UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4754
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STANLEY CHESTER WEBER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (5:11-cr-00227-MBS-1)
Submitted: July 13, 2012 Decided: August 23, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Winston D. Holliday,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stanley Chester Weber pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of knowingly and willfully making a
threat to take the life of, to kidnap, and to inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 871 (2006), and was sentenced to twelve months and one
day in prison. On appeal, Weber’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that he reviewed the record and “concluded that the appeal
presents no legally non-frivolous questions.” Counsel
nonetheless set forth as two possible issues whether: (1) the
district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when it
accepted Weber’s guilty plea; and (2) the district court’s
sentence was reasonable. Weber did not file a pro se
supplemental brief, although informed of his right to do so.
The government elected not to file a response to the Anders
brief.
Because the government did not invoke the appeal
waiver, this court conducted an Anders review in accordance with
circuit precedent. 1 Following this review, we sought
1
United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir.
2007) (“If an Anders brief is filed, the government is free to
file a responsive brief raising the waiver issue (if applicable)
or do nothing, allowing this court to perform the required
Anders review.”).
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supplemental briefing from the parties on a sentencing issue
pursuant to Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
Weber filed a supplemental brief, arguing that his sentence
violated Tapia. The government responded, arguing that the
district court did not violate Tapia when it imposed Weber’s
sentence and that, even if it did, the doctrine of invited error
would apply. The government also moved to dismiss the appeal
based on the appeal waiver in Weber’s plea agreement. 2 Weber
responded to the government’s motion to dismiss, arguing that
whether the district court committed plain error in sentencing
is beyond the scope of the waiver because he could not have
foreseen the potential for sentencing error.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that
waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). An appeal waiver is
generally considered to be knowing and intelligent if the
district court specifically questioned the defendant concerning
the waiver provision during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record
2
We recognize that our precedent and local rules allow the
government to defer invoking an appeal waiver. See Poindexter,
492 F.3d at 270; 4th Cir. R. 27(f)(stating that "[m]otions to
dismiss based upon the ground that the appeal is not within the
jurisdiction of the Court or for other procedural grounds may be
filed at any time."). Here, however, the government's last-
minute invocation of the waiver has resulted in a substantial
expenditure of time and resources on an issue that the
government now urges we not resolve on the merits.
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indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of
the waiver and was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005).
Whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal
is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v.
Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). This court will
enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue being appealed is
within the scope of the waiver.” Id. (citing United States v.
Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731-33 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Weber’s plea agreement contained a broad waiver of his
right to challenge his conviction and sentence on appeal, except
for claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance
of counsel. On appeal, Weber does not challenge the
voluntariness of his waiver, nor does the record support such a
challenge. At the Rule 11 hearing, the government specifically
highlighted the appeal waiver in its summary of the plea
agreement, and the district court verified that Weber understood
the agreement’s terms and wished to plead guilty.
Accordingly, because Weber knowingly and voluntarily
entered into the waiver and the government now seeks to enforce
it, we dismiss Weber’s appeal as to the claims raised in the
Anders brief and supplemental brief, which are clearly within
the waiver’s scope.
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In accordance with the requirements of Anders, we have
examined the entire record and have found no unwaived and
meritorious issues. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment, in part.
This court requires that counsel inform Weber in
writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Weber requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Weber. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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