Rojas v. United States

USCA1 Opinion









April 8, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________


No. 95-1902

ABEL ROJAS,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
____________________

No. 95-1906


EDUARDO A. ROBINSON-MUNOZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
_____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________

_____________________

Abel Rojas on brief pro se. __________
Eduardo A. Robinson on brief pro se. ___________________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Edwin O. Vazquez, ______________ ___________________
Assistant United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior _______________________
Litigation Counsel, on brief for appellee.
____________________


____________________













Per Curiam. Eduardo Robinson-Munoz and Abel Rojas __________

appeal from the district court's summary denial of their

motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. We affirm. ______

I. Robinson ________

Robinson challenges his conviction after a jury

trial of aiding and abetting the possession, with intent to

distribute, of marijuana aboard a vessel, 46 U.S.C.App.

1903(a), (c)(1)(A) & 18 U.S.C. 2. Specifically, he argues

that the vessel ("the Delfin") was not subject to United

States jurisdiction because it was not "a vessel without

nationality." We rejected that argument on direct appeal.

In United States v. Robinson-Munoz, 961 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. ______________ ______________

1992), we held that the government's presentation of a

certification of the Secretary of State indicating that the

Colombian government had denied the Delfin captain's claim of

Colombian registry "prove[d] jurisdiction beyond a reasonable

doubt." Id. at 305. Robinson again challenged the United ___

States' jurisdiction over the Delfin in his first 2255

motion. The district court ruled that the issue had already

been decided on direct appeal and could not be relitigated

under 2255. Robinson-Munoz v. United States, 819 F. Supp. ______________ _____________

1136, 1142 (D. Puerto Rico 1993). In his second 2255

motion, Robinson relied upon new evidence to challenge the

United States' jurisdiction over the Delfin. Specifically,

Robinson relied upon a letter dated May 10, 1993 from the



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Secretary General of the Colombian Department of National

Defense ("the May 10, 1993 letter"). The letter stated, in

relevant part, as follows:

having reviewed the files of the General
Command of the Armed forces and of the
National Navy, no document whatsoever was
found, of authorization for the boarding
of the motor vessel "DELFIN" on the 13th
of October, 1990.

Robinson appeals from the district court's summary dismissal

of his second 2255 motion. On appeal, he seeks to

introduce yet more new evidence to show that the

certification of the Secretary of State was fraudulently

prepared (i.e., no denial of registry was ever given by the

Colombian government) and, therefore, that the Due Process

Clause requires that his conviction and sentence be vacated.

We affirm.

The district court did not err in dismissing the

motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. A " 2255

motion may be denied without a hearing as to those

allegations which, if accepted as true, entitle the movant to

no relief, or which need not be accepted as true because they

state conclusions instead of facts, contradict the record, or

are 'inherently incredible.'" Shraiar v. United States, 736 _______ ______________

F.2d 817, 818 (1st Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). In

addition, "when, as in this case, a petition for federal

habeas relief is presented to the judge who presided at the

petitioner's trial, the judge is at liberty to employ the


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knowledge gleaned during previous proceedings and make

findings based thereon without convening an additional

hearing." United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. _____________ ______

1993).

The relevant evidence before the district court

when it ruled upon the 2255 motions consisted of the May

10, 1993 letter. At most, that letter indicates that the

Colombian authorities never gave the Coast Guard officials

permission to board the Delfin. Even accepting the truth of

that statement, it does not entitle Robinson to relief. In

this case, jurisdiction was based upon the Colombian

government's denial of registry. The denial of registry was

proved by a certification by the Secretary of State. The May

10, 1993 letter does not even contradict, much less disprove,

the statements made in the certification.

The document that appellants sought to introduce as

"Supplemental Pleadings on Appeal" -- a letter dated February

8, 1996, in which the Colombian authorities denied the

existence of a General Rodriquez at the time that he

allegedly denied registry -- was never before the district

court. The argument that it constitutes newly discovered

evidence and establishes a violation of the Due Process

Clause entitling Robinson to 2255 relief cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal. "It is a bedrock rule that

when a party has not presented an argument to the district



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court, she may not unveil it in the court of appeals." United ______

States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992). ______ _____

(Appellants' reliance upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) is misplaced

because they do not seek to supplement a pleading but to

introduce new evidence in support of a 2255 motion on

appeal.) "[A]ppellate courts retain the power to dispense

with the raise-or-waive rule in order to avoid a gross

miscarriage of justice." Slade, 980 F.2d at 31. This is not _____

such a case, however. Robinson has failed to demonstrate

that the new evidence "is 'so compelling as virtually to

insure appellant's success.'" Id. at 31. ___

II. Rojas _____

Rojas pled guilty and has never contested the

validity of his guilty plea. We note initially that although

the issue is not free from doubt, "the better view may be

that a valid guilty plea, as 'an admission of all the

elements of a formal criminal charge,' admits even those

allegations which form the factual predicate for federal

jurisdiction." Valencia v. United States, 923 F.2d 917, 921 ________ _____________

(1st Cir. 1991). We need not resolve that issue here,

however, because even if we assume that Rojas did not waive

the jurisdictional challenge by pleading guilty, he has

failed to show that the district court erred in denying his

2255 motion.





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In his 2255 motion, Rojas makes the same claims

and relies upon the same new evidence as did Robinson in his

motion. The new evidence -- the May 10, 1993 letter --

submitted with Rojas' 2255 motion did not disprove, or even

contradict, denial of registry, however. Accordingly, the

district court did not err in summarily dismissing the

motion. Rojas, like Robinson, also seeks relief on the basis

of the February 8, 1996 letter. For the same reasons that

the late-submitted evidence did not entitle Robinson to

relief under 2255, it is of no avail to Rojas.

The district court's summary dismissals of the

motions are affirmed. ________





























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