Shell v. K.E.M.

USCA1 Opinion









October 26, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 95-1314

SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

K.E.M. SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior District Judge] _____________________

____________________


Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,

Circuit Judges. ______________

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George A. Nachtigall, with whom Mark A. Pogue, Marc A. Crisafulli ____________________ _____________ __________________
and Edwards & Angell were on brief for appellant. ________________
Paul J. Pisano, with whom Paul J. Pisano Law Associates, Albert ______________ ______________________________ ______
R. Romano and Romano, Spinella & Hayes were on brief for appellee. _________ ________________________


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Per Curiam. Shell Oil Company ("Shell") sued, under Per Curiam. ___ ______

the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2801 et seq. __ ____

("PMPA"), to terminate its franchise agreement and lease with

K.E.M. Service, Inc. ("K.E.M.") due to alleged contract viola-

tions. K.E.M. counterclaimed, and Shell now appeals a prelimi-

nary injunction requiring it to continue selling gasoline to

K.E.M. pending final adjudication of Shell's PMPA-based claims.

See Shell Oil Co. v. K.E.M. Serv., Inc., No. 95-001B (D.R.I. Feb. ___ _____________ __________________

16, 1995). As the record does not enable a determination that

the district court manifestly abused its discretion in finding

that "there exist sufficiently serious questions going to the

merits [of Shell's claims and K.E.M.'s defenses] to make such

questions a fair ground for litigation," 15 U.S.C. 2805(b)(A),

we affirm.

We state the material facts briefly. K.E.M. and its

president/owner, John Gorter, operate a Shell retail gasoline

station in East Greenwich, Rhode Island. Their current five-year

franchise and lease agreement (hereinafter: "Agreement") expires

in 1998. According to K.E.M., Shell decided in 1993 to install

another franchisee on the leased premises, and when Gorter

declined a buy-out offer, Shell initiated a bad-faith effort to

oust K.E.M. prematurely from its franchise/lease. To this end,

Shell audited and cited K.E.M. for violations of Rhode Island

environmental regulations, specifically for its failure to keep a

written record of daily gasoline inventory reconciliations on the

leased premises. Further, Shell abruptly altered its longstand-


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ing policy of delivering "short loads" i.e., less than full

tank-truck loads of gasoline to K.E.M. Since K.E.M. has

limited underground storage-tank capacity, it was forced to buy

and sell non-Shell gasoline in short loads, or else cease opera- ___

tion.

Shell contends that its alleged bad faith is irrelevant

under the PMPA, given that K.E.M. admittedly engaged in the

"willful adulteration, mislabeling or misbranding of motor fuels

or other trademark violations." 15 U.S.C. 2802(c)(10); see ___

Agreement Art. 18.1(c)(10) (same). Shell also argues that, in at

least two respects, K.E.M. "knowing[ly] fail[ed] . . . to comply

with . . . State . . . [environmental] laws or regulations

relevant to the operation of the marketing premises," 15 U.S.C.

2802(c)(11); Agreement Art. 18.1(c)(11) (same). First, although

K.E.M. kept gasoline inventory figures and performed a daily

inventory reconciliation, it failed to record the final amount of

any differential in its written records. See Rhode Island Dep't ___

of Envtl. Management Regulation DEM-DWM-UST04-93, 13.00 et __

seq. (1993). Second, K.E.M.'s records were in the possession of ____

its accountant, rather than at the service station. Shell cites

case law to the effect that a franchisor's unilateral termination

of a franchise is conclusively presumed "reasonable," as a matter

of law and regardless whether the motives for the termination are

unfairly coercive or sinister, if the franchisee has committed

any of the twelve acts enumerated in PMPA 2805(c). See, e.g., ___ ___ ____

Russo v. Texaco, 808 F.2d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 1986). _____ ______


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K.E.M. counters that PMPA 2802(c) contemplates two

types of equitable exceptions to the presumption prescribed in

2805(c). First, any purported PMPA recordkeeping violation was

merely "technical," since K.E.M. substantially complied with

Rhode Island environmental regulations. Second, Shell pressured

K.E.M. into violating the PMPA ban on gasoline misbranding by

preying on its hand-to-mouth fiscal condition when it abruptly

changed its longstanding course of dealing regarding deliveries

of "short loads." K.E.M. contends that it faced an irresoluble

dilemma: either buy non-Shell gasoline for resale, or cease its

retail operation for more than seven days, thereby committing a

separate violation constituting an independent ground for fran-

chise termination. See 15 U.S.C. 2802(c)(9). ___

An appellant challenging a preliminary injunction must

bear the "heavy burden" of showing that the district court

committed a mistake of law or a manifest abuse of discretion.

