United States v. Carrion-Cruz

USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 96-1026


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ERIC JOEL CARRION-CRUZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

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Before

Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges, ______________

and McAuliffe,* District Judge. ______________

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Benicio Sanchez-Rivera, Federal Public Defender, and Juan E. ______________________ _______
Alvarez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on brief for _______
appellant.

Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles- ______________ __________________
Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Miguel A. Pereira, ________ ___________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for the United States.

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August 7, 1996

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Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Eric Joel Carrion-Cruz Per Curiam. __________

pled guilty to violating the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C.

2119(3). At the disposition hearing, the district court departed

upward from the guideline sentencing range to impose a sentence

of life imprisonment.1 Carrion-Cruz assigns error to the upward

departure.

We have carefully examined the transcript of the

disposition hearing, the presentence investigation report, and

the briefs. Since we are persuaded that the assignment of error

lacks merit, we summarily affirm. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. We add ___

only four brief comments.

First: U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 allows sentencing courts to _____

depart from the guideline sentencing range in a given case if the

court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances that render

the case atypical and take it out of the "heartland" for which

the applicable guideline was designed. See United States v. ___ ______________

Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. ________ ______________

Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 946 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Diaz- ______ _____________ _____

Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 _________ _____ ______

U.S. 862 (1989). Here, the multiple killings for which the

defendant was responsible murdering four individuals (two of

whom were good samaritans who had stopped to offer assistance)

within an abbreviated time frame transport the defendant's

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1In effect, the court raised the defendant's offense level
by three levels (from 40 to 43). Even for a first-time offender,
Offense Level 43 commands a sentence of life imprisonment. See ___
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).

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activities well outside the mine-run of carjacking cases. See ___

U.S.S.G. 5K2.1 (encouraging courts to consider upward departure

from the otherwise applicable guideline sentencing range if the

relevant offense conduct results in multiple deaths).

Second: The defendant points to his youth and limited ______

intellect as mitigating factors. But his counsel made much the

same argument below, and the district judge specifically

commented upon these factors in passing sentence and took full

account of them. Given the sentencing court's special coign of

vantage, see Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49, we cannot brush ___ ______________

aside that court's considered judgment on so interstitial a

matter.

Third: The defendant's challenge to the reasonableness _____

of the upward departure is unavailing. Offense Level 40 permits

sentences of up to 365 months for first offenders. The magnitude

of the ensuing departure to a life sentence (Offense Level

43) is reasonable, considering the sordid facts of the case.

See, e.g., Quinones, 26 F.3d at 218 (explaining that "unusually ___ ____ ________

brutal, cruel, and degrading treatment" of victims "is emblematic

of the very sort of sociopathic behavior" that will sustain a

substantial upward departure). The departure here meets any

conceivable test of reasonableness. See, id. at 219-20 ___ ___

(upholding 60% increase as reasonable); Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d ______________

at 52 (upholding departure that more than doubled defendant's

sentence as reasonable).

Fourth: Relatedly, the Supreme Court's recent opinion ______


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in Koon v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996), ____ _____________

makes it clear that we must respect a district court's special

competence in sentencing matters, see id. at 4516-17, and uphold ___ ___

a departure sentence unless the court has abused its discretion,

see id. at 4517. In light of the stark facts of this brutal ___ ___

crime, a convincing case of discretion abused simply cannot be

mustered.

We need go no further.2 The Supreme Court has

instructed us that "it is not the role of an appellate court to

substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to

the appropriateness of a particular sentence." Williams v. ________

United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992) (citation and internal _____________

quotation marks omitted). In essence, the defendant invites us

to contravene that precept. On these facts, we have no reason to

take so precipitous a step.



Affirmed. ________














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2Because the upward departure is fully justified by the
incidence of multiple deaths, we need not address the sentencing
court's alternative justifications for the sentence.

4