UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4766
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MONTERIO DEMIETRUS RILEY, a/k/a Monterio Demetral Riley,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cr-00440-WO-1)
Submitted: February 19, 2015 Decided: March 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew Charles
Cochran, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Monterio Demietrus Riley pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute crack
and powder cocaine (Counts 1 and 2) and possessing a firearm
after having been convicted of a felony (Count 3), in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
Based on a total offense level of 27, and a Criminal History
category of II, Riley’s advisory Guidelines range was 78 to 97
months’ imprisonment. However, because Riley had a prior felony
drug conviction, his Guidelines range was 120 months. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.2(b) (2012). The district
court imposed the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence on Count
1 and ordered the sentences on Counts 2 and 3 (86 months on each
count) to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 1. Riley
noted a timely appeal.
Riley’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the
district court plainly erred by imposing the mandatory minimum
sentence. Although advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, Riley has not done so.
We review Riley’s sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This review entails
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appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, this court considers whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory
Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for
an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at
49-51.
If the sentence is free of “significant procedural error,”
this court reviews it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.
Any sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines
range is presumptively substantively reasonable. United States
v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 421 (2014); United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289-90 (4th
Cir. 2012). Moreover, a statutory mandatory minimum sentence is
per se reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224
(4th Cir. 2008).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence
imposed by the district court was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The district court properly
calculated Riley’s sentencing range under the advisory
Guidelines, considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and
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imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range.
Because Riley received the mandatory minimum sentence, it is per
se reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Riley’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Riley, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Riley requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Riley. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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