MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 22 2015, 8:46 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Nick Gandin Michael A. Setlak
Fishers, Indiana Shilts Law Office
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nick Gandin, September 22, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1412-DR-569
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
Elina Lefand, The Honorable Charles F. Pratt,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
The Honorable Lori Morgan,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No. 02D07-
0407-DR-296
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Petitioner, Nick Gandin (Father), appeals the trial court’s denial of
his motion to correct error after the trial court issued its Order denying Father’s
petition for modification of custody and motion for injunctive relief, in favor of
Appellee-Respondent, Elina Lefand (Mother).
We affirm.
ISSUES
[2] Father raises four main issues and numerous sub-issues on appeal, all of which
we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion to correct error.
[3] Mother raises one issue, which re restate as: Whether Mother is entitled to
appellate attorney fees, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Father and Mother were married on March 23, 1999. Their son, B.G., was
born on December 25, 2002. On July 2, 2004, Father filed a petition for
dissolution of his marriage to Mother. On April 4, 2008, after contentious
proceedings, the trial court issued its dissolution decree, including extensive and
detailed findings of fact and conclusions thereon. The trial court granted
custody of B.G. to Mother, subject to Father’s extended parenting time. On
May 2, 2008, Father filed a motion to correct error, which was denied by the
trial court that same month. Father appealed the trial court’s denial of his
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motion to correct error. On April 13, 2010, this court issued its memorandum
opinion, affirming the trial court’s denial of Father’s motion. See N.G. v. A.L.,
No. 02A03-0907-CV-331 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010).
[5] On October 4, 2012, Father filed a petition to modify the decree of dissolution
of marriage as to custody. In his petition, Father alleged that Mother had
denied him his court-ordered parenting time; that Mother had failed to provide
for B.G.’s needs; that Mother does not have the time to properly care for B.G.;
that B.G. would benefit from spending more time with a male parent; that
Father made the best effort to care for B.G.’s needs; that even though Father
moved to Indianapolis, he still wants to spend as much time as possible with
B.G.; that the Indianapolis area provides better educational opportunities for
B.G., as well as a large and vibrant Jewish community. Thereafter, on October
4, 2012, Mother filed her motion to modify parenting time and child support.
On January 31, 2013, Father filed a motion for injunctive relief and on May 3,
2013, he filed a motion to add an issue of overpayment of child support.
[6] On October 7, 2013, the trial court entered its detailed and extensive Order,
denying Father’s petition for modification and motion for injunctive relief. The
trial court also denied Mother’s motion to modify parenting time and child
support; however, the trial court ordered Father to provide all of the
transportation for B.G. to and from his parenting time. The trial court agreed
that Father had overpaid his child support and reduced the amount to a
judgment in favor of Father.
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[7] On November 1, 2013, Father filed a motion to correct error, which Mother
responded to six days later. A series of hearings were held on March 10,
August 21, and October 30, 2014, respectively. On November 14, 2014, the
trial court denied Father’s motion to correct error.
[8] Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[9] A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to correct error and we
reverse its decision only for an abuse of that discretion. French v. French, 821
N.E.2d 891, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh’g denied. An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.
Id.
II. Modification of Custody
[10] Essentially, Father challenges the trial court’s denial of modification of custody
and lays out an extensive list of alleged factual errors in the trial court’s Order.
There is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and
deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Swadner v. Swadner, 897
N.E.2d 966, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622
N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). “[A]ppellate courts ‘are in a poor position to
look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who
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saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as
it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of
the evidence.’” D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 956-57 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Kirk
v. Kirk, 707 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). Our State’s courts have long
emphasized a concern that there be finality in matters concerning child custody.
Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind. 2008). “Modification of
custody is an area committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we
are constrained to neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of
witnesses.” Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 1186, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied.
[11] Father is acting pro se in the instant cause. While Father has every right to
represent himself in legal proceedings, a pro se litigant is nevertheless held to the
same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency
simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259,
266 (Ind. 2014). At the same time, this court has no desire to deter a litigant
from advancing any claim or defense which is arguably supported by existing
law, or any reasonably based suggestion for its extension, modification or
reversal. See id. To effectuate judicial economy, however, the legal system has
enacted rules for litigants to follow when presenting a case before a tribunal. As
such, our appellate rules provide guidance to appellate parties to have their
appeal determined on the merits and to enable the courts on appeal to
expeditiously and fairly review the cases before them without devoting
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inordinate amounts of judicial time to each one. See Gentry v. State, 586 N.E.2d
860, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
[12] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A) establishes the requirements for the Appellant’s
Brief. With respect to the argument section, section 8 of Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A) clearly requires each argument to be supported by citations to the
authorities, statutes, and the appendix or transcript, as well as cogent reasoning.
All of these requirements are absent in Father’s brief. Instead, we are presented
with a litany of perceived mistakes and Father’s tirade towards Mother and the
trial court’s judgment. While we are often tolerant of minor infractions of the
appellate rules, failure to substantially follow them puts an appeal in jeopardy
from the beginning. Id. As submitted, Father’s appellate brief is difficult to
follow, unsupported by case law and citations to the record, and most
importantly, lacks cogent reasoning. Accordingly, we find that Father has
waived appellate review of his cause. See AutoXchange.com v. Dreyer & Reinbold,
Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[13] Waiver notwithstanding, our review of what we are able to discern of Father’s
arguments leads us to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when denying Father’s motion to correct error. Father’s motion to
correct error and appellate brief are essentially a list of alleged factual errors in
the trial court’s Order denying his request for modification of child custody.
The trial court issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
reaching its decision. These findings are supported by evidence in the record, to
which the trial court extensively refers. To the extent that Father argues that
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the evidence should be construed differently, his arguments amount to a request
that we reweigh the facts and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we
will not do. Pawlik v. Pawlik, 823 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied.
