IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-51250
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLARANCE CALLIES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-01-CR-4-ALL
December 3, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Clarance Callies was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute in excess of fifty grams of cocaine base.1 He
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence seized from a motel room without a warrant and evidence
seized from two residences pursuant to search warrants.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(iii) & 846 (2001).
He first argues that police violated his expectation of
privacy by crossing the threshold of the motel room without a
warrant. The evidence and testimony at the suppression hearing
showed that the room was not registered to Callies and that police
obtained the key from the registered guest. There was no evidence
that Callies was an additional guest in the room or that the room
contained any of his personal effects. In fact, Callies denied
that the room was his and disclaimed an interest in the only item
found there, a jacket that contained cocaine. We conclude that
because Callies has not established a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the room, he lacks standing to challenge the search.2
Callies next argues that the searches of the two residences
were improper because the warrants were based on nothing more than
“bare bones” affidavits. In reviewing the denial of a motion to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, we must
first determine whether the good faith exception to the
2
See United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 798 (5th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that “one merely ‘legitimately on the premises’
represents the typical individual who may not claim [Fourth
Amendment] protection” and concomitantly denying Fourth Amendment
protection to Vega, who “offered no evidence of his purpose for
being” at the location in question); United States v. Irizarry, 673
F.2d 554, 556 (1st Cir. 1982) (“In order to challenge on Fourth
Amendment grounds the use of evidence at one’s trial, one must
demonstrate ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched.’ The hotel room here was registered to appellant Guilbe.
Appellant Garcia, however, offered no evidence of any personal
interest in the room beyond his being ‘merely present.’ Indeed, he
affirmatively sought to deny any connection with the room or its
contents. It was therefore perfectly legitimate to introduce
evidence seized from the room against him at trial.”).
2
exclusionary rule applies, and, if not, whether probable cause
supported the warrant.3 The affidavits in question indicated that
a confidential informant (CI) personally observed Callies possess
and sell cocaine at specified addresses within the prior twenty-
four hours and that the police officer had verified the CI’s
description of the two houses and verified the fact that Callies
was the record holder of utilities at one of the addresses. The
affidavits further indicated that the CI was made aware of possible
criminal consequences for providing false information but the CI
maintained the accuracy of the information. Further, the
affidavits stated that the affiant believed the CI’s credibility
was enhanced because the CI knew she would not receive any
financial reward if the information was incorrect. Considering the
totality of circumstances, we conclude that the affidavits were not
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.4
Finally, Callies argues that the district court erred in
denying a motion for mistrial based on a government witness’s
unresponsive answer, which referenced Callies’s “jail record.” The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion,
because the remark was ambiguous in the context in which it was
made, not clearly indicating that Callies had a prior conviction.
3
United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999).
4
See United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320-22 (5th
Cir. 1992).
3
Furthermore, any prejudice caused by the remark was overwhelmed by
evidence of Callies’s guilt.5
AFFIRMED.
5
The confidential informant testified at trial that she used
Callies as her supplier to support her drug addiction and purchased
cocaine from him two or three times per day. She also testified
about renting the room at the motel and stated that other people
came into the room to purchase drugs from Callies, who kept the
drugs in his jacket.
4