Rehearing granted, August 31, 2011
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4327
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL CARL STEVENSON,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00057-BO-3)
Submitted: April 26, 2011 Decided: July 19, 2011
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Denise Walker, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Michael Carl Stevenson was
convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). On appeal, Stevenson claims
the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. We
affirm.
This court reviews de novo the denial of Stevenson’s
motion for judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Green,
599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 271
(2010). “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government,” United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 166 (4th
Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3442 (2010), the court is to determine whether the
conviction is supported by “substantial evidence,” where
“substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,”
United States v. Young, 609 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate question is
whether “any rational trier of facts could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bynum, 604 F.3d at
166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics
under 21 U.S.C. § 846 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of three elements: “(1) an agreement between two or more persons
to engage in conduct that violates a federal drug law, (2) the
defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendant’s
knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy.” United
States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 657 (2009). “Because a conspiracy is by nature
clandestine and covert, there rarely is direct evidence of such
an agreement . . . [C]onspiracy is usually proven by
circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d
220, 226 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Evidence supporting an agreement may consist of the
defendant’s relationship to the other conspirators and his
conduct and attitude during the course of the conspiracy. United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show
that Stevenson entered into a conspiracy with Beatty and
Patterson. Stevenson knew Beatty had a history of dealing drugs
and had allowed him to store drugs on his property. On the day
of the transaction, Stevenson provided Beatty with drug testing
kits, drove him and Patterson to the location of the drug deal,
kept his plans private from other individuals, discussed with
the other two men that they needed to be on the same page if
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anything went wrong and agreed to accept payment of $1000 for
driving. We conclude that this evidence of Stevenson’s conduct
and attitude shows that he was in agreement with the other men
to purchase narcotics for the purpose of distribution.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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