Gately v. Commonwealth of Mass., 2 F.3d 1221, 1225 (1st Cir. ______ ______________________

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1832 (1994); see 28 U.S.C. _____ ______ ___

1292(a)(1). Due deference must be accorded the ruling below,

since the district court is "steeped in the nuances of a case and

mindful of the texture and scent of the evidence." K-Mart Corp. ____________

v. Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir. 1989). ____________________

Under the PMPA, preliminary injunctive relief is more

readily available to franchisees than was the case at common law.

See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.3d 4, 5 ___ ____ __________________________ ________

(1st Cir. 1991) (describing four-part, common law standard); but ___


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cf. Nassau Boulevard Shell Serv. Station, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., ___ __________________________________________ _____________

875 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that PMPA franchisor __________

must meet traditional, four-part test for preliminary injunc-

tion). Because the PMPA is a remedial statute, see infra, a ___ _____

franchisee need not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the __________

merits, but merely that the franchisor terminated the franchise

and that "there exist sufficiently serious questions going to the ____________ _______ _________

merits to make such questions a fair ground for litigation." 15 ____ ______ ___ __________

U.S.C. 2805(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Doebereiner ___ ____ ___________

v. Sohio Oil Co., 880 F.2d 329, 332 (11th Cir. 1989), modified on _____________ ________ __

other grounds, 893 F.2d 1275 (1990); Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. _____ _______ ______________________

Rago, 741 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1984).1 ____

Based on a careful evaluation of the record below, we

cannot conclude that the district court either committed a

mistake of law or abused its discretion in ruling that K.E.M.'s

proposed defenses were "sufficiently serious" to constitute "fair

ground[s] for litigation." Contrary to Shell's contention, the

question whether the PMPA admits of "equitable" exceptions which

would excuse a franchisee's noncompliance with state environmen-

tal regulations or its gasoline misbranding are matters of first

impression in this circuit, upon which we express no opinion at




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1PMPA 2805(b)(2)(B) does require the court to balance the
relative hardships to the parties in granting or denying prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. Shell does not challenge this aspect of
the district court ruling. See Shell Oil Co., No. 95-001B, slip ___ _____________
op. at 15 (D.R.I. Feb. 16, 1995).

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this juncture.2

Proper resolution of these important matters if

necessary requires a more thorough exposition of the course of

dealing between the parties during their nine-year franchise

relationship. For example, section 2805(c)(11) proscribes a

franchisee's "knowing failure" to comply with state law. Section _______

2801(13), however, defines "failure" to exclude "any failure _______

which is only technical or unimportant to the franchise relation- _________

ship." 15 U.S.C. 2801(13)(A). Although Shell contends that

K.E.M.'s violation was not "technical," it adduced no evidence

that it had ever threatened to terminate or terminated other

franchisees for comparable regulatory noncompliance, nor that the

State of Rhode Island had ever cited or fined a service station

owner for these types of violations. See S. Rep. No. 95-731, 95th ___

Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 874 _________ __

(noting that Congress designed the PMPA with the general purpose

____________________

2Our decision in Desfosses v. Wallace Energy, Inc., 836 F.2d _________ ____________________
22 (1st Cir. 1987), deals with PMPA 2802(c)(4), and not with
2802(c)(10) or (11). Although we there referred in general terms
to the "conclusive presumption of reasonableness" theory set
forth in Russo, supra, Desfosses had not defended on the ground _____ _____ ___
that the franchisor had based its termination or nonrenewal on a
purely "technical" violation of state law, nor that the fran-
chisor's own conduct had coerced Desfosses into violating the
PMPA. Indeed, 2802(c)(4) does not pertain to violative acts of __
the franchisee, but to acts entirely within the franchisor's ___ __________ ______ ___ ____________
control. 15 U.S.C. 2802(c)(4) (providing for termination or _______
nonrenewal upon the "loss of the franchisor's right to grant
possession of the leased marketing premises through expiration of
an underlying lease, if . . . the franchisee was notified in ________
writing, prior to the commencement of the term of the then
existing franchise . . . of the duration of the underlying lease
. . . ."). Desfosses simply claimed that Wallace had not provid-
ed him with the requisite notice. Desfosses, 836 F.2d at 26. ______ _________

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to protect "franchisees from arbitrary and discriminatory termi- _________

nations or non-renewals of their franchises") (emphasis added).

