a sentencing range of approximately 20 to 25 years in

prison. See 18 U.S.C. 2; 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 952,
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960, 963; U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) (base offense level of 38);

U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) (two level increase for supervisory role

in the crime); U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a) (two level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility); U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A

(sentencing table). In light of Soltero's cooperation with

the government, the district court departed downward from

the bottom of the range and sentenced Soltero, instead, to a

prison term of 17 years. Soltero appeals, arguing that the

district court should have departed downward by more than

just three years.

Soltero, however, cannot avoid the legal fact that

the sentencing statutes (insofar as here relevant) provide

him with only a very narrow right to appeal. Although they

permit an appellate court to set aside a departure that is

"unreasonable," see 18 U.S.C. 3742(f)(2), they give the
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court this power in the context of other provisions that

permit defendants to appeal only upward, and the government

to appeal only downward, departures. To be specific, the


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relevant provision permits the defendant to appeal the

reasonableness of a sentence that "is greater than the

sentence specified in the applicable guideline range . . .

." Id. 3742(a)(3). Here, Soltero's sentence is less than
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the "sentence specified" in the guidelines, not "greater."

Soltero tries to avoid this problem by pointing

out that the relevant statute also permits a defendant to

appeal a sentence that "was imposed as a result of an

incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." Id.
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3742(a)(2). We have specifically held, however, that this

provision ordinarily does not give a defendant the right to

appeal from a court's refusal to depart from the guidelines.
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United States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1989).
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See also United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.
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1991) (citing cases). Nor does it apply where a court does

depart in the defendant's favor, but does not depart enough

to satisfy the defendant. United States v. Pighetti, 898
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F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1990).

We use the word "ordinarily" because the ban on

review is not absolute. Rather, we have found an "incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines" where a sentencing

court has misunderstood how the guidelines -- including the

statutes and guidelines governing departure -- are supposed


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to work. Thus, we have reviewed cases where a defendant

alleges that the district court erroneously believed it

lacked the legal power to depart in the circumstances. See,
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e.g., United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 953 (1st Cir.
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1993) (remanding case for resentencing); United States v.
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Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir.) (citing cases), cert.
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denied, 113 S. Ct. 224 (1992). And we are willing to assume
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that we could also review, and correct, a departure decision

that reflected some other kind of fundamental

misunderstanding. See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d
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1150, 1157 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that a sentencing court

may not rely on constitutionally proscribed factors in

deciding to forgo or curtail a downward departure for

substantial assistance).

That assumption, however, does not help Soltero,

for the record makes clear that the district court did not

misunderstand the guidelines. Soltero says that the court

would have departed by more than three years had it not

tried to create a kind of sentencing parity among him and

his co-defendants -- an equalization effort that we have

previously held cannot provide a basis for departure.

United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (1st Cir.),
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cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 441 (1991); United States v. Carr,
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932 F.2d 67, 73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 112
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(1991). But that is not what the district court said it was

doing.

Rather, the sentencing judge said the following:

I am well aware of the cooperation of
the defendant. But that is one factor
the Court must take into account. I
must view the whole case, the overall
cooperation and the participation of the
defendant too. And also view him in
respect to other defendants because
there are other defendants here who did
go to trial, who did put the government
through its burden of proof. Yes, they
have a right to do that. But their
participation in the offense, a person
like Julio Luciano Mosquera, is minimal
compared to this defendant.

And that person [Mosquera] because of
the severity of the punishment of these
counts will spend a very long stretch.
And he is a person that came into the
scene just hours, hours before the
arrest. So this [Soltero] is a key
participant. This is not somebody who
came in at the last moment. I have to
give perspective to the whole case
because otherwise, we will be doing with
the Sentencing Guidelines precisely are
supposed [sic] to prevent. The
unfairness, lack of uniformity and more
sorrow. So I have taken into account
his [Soltero's] cooperation. But that's
as far as it will take him because his
cooperation cannot be seen isolated from
his role in the offense. Which was
mayor [sic] in this case. He was a key
figure in the whole conspiracy.
Reconsideration is denied.



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Nothing in this statement suggests an explicit effort to

"equalize" sentences as among defendants. The judge simply

spoke of the defendant's cooperation and the fact that (when

viewed in light of his co-conspirators' conduct) his role in

the offense was "key" and supervisory. To take account of a

cooperating offender's conduct, including his role in the

offense, when deciding the extent of a downward departure

seems to us perfectly reasonable. See Mariano, 983 F.2d at
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1156-57. Soltero makes no convincing argument that such a

consideration somehow reflects a basic misunderstanding of

the guidelines.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.
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