USCA1 Opinion
November 7, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1326
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
DON SANDOVAL,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Don Sandoval on brief pro se. ____________
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, Margaret E. Curran __________________ ___________________
and Gerard B. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief ___________________
for appellee.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Defendant Don Sandoval appeals from __________
the sentence the district court imposed on him following the
revocation of a term of supervised release. The court
sentenced defendant to both a term of imprisonment and a term
of supervised release.
Defendant first argues that the supervised release
revocation provision, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), does not permit
the imposition of a term of supervised release and a term of ___
imprisonment. We rejected this precise argument in United ______
States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993), and re- ______ ______
affirmed our position in United States v. LaPlante, 28 F.3d 1 _____________ ________
(1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 910 _____________
(1995). Defendant has not presented any persuasive reasons
why we should change this recent statement of the law.
Defendant's second argument on appeal is that the
district court violated the prohibition of the ex post facto _____________
clause by applying 3583(h) to him. This section was added
in 1994. It specifically provides that when revoking a term
of supervised release under subsection (e)(3), a district
court may include a requirement of supervised release after
imprisonment.
To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, the ______________
new law "must disadvantage the offender affected by it."
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (internal ______ _______
quotations and citation omitted). Assuming the district
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court used subsection (h), defendant was not disadvantaged.
In O'Neil, we already had construed subsection (e)(3) to ______
permit what subsection (h) now grants expressly. Cf. United ___ ______
States v. Hartman, 57 F.3d 670, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (per ______ _______
curiam) (the legislative history of subsection (h) shows that
subsection(e)(3) permits both incarceration and supervised
release).
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed. ________
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