Armacost v. Amica

USCA1 Opinion












UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1641

MELINDA RYAN ARMACOST,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant, Appellant.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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Thomas R. Bender, with whom David P. Whitman, and Hanson, Curran,
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Parks & Whitman were on brief for defendant-appellant.
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Mark S. Mandell, with whom Mandell, DeLuca & Schwartz, Ltd. were
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on brief for plaintiff-appellee.


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December 10, 1993
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BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. The principal issue
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
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in this automobile accident diversity case is whether a Rhode

Island statute requires that an insurer pay prejudgment

interest over and above its policy limits to the plaintiff.

We hold that the statute does so require. Some background

facts are necessary.

I.
I.

Plaintiff-appellee, Melinda Ryan Armacost, was a

pedestrian in Newport, Rhode Island, when she was struck by

an automobile owned and operated by Stephen B. Owen, a

resident of New York. Owen was insured by defendant-

appellant, Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica) of

Providence, Rhode Island. A complaint was filed in the

district court against Owen, but the summons was returned non
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est inventus. Plaintiff promptly amended her complaint,
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naming Amica as defendant under Rhode Island's direct action

statute.1 After discovery was completed, but prior to

trial, Amica admitted negligence by its insured. The only

issue for trial, therefore, was the amount of damages.


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1. The statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2, provides in
pertinent part:
An injured party, or, in the event of

that party's death, the party entitled to
sue therefor, in his or her suit against
the insured, shall not join the insurer
as a defendant. If, however, the officer
serving any process against the insured
shall return that process "non est
inventus," . . . the party . . . may
proceed directly against the insurer.

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Shortly prior to the trial date, plaintiff's

counsel made a written demand "equal to the coverage limits

of $500,000" to settle the case. The demand specifically

referred to the statute at issue, R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2.

Amica rejected the demand and made a counter offer of

$175,000. This was spurned by plaintiff. During the trial

Amica again offered to settle for $175,000; the offer was

again rejected. The jury returned a verdict of $750,000.

The district court amended the judgment by reducing it to the

amount of Amica's contractual liability under its policy

$495,000.2 The district court then held that Amica was

required under the statute to pay plaintiff prejudgment

interest on the amended judgment, "even though such interest,

when added to the amended judgment, requires Amica to pay an

amount which exceeds the limits of its liability under the

applicable insurance policy." Armacost v. Amica Mut. Ins.
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Co., 821 F. Supp. 75, 82 (D.R.I. 1993).
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II.
II.

The statute at issue has not been interpreted by

the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The only court to have

considered it is the United States District Court in the

opinion from which this appeal has been taken. This means

that we are called upon to decide how the Rhode Island


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2. The original policy limits of $500,000 had been reduced
by $5,000 because of a payment in that amount to settle the
claim of plaintiff's husband.

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Supreme Court would construe the statute in the context of

this case. The standard of review of the district court's

opinion is de novo. We do not accord deference to the
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district court's determination of Rhode Island law. Salve
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Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-35 (1991).
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The statute to be construed provides:

Interest on judgment Payment by
Interest on judgment Payment by
insurer. In any civil action in which
insurer.
the defendant is covered by liability
insurance and in which the plaintiff
makes a written offer to the defendant's
insurer to settle the action in an amount
equal to or less than the coverage limits
on the liability policy in force at the
time the action accrues and the offer is
rejected by the defendant's insurer then
the defendant's insurer shall be liable
for all interest due on the judgment
entered by the court even if the payment
of the judgment and interest thereon
totals a sum in excess of the policy
coverage limitation. This written offer
shall be presumed to have been rejected
if the insurer does not respond within a
period of thirty (30) days.

R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2.

Rhode Island's prejudgment interest statute

provides:

Interest in civil action. In any
Interest in civil action.
civil action in which a verdict is
rendered or a decision made for pecuniary
damages, there shall be added by the
clerk of the court to the amount of
damages, interest at the rate of twelve
per cent (12%) per annum thereon from the
date the cause of action accrued which
shall be included in the judgment entered
therein. This section shall not apply
until entry of judgment or to any
contractual


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obligation where interest is already
provided or as to any condemnation
action.