At this juncture, we conclude that K.E.M.'s alleged lapses are at

least arguably de minimis. Since K.E.M. does possess the raw __ _______ ___

gasoline inventory data in written form with which State ________ _________ ____

auditors could test its daily inventory reconciliations, we can

discern no manifest abuse of discretion in the district court

ruling that the "technicality" of this asserted ground for

termination presented K.E.M. with a colorable defense, i.e., a

"fair ground for litigation." See Shell Oil Co., No. 95-001B, ___ ______________

slip op. at 13 (D.R.I. Feb. 16, 1995).

Similarly, "Congress enacted PMPA to avert the detri-

mental effects on the nationwide gasoline distribution system

caused by the unequal bargaining power enjoyed by large oil

conglomerates over their service-station franchisees." Four ____

Corners Serv. Station, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 51 F.3d 306, 310 ___________________________ ________________

(1st Cir. 1995). See Desfosses v. Wallace Energy, Inc., 836 F.2d ___ _________ ____________________

22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that PMPA "'must be given a

liberal construction consistent with its overriding purpose to

protect franchisees'") (citing Brach v. Amoco Oil Co., 677 F.2d _____ ______________

1213, 1221 (7th Cir. 1982)). It also left "'to the courts the

task of resorting to traditional principles of equity to maximize

attainment of the competing statutory objectives consistently

with . . . the purposes of the [PMPA].'" Shell Oil Co. v. K.E.M. _____________ ______

Serv., Inc., No. 95-001B, slip op. at 11 (D.R.I. Feb. 16, 1995) ___________

(quoting S. Rep. No. 95-731). Accordingly, were discovery and


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trial to disclose that Shell knowingly took inequitable advantage

of K.E.M.'s precarious market position and inferior bargaining

position, the question whether Congress contemplated "equitable"

exceptions to section 2802(c)(10)'s "willful misbranding" prohi-

bition would be presented on a fully developed factual record.

Finally, equitable relief from section 2802(10) might

be considered more appropriate were K.E.M. to demonstrate at

trial that Shell had breached the Agreement first, leaving K.E.M.

with the Hobson's choice of buying non-Shell gasoline or going

out of business. The Agreement expressly provides that Shell has

no contractual obligation to deliver "short loads" to K.E.M. See ___

Agreement Art. 9.1. On the other hand, Shell abruptly ceased

providing K.E.M with "short loads" after a nine-year course of _____

dealing. Course of dealing may be competent evidence of a

subsequent modification of a written contract. See, e.g., R.I. ___ ____

Gen. Laws 6A-1-205, 6A-2-202. Although the Agreement contains

a provision barring nonwritten modifications, see Agreement Art. ___

26, the PMPA specifically provides that franchise agreements may

be written or oral. See 15 U.S.C. 2801(10), 2801(1)(A), (B) __ ____ ___

(defining "franchise" as "contract"); see also Royer v. Royer, ___ ____ _____ _____

501 A.2d 739, 741 (R.I. 1985) ("[A] written contract may be

modified by subsequent oral agreement of the parties," even where

contract expressly requires written modification only.); J. Koury ________

Steel Erectors, Inc. v. San-Vel Concrete Corp., 387 A.2d 694, 697 ____________________ ______________________

(R.I. 1979) (describing implied-in-fact contracts arising from

course of dealing).


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What is more important, the PMPA's definition of

"contract" expressly provides that, "[f]or supply purposes,

delivery levels during the same month of the previous year shall

be prima facie evidence of an agreement to deliver such levels."

15 U.S.C. 2801(10). If the "short load" delivery levels became

part of a modified Shell-K.E.M. franchise contract, Shell's

abrupt change of course might constitute a breach of the fran-

chise agreement. Thus viewed, K.E.M.'s "equitable" defense to

section 2802(c)(10) might be considered at least "colorable,"

since K.E.M. might make a plausible argument that Congress could

not have intended to permit franchisors to resort to conclusive

presumptions of "reasonableness" under section 2802(c) where

their own breach of the franchise agreement afforded the means of _____

securing a per se right of termination. ___ __

Given the prominent equitable mandate in the PMPA's

legislative history, as well as the nebulous and undeveloped

factual record, we cannot conclude that the district court

manifestly abused its discretion in deciding that "serious

questions going to the merits [of Shell's claim and K.E.M.'s

defenses offer] . . . fair ground for litigation." Nor do we

presume to determine the relative merits, either of Shell's

claims or K.E.M.'s defenses.

The preliminary injunction is affirmed and the case is ___ ___________ __________ __ ________ ___ ___ ____ __

remanded to the district court for further proceedings. ________ __ ___ ________ _____ ___ _______ ___________






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