Fausto v. Welch

USCA1 Opinion


                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                     


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No. 94-2176

JOSEPH ANTHONY FAUSTO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JOHN J. WELCH, JR.,
ACTING SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE,

Defendant, Appellee.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________

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Joseph Anthony Fausto on brief pro se. _____________________
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Thomas E. Kanwit, ________________ _________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


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August 29, 1995
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Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Anthony ___________

Fausto appeals pro se from entry of summary judgment ___ __

disposing of his claim that the Air Force discriminated

against him, based on his gender, when it failed to hire him

as an administrative officer. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

I.

The relevant background is fully and accurately set

forth in the district court's memorandum and order, and we

need only provide a brief summary here. On May 29, 1984,

Fausto applied for the position of Administrative Officer,

GS-11, at an Air Force facility located in Wilmington,

Massachusetts. The evidence in the record establishes that

Fausto was one of eight candidates interviewed for this

position; that the candidates were scored after their

interviews; that Fausto received the lowest score; and that

Fausto's low score was due, in part, to his poor performance

during his oral interview.1 There is some evidence that the

highest scoring candidate, a woman, was offered the job and

declined for personal reasons. In any event, none of the

remaining candidates was offered the position. Instead, the

job was restructured as a GS-9 developmental position,




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1. Fausto suggests, without evidentiary basis, that the
other interviewees never existed. In addition, Fausto
submitted his own affidavit proclaiming that he had performed
well during his oral interview.













reannounced, and eventually offered to Rosemary Tremblay, a

woman who had been shouldering many of the job's

responsibilities for some months.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Fausto

filed suit in the district court against defendant-appellee

John J. Welch, Jr., Acting Secretary of the Air Force,

alleging discriminatory treatment in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Both

parties moved for summary judgment. The district court,

relying on the three-stage, burden-shifting framework set

forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 _________________________ _____

(1973), found that Fausto had established a prima facie case _____ _____

of discrimination. The court found, however, that the Air

Force successfully had rebutted the presumption of

discrimination arising from Fausto's prima facie case by _____ _____

articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

decision, namely, Fausto's low candidate ranking. Finally,

the court concluded that Fausto had failed to submit evidence

sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that

the Air Force discriminated against him because he is a male.

Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

the Air Force.2

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2. Fausto also alleges in his complaint that he was the
victim of retaliation for filing a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The district court
granted summary judgment for the Air Force on this claim on
the ground that Fausto failed to present a prima facie case _____ _____

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II.

The basic order and allocation of burdens of proof in a

Title VII discriminatory treatment case was limned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802-05, and _________________

expounded in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 _____________________ _____

(1993). Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of

discrimination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Smith _____ _____ ___ _____

v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1994), _______________________

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995). If the plaintiff _____________

establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the _____ _____

employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its decision. See Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., ___ _______ _________________

950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 ____________

(1992). Finally, if the employer meets its burden, the

plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence to show that the

employer's justification is a pretext and that the true

reason for its action is discriminatory. See Smith, 40 F.3d ___ _____

at 16. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, __ ____

viewing the evidence, and the reasonable inferences

therefrom, in a light most favorable to the party resisting

summary judgment. Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d _______ __________________

1087, 1091 (1st Cir. 1995).


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of retaliation. Fausto does not argue that this was error,
and we deem the issue waived.

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A. Defendant's Burden of Production

Once Fausto made out a prima facie case of gender _____ _____

discrimination, the Air Force was required to articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse

decision. Fausto argues that, in the procedural posture of a

motion for summary judgment, the district court impermissibly

judged the credibility of the affiants in determining that

the Air Force met its burden. Fausto also contends, relying

on Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070, 1079 (D.C. Cir. ______ __________

1981), that his low score, relative to the other candidates

who were interviewed, could not be used to justify his non-

selection. These arguments fail.

First, an employer's burden at the second stage is merely

a burden of production; it must introduce evidence which, if

"taken as true," would permit an inference that there was a

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Hicks, 113 _____

S. Ct. at 2748. Second, Milton is inapposite. In Milton, ______ ______

the District of Columbia Circuit held that the relative

rankings of candidates before their interviews could not,

alone, serve as a legitimate reason for the non-selection of

the appellants where it was apparent that the selecting

official did not rely solely on these rankings to make his

decision. See Milton, 645 F.2d at 1079. In the instant ___ ______

case, the relative rankings introduced by the Air Force were

final rankings of the candidates after their interviews.



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Moreover, the Air Force introduced other evidence

demonstrating that Fausto's interview went poorly and that

the selecting officials believed he lacked the capacity to

perform the job. Under the circumstances, the Air Force met

its burden of production.

B. Plaintiff's Burden of Showing Discriminatory Animus

At the third and final stage, Fausto was required to

proffer sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the Air Force's justification was merely a

pretext for gender discrimination. Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091- _______

92. We are persuaded that Fausto failed to meet this burden

essentially for the reasons stated by the district court. We

add the following.

Contrary to Fausto's suggestion, the fact that the Air

Force redacted the names of the other candidates and

identified them solely by their sex for purposes of its

summary judgment motion does not support an inference that

these candidates did not exist or that their scores were

fabricated. See Byrd v. Ronayne, 1995 WL 461827 at *3 (1st ___ ____ _______

Cir. Aug. 9, 1995) (summary judgment cannot be defeated by

reliance "upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences,

and unsupported speculation" (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. ____________ ____

Reynold Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990))). ___________________

We also reject Fausto's suggestion that summary judgment

was improper because he submitted evidence from which, he



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claims, it could be inferred that he was better qualified for

the position of administrative officer than was Rosemary

Tremblay.3 The unrebutted evidence that both male and

female candidates were passed over in the decision to

restructure the job makes improbable the inference that

Tremblay was offered the position at a lower grade because of

her gender. More importantly, the unrebutted evidence that

Fausto had the lowest ranking of the eight candidates

interviewed renders implausible the inference that gender

bias was a motivating factor in the decision not to select

him. Cf. Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1253 ___ _____ ____________________

(7th Cir. 1990) (upholding grant of summary judgment where

race discrimination claimant would have placed no higher than

fifth on the eligibility list even in the absence of the

alleged discrimination).

Affirmed. ________















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3. Fausto submitted a copy of his form SF-171, a standard
government form providing detailed employment history, and a
copy of Rosemary Tremblay's resume.

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