Id. 9-21-10.
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The question is whether the prejudgment interest

statute, 9-21-10, applies to the rejected-settlement-offer

statute, 27-7-2.2. Ordinarily, we would certify to a state

supreme court a question of first impression involving the

interpretation of a state statute. In this case, however,

the language of the implicated statutes, the evident purpose

of the statutes, and the case law are so clear that we think

certification would be a waste of judicial resources.

Amica raises two issues: whether the Rhode Island

Supreme Court would construe 27-7-2.2 as not applicable to

direct action suits against insurers; and whether the Rhode

Island Supreme Court would limit the interest due on cases

arising under 27-7-2.2 to that accruing after judgment.

A. The Applicability of 27-7-2.2 to the Direct Action
A. The Applicability of 27-7-2.2 to the Direct Action
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Statute
Statute
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Amica's argument on the first issue runs as

follows. The starting point is that statutes granting

interest on judgment must be strictly construed because they

are in derogation of the common law. So construed, 27-7-

2.2 applies only to actions "in which the defendant is

covered by liability insurance." Amica therefore contends

that, because it is an insurer, and not, in the words of the

statute, "a defendant covered by liability insurance," it


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does not come within the compass of the statute. It argues

that the phrase "written offer to the defendant's insurer" is

directed at the situation where the decision to settle is not

within the control of the defendant, but lies with

defendant's insurer. The purpose of the statute, Amica

concludes, is to protect a defendant who is insured from

interest liability in excess of the policy limits due to a

decision made by the insurer.

This is an ingenious argument; it uses the strict

construction doctrine to avoid the plain meaning of the

statute. But it ignores the legal fact that the action

against the insurer is a derivative action. Amica was the

insurer of defendant Owen. The complaint was originally

brought against Owen. Amica was made a defendant under the

direct action statute, 27-7-2, because its insured could

not be served with process. Amica stands in Owen's shoes.

It is both defendant and insurer. This case started out, in

the words of 27-7-2.2, as a "civil action in which the

defendant is covered by liability insurance." If process had

been served on Owen, Amica's handling of the case would have

been no different, and it would be making the same argument

as to prejudgment interest because in either case it would

have to pay the amount found due. We see no basis in logic

or common sense for the argument that 27-7-2.2 is not

applicable to the insurer under the direct action statute.



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B. Construing the Statute
B. Construing the Statute
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Amica makes a number of arguments attacking the

district court's construction of the statute. The

overarching argument is that the district court did not apply

the rules of statutory construction that would have been

applied by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and, as a result,

improperly construed the statute. Because our review is de
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novo without any deference to the district court, we do not
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think it necessary to discuss point-by-point defendant's

attack on the district court opinion. The only question is

whether the ultimate conclusion of the district court should

be affirmed. We are not concerned with the route taken by

the court in reaching its result.

We start our analysis with a determination of the

purpose of the rejected-settlement-offer statute, 27-7-2.2.

Although the construction of this statute is one of first

impression, the purpose of the prejudgment interest statute,

9-21-10, has been articulated by the Rhode Island Supreme

Court. In Martin v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty, 559 A.2d
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1028 (R.I. 1989), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that

the prejudgment interest did not apply to condemnation cases.

In the course of its opinion it stated:

Statutes that award prejudgment interest
generally serve the dual purposes of
encouraging the early settlement of
claims, Pray v. Narragansett Improvement
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Co., 434 A.2d 923, 930 (R.I. 1981), and
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compensating plaintiffs for waiting for


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recompense to which they were legally
entitled, Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp.
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Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 901 (1st
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Cir. 1984).

Martin, 559 A.2d at 1031; see also Isserlis v. Director of
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Public Works, 300 A.2d 273, 274 (R.I. 1973) (clear purpose of
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such legislation was to accelerate settlement of tort cases).