[14] Instead, this appears to be a situation where both parents clearly love B.G. and
have his best intentions at heart, but have lost all ability to communicate as
parents and to work together to seek B.G.’s best interest. We echo the trial
court’s sentiments when we state that “[t]he parents appear to have become so
caught up in controlling the other parent and ‘winning the battle’ over the
various disagreements that they do not realize that their inability to interact
appropriately and to communicate like rational adults who put their child’s
interests ahead of their own will very likely have a significant and negative
impact on their child in the future.” (Appellant’s App. p. 54). We discern no
reason to reverse the trial court’s denial of Father’s motion to correct error.
III. Mother’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees
[15] Contending that Father carelessly and frivolously filed this appeal in an “effort
to achieve a second bite at the apple,” Mother requests that we remand this
cause to the trial court for determination of reasonable appellate attorney fees
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E). (Appellee’s Br. p. 13).
[16] Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he [c]ourt may
assess damages if an appeal . . . is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in
the [c]ourt’s discretion and may include attorneys’ fees.” Our discretion to
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award attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited, however, to
instances where an appeal is permeated with meritless arguments, bad faith,
frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay. Thacker v. Wentzel,
797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). While Indiana Appellate rule 66(E)
provides this court with the possibility to award appellate attorney fees, we
must use extreme restraint when exercising this power because of the potential
chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal. Id. A strong showing is
required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not
imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious. Helmuth
v. Distance Learning Systems Ind., Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1085, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005).
[17] Indiana appellate courts have categorized claims for appellate attorney fees into
“substantive” and “procedural” bad faith claims. Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 346-
47. Procedural bad faith occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and
content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates
relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner
calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing
party and the reviewing court. Id. at 347. Substantive bad faith, on the other
hand, occurs where the appellant’s contentions and arguments are utterly
devoid of all plausibility. Id. Substantive bad faith “implies the conscious
doing of wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.” Wallace v.
Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
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[18] Rather than a dishonest purpose, we believe that Father is driven by his
perception of what is best for his minor son. Even though Father has
steadfastly ignored unfavorable determinations and rulings by the trial court, we
do not perceive his intent was to harass or unnecessarily prolong these
proceedings. And while Father’s appellate brief did not comply with the
procedural rules, these omissions did not rise to the level of tainting his appeal
as vexatious. As such, the record does not support a finding that Father’s
appeal, although ultimately unsuccessful, was permeated with bad faith or
frivolity. Accordingly, an award of appellate attorney fees is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
[19] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Father’s motion to correct error. Additionally, we deny
Mother’s request for appellate attorney fees pursuant to Ind. Appellate R. 66(E).
[20] Affirmed.
[21] Friedlander, Sr. J. concurs
[22] Brown, J. concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nick Gandin, [Add Hand-down date]
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1412-DR-569
v.
Elina Lefand,
Appellee-Respondent.
Brown, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[23] I concur with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Father’s motion to correct error. However, I respectfully dissent from
the denial of Mother’s request for appellate attorney’s fees.
[24] The majority concludes that an award of appellate attorney’s fees is not
warranted based on the belief that Father’s motivation is his son’s best interests,
that his intent was not to harass Mother or prolong these proceedings, and that
while “his brief did not comply with the procedural rules” his appeal cannot be
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characterized “as vexatious.” Slip op. at 8-9. To the extent that the majority
concludes that the form and content of Father’s appellate briefs do not warrant
an award of fees, I disagree.
[25] As noted in the opinion, procedural bad faith occurs when a party flagrantly
disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate
procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, or files
briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of
time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court. Thacker v. Wentzel,
797 N.E.2d 342, 346-347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Even if the appellant’s conduct
falls short of that which is “deliberate or by design,” procedural bad faith can
still be found. Id. at 347. As noted by this court in Thacker, “[e]ven pro se
litigants are liable for attorney’s fees when they disregard the rules of procedure
in bad faith.” Id.
[26] While Father may not have deliberately produced a brief in violation of the
Appellate Rules, I would find that he has committed procedural bad faith. His
table of contents indicates no citation to any case law, but his statement of
issues includes a number of citations. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(4) governs the
statement of issues and provides that “[t]his statement shall concisely and
particularly describe each issue presented for review.” Father’s statement of
issues is found on four pages of his brief, and contains four issues, with the last
issue containing subparts (a) through (k). However, the argument section does
not reflect this arrangement, making it difficult to follow.
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[27] His statement of the case does not include any citations to the record or
appendix as required by Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), which provides that in
the statement of the case “[p]age references to the Record on Appeal or
Appendix are required in accordance with Rule 22(C).” His statement of facts
covers seven pages and contains only one citation to the record, and I cannot
say that it met the requirement of Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) that “[t]he facts
shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in
accordance with Rule 22(C).” With respect to the argument section of his brief,
contrary to Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8), 1 Father fails to provide cogent
argument with respect to many of the issues he raises, does not include a
standard of review in his argument section, and consistently neglects to support
his arguments with citations to relevant authority, statutes, and the appendix or
record. Additionally, his brief is written in such a way so as to require the
maximum amount of time and effort in order to piece together his contentions
and arguments on appeal. Accordingly, I would award appellate attorney’s fees
to Mother.
1
Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) provides in part:
(a) The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent
reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or
parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.
(b) The argument must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review; this
statement may appear in the discussion of each issue or under a separate heading placed before the discussion
of the issues. In addition, the argument must include a brief statement of the procedural and substantive facts
necessary for consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including a statement of how the issues relevant
to the appeal were raised and resolved by any Administrative Agency or trial court.
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[28] For these reasons I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
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