We have echoed this finding of settlement purpose. Roy v.
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Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1135 (1st Cir. 1978) ("The
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Rhode Island prejudgment statute was enacted to promote the

expeditious settlement of claims.").

We think it plain from its terms that the rejected-

settlement-offer statute has the same purpose as the

prejudgment interest statute to accelerate the settlement

of tort cases. This purpose is readily apparent from its

provision that if the plaintiff's offer of settlement

is rejected by the defendant's insurer
then the defendant's insurer shall be
liable for all interest due on the
judgment entered by the court even if the
payment of the judgment and interest
thereon totals a sum in excess of the
policy coverage limitation.

27-7-2.2.

This language tells the insurer in no uncertain terms that it

runs the risk of paying a stiff price for shrugging off an

offer of settlement.

We next turn to the wording of the two implicated

statutes. The prejudgment interest statute says: "In any
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civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision is


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made for pecuniary damages," interest shall be added to the

amount of damages from the date the cause of action accrued.

9-21-10. It is beyond cavil that this case was a civil

action, that plaintiff's offer of settlement was for an

amount "equal to . . . the coverage limits in the liability

policy in force at the time the action accrue[d], and the

offer was rejected by the insurer." 27-7-2.2. It is

manifest that the prejudgment interest statute applies

directly to the case at bar.

It also seems evident to us that, by its very

words, 27-7-2.2 requires the payment of prejudgment

interest. It says that if the plaintiff's offer is rejected

"then the defendant's insurer shall be liable for all
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interest due on the judgment entered by the court even if the

payment of the judgment and interest thereon totals a sum in

excess of the policy coverage limitation." (Emphasis added.)

Despite the labored argument of defendants to the contrary,

it seems obvious that "all interest" can only mean

prejudgment and postjudgment interest. And this is the only

interpretation that makes sense if the purpose of the statute

is to promote settlement, as is obvious. There would be no

pressure on the insurer to consider a settlement offer if all

it had to pay for rejecting the offer was post-judgment

interest. Defendant's suggested construction of the statute

would take all of the bite out of it.



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We think the following statement by the Rhode

Island Supreme Court applies to the statute in issue:

In the face of a statute so clear and
unambiguous there is no room for the
application of the usual canons of
statutory construction. In such a case
the statute declares itself. Vezina v.
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Bodreau, 86 R.I. 87, 133 A.2d 753; Long
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v. Langlois, R.I., 170 A.2d 618. We may
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not where no ambiguity exists search
beyond the statute for a different
meaning. Hathaway v. Hathaway, 52 R.I.
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39, 156 A. 800. Even hardship does not
justify a court in reading into a statute
something contrary to its unequivocal
language. Clark v. Orabona, 1 Cir., 59
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F.2d 187. Only when the legislature
sounds an uncertain trumpet may the court
move in to clarify the call. But when
the call is clear and certain as it is
here we may not consider whether the
statute as written comports with our
ideas of justice, expediency or sound
public policy. In such circumstances
that is not the court's business. Blais
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v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 77 A. 172.
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Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 187 A.2d 262, 264-65 (R.I.
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1963).

Out of an abundance of caution we have examined

similar statutes in other jurisdictions because we think the

Rhode Island Supreme Court might possibly have done so. Of

the more than thirty states surveyed, many have prejudgment

interest statutes accompanied by rejected-settlement-offer

provisions, or separate statutes that are invoked in tandem

to expedite claims settlement. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code
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3291 (West Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-192a(b); Minn.

Stat. Ann. 549.09(c) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat.


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408.040.2 (Vernon 1990); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1343.03(c)

(Anderson Supp. 1993). Our survey has not disclosed a single

instance where prejudgment interest has been held not to

apply to a rejected- settlement-offer statute. Given the

rejected-settlement-offer statute's plain language and the

Rhode Island courts' long history of applying the prejudgment

interest statute in tort cases, we think the Rhode Island

Supreme Court would apply its prejudgment interest statute to

the rejected-settlement-offer statute.

Affirmed. Costs on appeal awarded to appellee.
Affirmed. Costs on appeal awarded to appellee.
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